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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Background and Rationale 
The backbone of any democracy is most certainly the freedom of expression and freedom of 
press. Only when independent media can operate freely within a country, spread accurate 
political information, provide citizens with a pluralistic account of events and monitor the 
performance of government, a political system can be defined as democratic. In the traditional 
sense, media are responsible for providing the ordinary citizen with information about the 
outcomes of political decisions by their political representatives. Thereby they allow citizens 
to make informed decisions and thus increase their “political awareness, responsibility and trust 
in representative democracy” (Ceron, Memoli, 2015:227). Thus, the media are a powerful tool 
that can shape political attitudes and values by “influencing public perception about the nature 
and importance of issues and problems” (Heywood, 2013:179). The more information is 
available, the better voters can monitor politicians. Therefore, much like opposition parties, the 
media function as a political ‘watch-dog’ that protects against abuses of power, facilitates 
political accountability, and uncovers corruption (Camaj, 2013).  
Although some argue that the negativity of the media, and the coverage of politics as “horse-
race” can lead to lower levels of trust and cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Robinson, 
1976; Heywood, 2013:185), it is generally agreed upon that the media is only beneficial for 
democracy. Norris (2000) talks about the “virtuous circle” of trust in democratic institutions 
that is facilitated through media coverage. The more an individual is exposed to political 
information, the more he or she will be interested in politics, have an increased knowledge 
about politics, and will become more likely to participate (Dalton, 1996; Norris, 2000). In short, 
the media – while acknowledging that some pursue a biased agenda that may lead to fabricated 
information – is a beneficial tool for democracy by increasing internal and external levels of 
efficacy.  
What about online media? Manuel Castells, a Spanish sociologist whose research and academic 
contributions focus on the formation and rise of the information society, introduced his ideas 
concerning networks and information in the late 1990s. Preceding his work on the knowledge 
society – elicited by the change in social structures such as the economy and labour processes 
– Castells claims that we have now entered the age of the network society. Living in what he
calls the "information age", of which the primary characteristic is the "spread of networks 
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linking people, institutions and countries", he believes that social structures are bound to 
change (Webster, 2014:101). Castells asserts that the consequences of such a society are two-
fold; on the one hand, divisions will be heightened while on the other, integration in global 
affairs will increase. He traces the roots of the network society back to the information age in 
the 1970s, a time marked by the end of the post-war settlement and the “capitalist crisis”. 
During this time, the growth of information and communication technologies (ICTs) laid a new 
foundation for commercial activity. In short, a time he calls the “information revolution” 
(Webster, 2014:102-103). 
His focus does not lie so much with the content of ICTs, but rather its consequences for society. 
Castells argues that the very nature of access to these technologies determines whether one will 
be able to play a full part in the network society. Furthermore, he believes that Internet networks 
will finally replace mass communication networks such as the television, because it 
“individuates and allows interaction”, an important characteristic that combines the internet 
and politics. Most importantly, however, Castells contends that the Internet with its 
“technologically and culturally embedded properties of interactivity and individualisation” will 
lead to the formation of a virtual community and finally lead to an “interactive society” 
(Webster, 2014:106).  
With the rise of the Internet and its users, scholars have begun to show an interest in the 
relationship between the web and democracy. Opinions about such a relationship are 
inconsistent. While some argue that it strengthens citizen demand for democracy (Norris, 2011; 
Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014), commitment to democratic governance (Swigger, 2013) and 
satisfaction with democracy (Bailard, 2012), others highlight the null to negative relationship 
between the web and democratic regimes, participation, and political awareness (Quintelier & 
Vissers, 2008; Falk, Gold, Heblich, 2012).  
As controversial these findings might be, Boullianne (2009) sheds some light on these 
inconsistencies. In a meta-analysis of 38 studies on the Internet and its effects on democracy, 
she concludes that findings show overall beneficial effects for democracy. It should be noted 
that these effects only hold when the web is “expressly used to gather news and retrieve 
information” (Boullianne, 2009:201). In other words, when it functions in the sense of 
traditional media. This seems only logical if we consider that the web can be accessed for 
several purposes that are non-political. There is no reason to expect that Internet usage as such 
will have any effect – positive or negative – on democracy. What seems to be the common 
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denominator between traditional media and the Internet, is political information. Therefore, the 
level of measurement, i.e. using the Internet to acquire political news or information, is 
important when trying to determine relationships. 
The initial optimism regarding the sheer number of available sources online has quickly been 
rejected by scholars, who argue that people are more likely to expose themselves to “politically-
like minded sources” (Mutz & Young, 2011: 1025). Thereby, their likelihood of being exposed 
to different viewpoints that could make citizens more critical and/or tolerant decreases and 
instead, they find themselves in reinforcing environments that foster identity politics.  
However, this selective exposure is not just due to individual choices, but also a result of 
algorithms that sort and filter information for us, based on our preferences. This is done to 
avoid information overload and to improve users’ experiences online by aggregating 
information that is not relevant to them. Thus, algorithms such as the ones used on social media, 
decide what we see on these websites which further contributes to the existence of online echo 
chambers. Yet, around 60% of social media users are unaware of the filtering out of information 
(Fardigh, 2010), which further reinforces their belief of not missing any relevant news. In fact, 
each social media users’ experience is quite distinct from any other user (Praiser, 2011).  
While some authors believe that people tend to expose themselves to echo chambers online 
(Conover, Ratkiewicz, Francisco, Goncalves, Menczer & Flammini, 2011; Tarbush and 
Teytelboym, 2012), others contend that social media are the perfect platforms to facilitate 
“cross-cutting exposure” to different viewpoints (Bakshy, Messing & Adamic, 2015). These 
mixed findings may suggest that the decision to expose oneself to opposing views depends 
solely on the individual and their intention to retrieve meaningful, diverse information.  
This begs the question as to why the Internet should be any different in shaping citizens’ 
political attitudes and behaviour than traditional media? Bailard (2012:157) provides a simple 
answer to this question by arguing that “the potential political influence of the Internet hinges 
on its capacity to make communication, information retrieval, and information dispersion more 
efficient”. This argument is further strengthened if we consider the “high speed, low cost and 
broad scope” of information that is available online (Ceron & Memoli, 2015:229) as well as 
the variety of alternating viewpoints that traditional media do not necessarily broadcast. 
Therefore, the sheer amount of data on the Internet and its pluralistic nature allow users to 
diversify their sources and through this, shape their opinions in a way that traditional news 
might not be able to.  
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The the impact of the Internet on politics has mostly been studied in more advanced economies 
where access is almost universal. However, online behaviour and its relation to politics has 
been largely unexplored in the South African context. Research has been limited to qualitative 
analyses of hashtag movements in protest action (see Bosch, 2013; Luescher, 2017; Bosch and 
Mutsvairo, 2017; Bosch, Wasserman and Chuma, 2018; Gwaze, Hsu, Bosch, Luckett, 2018). 
Therefore, measurable relationships between Internet penetration and citizen attitudes and 
behaviour can only be speculated. Amidst rising levels of access by South African households, 
shifts in their political attitudes and behaviour have been observed by scholars such as Schulz-
Herzenberg (2014), Steenekamp (2017), Gouws, and Schulz-Herzenberg (2017), de Jager and 
Steenekamp (2019), Mattes (2008; 2012), Seekings (2014) and others. Even though these 
scholars attribute those shifts to poor government performance, it could also be that the Internet 
and social media have had an impact thus far.   
1.2 Problem statement 
In South Africa, there is increasing evidence to suggest that the Internet and social media may 
have far-reaching influences on politics and society. Although research on the topic has been 
done mainly through qualitative approaches, we can draw some conclusions. Particularly social 
media such as Facebook and Twitter have aided in the mobilisation of cause-oriented 
participation among South Africans as Bosch (2012; 2013) and colleagues have shown.  
Research by the Pew Research Center indicates that in the world’s largest economies, the 
Millennial generation’s (term used to usually describe those individuals reaching adulthood in 
the early 21st century) access to the Internet is nearing almost 100%. By comparison, fewer 
than six in ten South African Millennials indicated that they have access to the Internet 
(Poushter, 2016: 10). However, at the time of publication, strong evidence for a digital divide 
could be found, where younger people had higher access to the Internet. Of all respondents 
aged 18-24, 52% indicated that they had access to the web compared to a third of 35+-year-
olds. Almost two thirds of respondents with higher levels of education versus a mere quarter 
of respondents with less education reported having access to the Internet and there were large 
differences between lower income (22%) and higher income (57%) participants (Poushter, 
2016: 11). In South Africa, a difference in terms of access based on age, education, and income 
is therefore apparent. Malowa (2009) claims that many townships, inhabited by mostly black 
South Africans, are affected the most by the digital divide.  
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Despite these relatively low country-levels of Internet usage, the Pew Research Center found 
that 73% of those respondents who use the Internet are using social networking sites (Facebook, 
Twitter, WhatsApp, YouTube, LinkedIn, Pinterest, etc.), which constitutes 27% of the entire 
population (Poushter, 2016: 21). According to BusinessTech (2017)1, 30% of South Africa’s 
entire population is signed up on Facebook and 6.5% have a Twitter account. This may account 
for the fast spread of the 2015 and 2016 student protests in South Africa, which will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
Tanja Bosch, a leading researcher in media studies, has published various articles that show 
the use of social media in protest mobilisation in South Africa. According to her research, many 
citizens are experiencing a “major shift in communication and lifestyle patterns thanks to the 
rapidly increasing use of social media” (Bosch and Mutsvairo, 2017: 73). Particularly the use 
of “hashtag politics” has gained strong momentum in the pursuit of mobilising the masses 
(Bosch and Mutsvairo, 2017: 76).  
In March 2015, students from the University of Cape Town called for the “decolonisation” of 
the university which included inter alia the removal of the statue of British imperialist, Cecil 
John Rhodes. Under the hashtag movement #RhodesMustFall, a group of students organised 
themselves on social media. In October later that year, students of the University of the 
Witwatersrand in Johannesburg responded to a government announcement about an increase 
in tuition fees with the #FeesMustFall movement which spread throughout South African 
universities. (Mudavanhu, 2017). These protests sparked off later movements such as 
#OpenStellenbosch at Stellenbosch Universities which demanded the removal of Afrikaans as 
a tuition language.  
Luescher (2017: 231) argues that through these movements “activism in South Africa has taken 
on characteristics of [internet-aged] network social movements”. The use of Internet-based 
communication, particularly social media such as WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and 
the like “signals the advent of a new way of mobilising and organising political power” 
(Luescher, 2017: 231). The growing access to the Internet and social media (mostly via mobile 
phones) in South Africa has been utilised by many activists who seek to facilitate change (see 
Bosch, 2013; Bosch and Mutsvairo, 2017; Bosch, Wasserman and Chuma, 2018; Gwaze, Hsu, 
Bosch, Luckett, 2018).  
                                                     
1 https://businesstech.co.za/news/internet/199318/how-many-people-use-facebook-twitter-and-instagram-in-
south-africa/ 
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Alongside increased Internet access in South Africa, there is an observable transformation in 
the political attitudes, and behaviour of South Africans. This is portrayed through studies that 
show that support for democracy is in decline while support for authoritarian rule increased 
since 1994, accompanied by declining levels of confidence in the government and lowering 
levels of support for political process (Steenekamp, 2017). Additionally, there appears to be a 
decline in institutional trust, perceived low levels government performance (Gouws, Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2017; de Jager & Steenekamp, 2019), and declining levels of turnout (Schulz-
Herzenberg, 2014). While these changes are likely to be due to poor government performance, 
it is possible that they may be facilitated through increasing online access. We might see 
similarities between global trends that suggest that Internet penetration has an influence on 
political attitudes and behaviour, and the South African context.  
Using the last four waves of the World Values Survey (1995, 2001, 2006, 2013), Steenekamp 
(2017) looks at the political culture in the country by analysing levels of support for democratic 
rule and support for authoritarian rule since 1995. Although support for democratic rule 
remained consistently high between 1995 and 2006 since the country’s democratic transition, 
it dropped significantly in 2013. This decrease in support for democracy was accompanied by 
an increase in support for authoritarian rule. Steenekamp (2017:67) concludes that there 
“appears to have been a value shift” in the country where the “gap between support for 
democratic rule and authoritarian rule has narrowed”.  
Similarly, de Jager and Steenekamp (2019:159) use the last four waves of the WVS to 
determine the “relationship between quality of governance, legitimacy and support for 
democratic regimes”. Of 15 performance indicators, 11 declined by more than 10%. The results 
show that South Africans place a high value on the instrumental aspects of democracy as 
reflected in their dissatisfaction with government’s inability to deliver predominantly economic 
goods, which in turn leads to declining support for the incumbent government. As such, South 
Africans still hold strong materialist value priorities (de Jager, Steenekamp, 2019:161).  
Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg (2017) show that trust in authorities in South Africa is on a 
decline as seen by a decline in both specific and diffuse support for democracy. As a result, 
there has been an increase in scepticism between the years of 2006 and 2014. The implications 
thereof give rise to concern as diffuse support is a critical component in the process of 
reconciliation in newly established democracies. A decline in diffuse support would eventually 
lead to a decline in support for the political community which may have negative effects on 
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democracy and the process of nation building. Gouws and Schulz-Herzenberg (2017:224) fear 
that the erosion of diffuse support will lead to government resorting to “more authoritarian 
action or attempts to conceal poor government decision making”, which will eventually erode 
legitimacy, a concept crucial for any successful democracy. 
As such, we find that there is a simultaneous decline in perceptions of government 
performance, institutional confidence, and levels of trust that translates into low levels of 
diffuse support (Gouws, Schulz-Herzenberg, 2016, 2017), which tends to “render citizens more 
likely to reject the existing political system and support parties of the extreme Right or Left” 
(Garcia-Rivero, Kotzé, du Toit, 2002:172). This shows that there exists a legitimacy gap in 
South Africa, which makes “the country vulnerable to radicalism” (de Jager, Steenekamp, 
2019:165).  
Electoral participation levels have also declined in South Africa. Schulz-Herzenberg (2014) 
finds that the number of registered voters and actual vote casts has declined since 1994 in 
comparison to a growing eligible voting age population. The decline in turnout and registration 
levels are particularly strong among younger South Africans and reflect similar global trends 
in relation to declines in political participation among young people (Henn & Weinstein, 2006; 
Mattes, 2012; Seekings, 2014; Wattenberg, 2015; Mattes & Richmond, 2015). 
Most scholars attribute these changes in political attitudes and behaviour as reflected in 
declining levels of trust, support, performance evaluation, and turnout levels to government’s 
inability to deliver economic goods, rising levels of corruption and mismanagement. While this 
cannot be disputed, another aspect that may affect these changes, which is the influence of the 
Internet and information and communication technologies (ICTs), remains largely unexplored 
in the South African context. The evidence presented by the global literature that supports the 
notion that the Internet affects political outcomes, speaks for an evaluation of the role of the 
Internet in South African politics.  
1.3 Literature review 
1.3.1 Effects of Internet use on political attitudes 
The global literature suggests that increasing use of ICTs has resulted in increasing influences 
on political attitudes and behaviour. These studies predominantly focus on advanced 
economies and to date, there is little to no academic research that focuses on the influence of 
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the Internet on attitudes and behaviour in South Africa. Below, some primary findings are 
discussed. These lay the foundation upon which research questions and hypotheses are formed. 
Norris (2001) argues that cyberspace is dominated by people holding postmaterialist value 
preferences, where users are more concerned with self-actualisation and issues concerning 
quality of life, self-expression, individual freedom, cosmopolitanism, and participatory 
democracy. Thereby, postmaterialist values are more likely to spread faster among Internet 
users than non-users. In relation to previously expressed arguments that the Internet may 
facilitate new forms of social capital (Martin, 2008:5) through interactivity and exchange, the 
content creator and the content consumer “merge” in the absence of hierarchies (Yildiz, 2002). 
It becomes clear that emancipative values indeed seem to be popular online.  
Johnson and Kaye (2003:27) suggest that the use of the Internet serves as a “strong predictor 
of positive political attitudes”. Through the exposure to political information online, citizen 
interest and in politics is heightened and as a result they develop attitudes that are conducive 
to strengthening political efficacy and citizens’ willingness to engage in politics. Especially 
satirical news may heighten citizen interest in politics as they “may intersect with, or even 
affect” viewers’ perceptions of politicians as well as their attitudes and beliefs about political 
systems. The combination of comedy and serious political topics seems to appeal to many 
viewers and as a result may lead to increased political knowledge, efficacy as well as increased 
criticism toward politicians.  
Stoycheff and Nisbet (2014) believe that increased Internet exposure may lead to citizens 
becoming more critical and aware of politicians in their respective country. Through the 
process of “window-opening” and “mirror-holding”, people are exposed to different regime 
types and can compare these to their own. As a result, they begin to see democracy as a 
favourable political system and thus demand more democracy in their own country, while also 
perceiving a lower supply. Therefore, Nisbet and Stoycheff (2014) believe that Internet access 
leads to the rejection of authoritarian rule.  
1.3.2 Effects of Internet use on political behaviour 
In light of a decline in overall political participation, especially among younger generations in 
western democracies, some arguments have been made that the web itself might be responsible. 
Bakker and de Vreese (2011:453) disagree and believe that many of such assumptions are 
“biased by a disproportional focus on institutional and limited measures of participatory 
behaviour”. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) have shown that participation has a number 
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of dimensions and that different kinds of participation depend on time and resources available 
to citizens. The Internet, however, lowers opportunity costs of participation to a variety of 
users, most importantly the youth. Bakker and de Vreese (2011:465) also find that various 
types of Internet use are “positively linked to measures of political participation”.  
Below, four theses will be briefly discussed that seek to explain the effects of Internet usage 
on political participation. The most positive view is held by “cyber-optimists”, who emphasise 
the possibilities of online activities for the “involvement of ordinary citizens in (…) 
democracy” (Norris, Curtice 2006:2). This view often also called the “mobilisation thesis” 
suggests that online activities may serve as a substitute mechanism for the facilitation of 
alternative channels of civic engagement. This could be achieved through political chat-rooms, 
remote electronic voting in elections, referenda, and the mobilisation of virtual communities 
which could have the potential to “revitalise levels of mass participation” (Norris, Curtice, 
2006:2).  
Norris and Curtice (2006:12), using the British Social Attitudes Survey of 2003, find that 
people who spend more time online are also more likely to vote and to engage in offline forms 
of political participation. Additionally, they find evidence for the existence of a “digital divide” 
among Internet users where younger people are more active, and that usage is “skewed toward 
the well-educated and more affluent social sectors”.  
Other theories proposed by “cyber-pessimists” challenge this view by arguing that the Internet 
will eventually “reinforce existing inequalities of power and wealth, generating deeper 
divisions between the information rich and poor” (Norris, Curtice, 2006:3). This 
“reinforcement thesis” maintains that the Internet may further contribute to a participation gap 
between “engaged and disengaged citizens” (Hoffman, Lutz, Müller, 2017:1).  At worst, the 
Internet could create a “digital divide” by increasing the power of the elites while 
disenfranchising the poor who have little access to it (Johnson & Kaye, 2003:10). 
The “normalisation thesis”, also representing a rather pessimistic view, proposes that the 
appearance of the knowledge society has had little impact on changing the participation gap 
between engaged and disengaged citizens. It further states that technology has done little in 
changing the political status quo, and that radical change is unlikely to happen as the Internet 
will eventually reflect a “politics as usual” scenario, where participation will be skewed 
towards more educated and wealthier users (Norris, Curtice, 2006; Hoffman, 2017).  
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Finally, the “displacement hypothesis” suggests that “time spent online could actually displace 
time formerly devoted to social and political purposes” (Hoffman, 2017:1). This view holds 
that the more an individual spends time on the Internet or operating technological devices, the 
less likely he or she is to devote remaining leisure time to pursue civic activities. As a result, 
Internet use would contribute to the weakening, instead of the strengthening of citizen’s civic 
and political engagement.  
Of all theses, the mobilisation thesis stands out in the literature and has gained the most support 
of all four theses. Although opinions differ largely in terms of measurement and what merits 
the label “online political participation”, it becomes clear that despite a lack of consensus, the 
Internet does exert a considerable influence on its users.  
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
1.4.1 Research Question 1 
RQ1: Which demographic groups predominantly use the Internet and social media to source 
political news?  
The reinforcement hypothesis suggests that certain groups of people, especially younger, more 
educated individuals dominate the web and are therefore more likely to be exposed to different 
ideas and beliefs. This in turn, could have implications for members of different groups of 
society. In short, it is important to determine who Internet users are and how Internet use may 
affect their attitudes, values, and behaviour.  
Previous research about the Internet has revealed a gap where users of a higher socioeconomic 
background, and higher levels of education are most active, commonly referred to as the 
reinforcement thesis. Furthermore, younger generations appear to be more present on social 
media platforms and the Internet in general, due to their early introduction to technology and 
their ability to adapt and utilise it (Steinberg, 2015).  
Thus, in relation to RQ1, the following hypothesis arises:  
Hypothesis 1: regular Internet users tend to be younger, and more educated.  
 
Yet, these findings were made in advanced economies, where smaller income and equality gaps 
exist. However, South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies in the world with a 
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Gini coefficient of 0.65 measured in 2015, with the black population predominantly suffering 
from poverty and low standards of living (StatsSA, 20162). While recent years have seen an 
impressive growth of South Africa’s black middle class, which has increased from 1.6 to 6 
million within the last five years and is now larger than the white middle class (Korhonen, 
20183), it can nevertheless be expected that access is determined by race as Bosch (2018) 
argues.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a difference in terms of access to Internet and social media based on 
race.  
 
According to research released by Statista (20174), men (51%) in South Africa have a slightly 
higher access to ICTs than women (49%) with a mere 2% difference in access and/or usage. 
This, combined with decreasing costs as well as increasing ease of accessing the Internet, leads 
to the second hypothesis of this study: 
Hypothesis 3: Gender does not determine access to or frequency of Internet and social 
usage.  
 
Studies have shown that certain segments of the population have uneven access to the Internet, 
with rural areas being less likely to have an Internet connectivity, neither through a land line 
nor through a cellular phone (Sylvester, McGlynn, 2010). This is due to the fact that broadband 
providers are not as quick to enter rural markets, because of lower profitability as a result of 
limited customers, as well as the difficulty of building technological infrastructure on uneven 
terrain. Therefore, the third hypothesis in line with RQ1 states:  
Hypothesis 4: Internet and social media users are more likely to live in urban, rather than rural 
areas.  
 
                                                     
2 http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=9922 
3 https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-measuring-south-africas-black-middle-class/ 
4 https://www.statista.com/statistics/462958/internet-users-south-africa/ 
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1.4.2 Research Question 2 
RQ2: Is there a measurable difference between Internet and social media users versus non-
users in terms of their political attitudes and behaviour?  
The literature review in this study outlines the comparative, global research on the observable 
shifts in political attitudes and values and a marked difference in the political behaviour of 
Internet users and non-users. Building on the premise of such differences, the second research 
question looks at where attitudes and behaviour differ in terms of age and race of respondent. 
Are Internet users more interested in politics and more critical of government and officials? Do 
they exert more emancipative values than those individuals who use the Internet less 
frequently? Are they more politically engaged and more likely to participate? How do they 
affect different parts of society?  
A number of scholars (de Vreese, 2007; Moeller, et al. 2014; Velasquez & La Rose, 2015) 
believe that the Internet plays an increasingly important role in informing citizens in terms of 
politics and “cultivating a sense of political efficacy”. People who spend more time browsing 
the web are more likely to be exposed to political information, whether they intentionally 
search for it or not, than people who spend less time online. This results in a heightened sense 
of political interest and efficacy, reflected in more political discussions with family and peers. 
In relation to RQ2, the following hypotheses stand;  
Hypothesis 5: frequent Internet and social media users are more likely to discuss and be 
interested in politics than non-users.     
 
The content that is shared on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube, 
varies significantly. Users may choose to post/tweet their own opinions in the form of visual 
or written content and can share articles containing news, lifestyle, politics, or recreation. 
Additionally, users can disclose their personal information on such websites, for example, their 
religious orientations, political affiliations, hobbies, or even telephone numbers, emails and 
residence. Swigger (2012:590) argues that the rise of Web 2.0 and specifically social 
networking sites have a significant impact on the values that individuals hold. He argues that 
individuals, who are actively sharing information have begun to "value the right of free 
expression more and the right of privacy less". His research provides evidence that the Internet, 
while becoming a fundamental aspect of most people's everyday lives, has begun to shape and 
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change the way people perceive a number of things, including values and beliefs. Accordingly, 
the following hypothesis arises: 
Hypothesis 6: regular Internet users are more likely to express a preference for 
emancipative values (less deference to authority posed by government) than non-users.   
 
Nisbet and Stoycheff (2014) conducted a study examining the relationship between Internet 
access and perceived supply and demand for democracy. Results confirmed that the more 
access individuals had to the Internet, the more likely they were to perceive a low supply of 
democracy in their country and consequently display higher demands. Through the process of 
“window-opening”, Internet users are exposed to the way governments function in other 
countries, and as a result, form ideas about roles and responsibilities of citizens and state and 
then compare these to conditions in their own countries through the process of “mirror-holding” 
(Bailard, 2012a, 2012b). Through these processes, individuals become more likely to prefer 
democracy over any other kind of government. Consequently, the following hypotheses are 
formed: 
Hypothesis 7: Internet and social media users are more likely to be critical and distrustful 
of government and political actors than non-users. 
Hypothesis 8: Internet users are more likely to express a preference for democracy over any 
other form of government.  
 
The significance of Web 2.0 platforms is that users have the opportunity to participate in the 
flow and exchange of information, instead of a mere passive absorption of information. The 
interactive nature of such discussions does not only allow for almost immediate feedback, but 
participation in such discussions is unrestrained by time, and users’ geographical location. 
Furthermore, they represent an opportunity to obtain information at a much lower cost in terms 
of time and resources than conventional sources of information. Therefore, Web 2.0 may have 
significant impacts on the mobilisation of civil society. In the South African context, this could 
be observed especially among tertiary education students who instigated movements such as 
‘Fees Must Fall’, ‘Rhodes Must Fall’, or ‘Open Stellenbosch’, the mobilisation of which 
primarily took place on social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. Thus, the 
following research question arises: 
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Hypothesis 9: the more time someone spends online, more likely they are to be engaged in 
offline political participation5, thus providing evidence for the mobilisation thesis.  
1.5 Methodology and Operationalisation 
This research study follows a mixed methods approach. Debates exist between supporters of 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches, and each has its own strengths and limitations. 
The main advantage of a mixed methods approach is the fact that inferences can be made based 
on quantitative outcomes and can further be studied in detail through qualitative research. 
While both approaches differ significantly, they can at times complement each other and yield 
benefits to the outcome of research. Ragin (1994a:92) explains that “most quantitative data 
techniques (…) condense data in order to see the bigger picture. Qualitative methods, by 
contrast, are best understood as data enhancers. When data are enhanced, it is possible to see 
key aspects more clearly”.  
Nie and Erbring (2000) suggest that time individuals spend online is less important than what 
they are doing online, i.e. which websites they visit and how they engage with those websites. 
The quantitative research of this study will only provide information on whether people who 
do use the Internet for political news, are in some way influenced by it. However, this approach 
does not explain in what way they engage with the news they read online and whether they 
receive them from reputable sources. This gap is aimed to be filled by the qualitative aspect of 
this research in that it seeks to determine how students engage with content online, which may 
in turn have a potential impact on their political values, attitudes and behaviour.  
1.5.1 Part I: Quantitative analysis 
Using quantitative data analysis, inferences will be made about possible associations and 
relationships between Internet use and political attitudes, values, and participation. The data 
will be derived from the Afrobarometer Round 6 Questionnaire of 2015. Therefore, a cross-
sectional, rather than a longitudinal approach will be taken in terms of the quantitative research.  
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in this study are numerous political attitudes, values, and participation. 
Using the Afrobarometer Round 6 data, question items pertaining to each variable will be 
                                                     
5 Such as voting, attending community meetings or raising an issue, and being active in campaigns 
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grouped together under attitudes, values, and behaviour. (See Appendix B for a full outline of 
question items) 
1. Political values are measured through a battery of questions where respondents were 
asked with which statement they agree the most. Specifically, emancipative value 
preferences will be tested. Respondents who are more likely to believe that government 
should interfere when it comes to press freedom and freedom to join any organisation, 
and oppose gender equality in terms of leadership are believed to have lower 
emancipative value sets. Furthermore, respondents are asked questions pertaining to 
their valuing of democracy as grounded in Nisbet’s and Stoycheff’s (2014) findings.  
2. Political attitudes are measured by looking at questions that measure views of 
democratic processes in South Africa, citizens’ views and evaluations of government 
and the country, as well as views of political institutions.  
3. Political behaviour is measured by looking at respondents’ partisanship, turnout, their 
campaign and communal activity, as well as protest action.   
Demographic variables 
Demographic variables will be employed to determine any sociological differences in usage 
based on age, gender, race, location, and education. The demographic variables used in this 
research study are age, gender, race, education and location of respondent. The categories for 
age and education of respondent will be collapsed into less categories in order to make the 
analysis clearer.  
Independent and control variable 
Contrary to most research that looks at the effect of many independent variables on one 
dependent variable, this research will focus on three independent variables (internet and social 
media use for political news, and a scale consisting of both, social media and general internet 
use for acquiring political news) and how they affect a large number of dependent variables 
(political values, attitudes, and behaviour). This study will distinguish between Internet and 
social media users and non-users (see chapter 3 for a detailed description for the criteria of 
determining usage). The distribution of Internet users (48.8%) and non-users and social media 
users (47.8%) and non-users (52.3%) represents a more or less equal distribution of 
respondents, which is important for statistical tests.  
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1.5.2 Part II: Qualitative analysis 
Once associations based on quantitative analysis have been determined, the second part of the 
research aims to focus on qualitative data collection through focus group discussions with 
students at Stellenbosch University. Following H1's assumption that Internet users tend to be 
younger and more educated, this seems to be an appropriate focus group that could offer 
valuable insight into the nature of engagement with the Internet among young people. It might 
also offer useful insight into the political behaviour of this cohort, which appears to be less 
engaged in politics than its older counterparts (Tracey, 2016; Resnick & Casale; Malila, 2016, 
Schoemann & Puttergill, 2007; Mattes 2012; Mattes & Richmond, 2015; Seekings, 2014).  
In order to recruit participants, ethical clearance was sought from Stellenbosch University first, 
followed by a request at the University to allow the researcher to conduct focus group 
discussions with students from the department of political science. This serves to determine 
how students engage with the Internet and social media.  
The information obtained during the discussion was handled with confidentiality and 
participants were guaranteed anonymity. Participants were asked for permission to video 
record the group discussion for research purposes and had to sign a consent form, informing 
them of the aim of the research and possible risks. Any data that was be collected during the 
interviews that could disclose participants’ identity was stored on a password-secured personal 
computer which only the researcher had access to. The venue for discussions was an open, 
friendly, and neutral environment that enables members of discussions to feel comfortable and 
safe.  
The focus group serves to enrich the outcome of this study through more in-depth discussion 
of Internet and social media use. It is aimed at gaining a better understanding of the way in 
which university students engage with content online and how this affects their attitudes, 
values, and behaviour.  
1.6 Significance of the Study 
If Hypothesis 1 which assumes that regular Internet users tend to be younger, and more 
educated, holds true, then this could have major implications for future democratic processes 
in South Africa. Younger generations will possibly have greater access to a vast array of 
information that could potentially influence their values and attitudes towards democracy in 
the country, as well as their levels of mobilisation and participation. Given the large youth bulk 
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in the country with a median age of 26 (Statistics South Africa, 20166), we need to pay closer 
attention to the ways in which this cohort shapes its attitudes and values and how their political 
behaviour may develop. If young people are more active online, this may imply that the Internet 
emerges as a new agent of socialisation. Are younger South Africans who have greater access 
to the web subject to different kinds of socialisation, which have not yet been fully studied?  
Depending on the content that is viewed online, more educated Internet users can utilise the 
information to form their own opinions and make informed decisions by comparing different 
sources that are widely available. Provided that users do engage in a critical assessment of 
various sources, this may imply that citizens will be able to make more informed decisions. 
However, if less educated people also have lower access to the Internet, their levels of access 
to information may put them in an even more disadvantaged position. As such, a gap in terms 
of availability of information in South Africa may ensue which will also be prevalent among 
rural versus urban areas where urban dwellers will have higher access to the Internet than rural 
dwellers (Hypothesis 4). Furthermore, if the web is dominated by more educated people, we 
may see an increased inequality gap that transcends to the Internet. Less educated people may 
thus have less access to information and may be left out in the formation of Castells’ 
information society. This will confirm his prediction that on the one hand, divisions will be 
heightened, and on the other, integration in global affairs will be increased, (Webster, 
2014:102-103).  
Hypothesis 2 states that there is a difference in terms of Internet access based on race. If this 
hypothesis finds support, then we may see increased race cleavages in South Africa, based on 
technological advancement. Depending on whether people from different race groups have 
differing levels of access, then Castells’ thesis of increased divisions will further run along 
racial lines in South Africa, “generating deeper divisions between the information rich and 
poor”. This implies that some groups in South Africa may be left behind in the process of 
modernisation and globalisation and that “existing inequalities of power and wealth” will be 
reinforced (Norris, 2006:3).  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that gender does not determine access to or frequency of Internet and 
social media usage. Should this hypothesis find support, then we may finally see a closing gap 
in terms of gender inequality in South Africa. Women and men might have equal access to 
technology which might further reflect on more equal opportunities in other areas of life. 
                                                     
6 http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=9922 
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Following Castell’s (1998) line of thinking on the appearance of an “information society”, 
Webster (2014) introduces the concept of a “network society” that has emerged through the 
fusion of capitalism and the “information revolution”7. Webster (2014) explains that the 
formation of the network society bears certain cultural consequences, some of which social 
scientists have yet to grasp. However, the implications of the network society for politics are 
clear; in order to be an active participant in politics, one must have access to the network. As 
such, the network society and politics have embarked on a new relationship, which is 
increasingly moving online. Hypothesis 5 states that Internet users are more likely to discuss 
and be interested in politics than non-users, implying that levels of usage determine levels of 
interest and/or efficacy. If Internet usage turns out to be an indicator of political interest, then 
this may have positive implications for levels of turnout during elections, and political 
engagement, ultimately leading to more engaged citizens. This would also confirm Hypothesis 
9 which states that Internet users are more likely to be engaged in offline political participation. 
If Webster’s (2014) argument holds true for South Africa, then those who spend more time 
online are also more likely to play a bigger part in politics. As such, the rise of the web may 
positively affect levels of consolidation and the quality of democracy in South Africa, which 
is largely driven by a more informed citizenry that shows an active interest in politics.  
In relation to H6, which states that Internet users are more likely to express a preference for 
emancipative values (less deference to authority posed by the government, freedom of press, 
and equality in female leadership) than non-users, is supported then this may mark a value shift 
in South Africa towards more post-materialist value preferences. Mattes (2007) and 
Steenekamp (2017) contend that South Africans still value democracy instrumentally, rather 
than intrinsically which is reflected in their higher rankings of economic compared to 
democratic goods. Van Deth and Scarbough (1995:29) argue, based on various definitions on 
values that there “appears (…) to be a broad consensus that values are significant in their 
bearing to action”. In this vein, the origin of a change in attitudes about government and politics 
can be found in the notion of a change of values. Thus, values impact attitudes, which function 
as the “building blocks of political activity” and may potentially serve as a predictor of 
behaviour (Manheim, 1982:8). Therefore, a shift from more materialist to emancipative/ post-
materialist values may indicate a change in political behaviour in the country. 
                                                     
7 The information revolution refers to the rapid development and evolution of ICTs in the second half of the 20 th 
century (Melinkov & Semenyuk, 2013:10). 
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Welzel (2006:871) argues that “democratization is essentially an emancipative process, for it 
manifests human freedom by empowering people with civil and political rights”. Such an 
emancipative process, he argues, leads to mass attitudes of “liberty aspirations” which are more 
powerful in facilitating progress toward democratization than any other indicators such as GDP 
or social capital. If going online more often translates into greater support for emancipative 
values, then this could mark an important step toward reconciliation in South Africa. Gouws 
and Schulz-Herzenberg (2017) show that levels of diffuse support are declining in South 
Africa, which is worrisome as it could potentially lead to a regime that loses legitimacy and 
accountability. However, the spread of emancipative values through the Internet could mean a 
renewed sense of diffuse support for democracy among those who go online more frequently. 
This would be a heartening finding which could renew hopes for more successful 
reconciliation.  
If Hypothesis 6 and 7 hold true, then Nisbet’s and Stoycheff’s (2014) study finds support. 
Through the process of “window-opening” and “mirror-holding” that is enabled through online 
activity, users can compare their own political system and processes to those elsewhere and 
thereby increasingly become more distrustful and critical of government performance. At the 
same time, it may enforce the view of democracy being ‘the only game in town’ and thereby 
strengthening preferences for democracy over any other form of government. As a result, we 
may see a gradual decline in the recent rise in support for authoritarian rule as demonstrated by 
Steenekamp (2017) and de Jager and Steenekamp (2019) and rising levels of diffuse support 
for democracy.  
The qualitative part of this study which seeks to gain insight into young people’s online activity 
may make a major contribution in the study of (online) media and citizenship in South Africa. 
It is particularly important to explore the impact of the Internet on younger South African 
generations given that their political participation at elections has been declining, and their 
political behaviour now strongly resembles that of other younger generations in advanced 
democracies (Henn & Weinstein, 2006; Dalton, 2009; Mattes, 2012; Seekings, 2014; 
Wattenberg, 2015; Mattes & Richmond, 2015). This behaviour does not conform to 
conventional forms of participation but has been shaped in a way that is more pro-active. Online 
campaigns have seen a rise in support among young people who wish to influence immediate 
change in politics, rather than hoping to exert change by voting for representatives that might 
or might not represent their interests. Due to forces exerted through generational replacement, 
it is crucial to determine the driving forces behind changes in value preferences and attitudes 
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that might influence voting decisions and patterns of political behaviour. Furthermore, given 
the successful utilisation of social media during the student hashtag movements, it is likely that 
South Africa’s younger cohorts will make use of such platforms in the future.  
If we are to study and understand the political behaviour of citizens, we need to consider all 
possible influences that may affect their political attitudes and values. The Internet and social 
media are increasingly becoming intertwined in our everyday lives and are thus an integral part 
in the way we shape opinions and ideas. Therefore, it is essential that we begin to regard it as 
a significant and important influential political component. This study intendes to mark the 
beginning of filling the gap that exists in the literature regarding Internet use and South African 
politics. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the research study through an introduction and 
background of what constitutes today’s network society and the role of the Internet and ICTs 
in politics. Furthermore, it provides a problem statement which is that the political attitudes, 
values and political behaviour of South Africans are changing and that given the rise of 
heightened Internet access, online influences might be an explanatory factor. This chapter also 
outlines the research questions and related hypotheses that guide this research study and briefly 
touches on the methodologies that used in order to answer these questions. It concludes by 
explaining the significance of this study, which is that should there be significant relationships 
between Internet and social media use and political attitudes, values and behaviour, we need to 
consider ICTs as an important political component in South Africa’s democracy that needs to 
be studied in more depth in order to understand South African political behaviour.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The interconnectivity enabled by the web and the growing relevance it has in our lives has led 
to researchers asking questions about the influence of the Internet on socialisation processes 
and attitudes, values, and behaviour relating to politics. Information, ideas and beliefs spread 
rapidly from one country to the next within a matter of seconds. As such they are readily 
available to us at our own convenience as never before in the years preceding the Internet.  
This literature review examines research that explores the relationship between the web and 
politics. The first section of this chapter provides an overview of why the Internet is relevant 
in the study of political behaviour. Following this, we look at how the web has infiltrated 
politics, how it has gained increasing relevance for politicians and how they use online 
platforms to their advantage in the pursuit of gaining support and connecting with citizens. The 
third section of this literature review explains how the web may possibly influence value and 
attitude formations. The fourth section seeks to provide the reader with an overview of the four 
dominating theses that relate to the Internet and political behaviour, those being the 
mobilisation, reinforcement, normalisation, and displacement theses. Each thesis is examined 
separately, and different case studies are provided to demonstrate differing findings in relation 
to each point of view. Thereafter, an explanation of the dynamic of the Internet and its users 
sheds some light on the causal relationship between the two. Finally, the review will assess the 
literature which seeks to explain the interconnectedness of each standpoint relating to political 
attitudes, values, and behaviour. 
2.2 The Internet and Politics 
Today, politics without social media seems almost unimaginable – the majority of politicians 
are using the medium to their advantage. Using Twitter accounts, candidates are able to update 
their supporters (and opponents) on their latest decisions and policy stances. The 2008 United 
States presidential bid serves as an excellent example to demonstrate just how effective the 
Internet and new media were in securing Barack Obama the presidency. The Democratic 
National Committee (DNC) embarked on an enormous online advertising campaign that was 
specifically targeting younger voters. In a DNC-organised advert broadcast on YouTube, 
Obama could be seen sending out his message to his followers,  
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“Today, you have a chance once again to defy the conventional wisdom that we can’t overcome 
the cynicism of our politics. But we can overcome the special interests and the big money. You 
can prove one more time that change comes from the bottom up. Together, we can keep moving 
this country forward” (Fifield, 2010).8   
With an advertising campaign of US $2.5m, the DNC placed videos on popular websites among 
young people, such as Facebook, MTV, Comedy Central, and YouTube, in order to mobilise 
voters. As could be seen by the outcome of the election, Obama was successful in exploiting 
the potential of the Internet which ultimately secured him the presidency. The USA does not 
serve as the only example demonstrating the beneficial effects of the Internet for political 
campaigns. During the 2011 Russian presidential election, blogs for example, were a popular 
means of raising support (Carty, 2017) while YouTube served as another popular source of 
mobilisation during the 2007 Australian election (Gibson & McAllister, 2011).  
In Sweden for example, an entire new party – the Pirate Party – was formed online and quickly 
gained political momentum and even gained a seat in the European Parliament in 2009 (Li, 
2009:307). Even the United Nations has acknowledged the need to include individual experts 
online as well as individual users (Sha’ban, 2005:238). This goes to show that the Internet has 
gradually eroded the dominance of certain powerful groups, and channels political influence to 
individual citizens.  
Bertola (2010) even claims that the Internet has not only equalled the playing field of 
candidates as Bode and Dalrymple (2016) argue, but that it may redistribute power as a whole. 
She explains that throughout the twentieth century, power has shifted from single large entities 
such as governments to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have “replaced 
traditional, hierarchical power relationships with horizontal and distributed interactions”.  This 
process, which has particularly been pushed by the Internet, has now placed power in the hands 
of individuals, not in the sense of traditional power but in terms of an “avalanche effect” that 
can be created by a single person “using collaborative internet platforms to promote political 
stances” and thereby affect an entire political system (Bertola, 2010:327).  
This avalanche effect could be seen through Trump’s election which was shortly followed by 
the Cambridge Analytica scandal. In early 2018, Cambridge Analytica allegedly illegally 
gathered and sold data from over 87 million Facebook users, using a quiz which collected 
information from users’ friends online. The data was employed for now US President Trump’s 
2016 election campaign by analysing voters’ preferences which in turn would predict their 
                                                     
8 http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A24115434./AONE?u=27uos&sid=AONE&xid=75c4aa1b  
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voting behaviour. Cambridge Analytica, which has now filed insolvency is currently under 
investigation by the FBI (Reuters, 2018).9 
Moreover, a recent study by Gunther, Beck, and Nisbet (2018) suggests that the spread of fake 
news online may have caused Trump to win the presidency. The study suggests that about 4% 
of Obama’s 2012 supporters may have been dissuaded from voting for Clinton in 2016 by 
belief in fake news stories (Gunther, Beck, Nisbet, 2019:2). Using a YouGov survey, the 
authors inserted three popular fake news stories into the questionnaire, which about a quarter 
of Obama voters believed to be true. Of those who believed at least one of the fake stories, 45% 
voted for Clinton compared to 89% of Clinton supporters who did not believe in any of them. 
Although no causation between loss of support and fake news could be found in the study, the 
study’s data strongly suggests that fake news did have an impact on the outcome of the election. 
Citizens are becoming aware of the role of social media in political campaigns. The Pew 
Internet and American Life Project survey of 2011 revealed that during the 2010 campaign in 
the US, 22% of adult Internet users reported using Twitter and other social media websites for 
political purposes. As Larsson and Moe (2011:729) put it, “in purely quantitative terms, Twitter 
contributes to a broadening of public debate: it constitutes a novel arena for mediated public 
communication” testified by the sheer number of tweets.  
This argument is supported by the recent shutdown of Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter in 
Zimbabwe in January 2019, amid violent protests in the country due to a rise in the price of 
fuel. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum accused the Zimbabwean authorities of 
having cut off the Internet in the country to “mask the massive human rights violations” (BBC, 
201910). Other examples of an Internet shutdown in 2019 in Africa include the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, due to a disputed presidential election, Gabon in response to an attempted 
coup, and Sudan, which blocked social media “amid growing calls for its long-time president 
to step down” (News24, 201911). 
The use of social media has gained increasing popularity among young adults and in many 
instances is preferred as a source of political information (Rainie, 2012). Arguments have been 
raised that social media such as Facebook and Twitter do not necessarily represent a source of 
news since the focal point of such websites is personal interaction and the likelihood of 
                                                     
9 http://ewn.co.za/2018/05/03/cambridge-analytica-and-british-parent-shut-down-after-facebook-scandal  
10 https://www.bbc.com/news/amp/world-africa-46917259   
11 https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/explainer-109-a-busy-year-for-african-internet-shutdowns-20190121  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
24 
 
encountering news is slim. However, research (Rainie, 2012; Smith & Duggan, 2012a, 2012b) 
has shown that most young people prefer obtaining political news as well as expressing their 
political views and opinions on such platforms, thereby creating user-generated political 
content. Therefore, by virtue of online friends and their expressions on the Internet, the 
likelihood of encountering political content online grows significantly, even if one is not 
interested in politics nor deliberatively searches for information (Yamamoto, Kushin & 
Francis, 2015). 
Having established that the Internet has gained increasing importance as a political tool for 
political parties, candidates and citizens, the question remains how the Internet is used and 
influences citizens. To understand how the Internet will affect politics in the future, we need to 
pay closer attention to how it has already facilitated changes in society and politics.  
2.3 The Internet and Political Values and Attitudes 
Values are fundamental in guiding one’s decisions in life as they “presumably shape attitudes 
and behaviour” (Dalton, 2014:87). They are an indication of what is important to an individual 
and thus function as a “reference standard for making decisions”. However, values in a society 
are not fixed and contemporary societies have recently displayed shifts in their value priorities, 
which has led to a “new style of citizen politics” (Dalton, 2014:87; Inglehart & Abrahamson, 
1994). In particular, “emancipative values” as Inglehart and Welzel (2009:129) describe them, 
have recently gained rising popularity globally. As a result of rising levels of education, 
exposure to political information, and the rise of technology, these values have increasingly 
replaced “hierarchical relationships and deference to authority” (Dalton, 2014:87) and stress 
“equality, tolerance, autonomy, and expression”, as well as quality of life (Welzel, Inglehart, 
2009:129).  
Attitudes, on the other hand, are the “building blocks” of political activity (Manheim, 1989:8). 
They have the potential to predict or serve as an “indicator of behaviour” since they function 
as a “predisposition to respond to a particular stimulus in a particular manner” (Manheim, 
1989:8). When receiving a particular message or being exposed to certain stimuli, attitudes 
serve as a tool to make sense of information in such a powerful way that the very nature of the 
message itself may change, due to the fact that the context within which it is received, is highly 
individualised. Thus, the study of political attitudes is an important tool for social scientists as 
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it serves to predict political behaviour. As such, attitudes flow from values and can be seen as 
a prelude to political behaviour and will be discussed first.  
With the rise of Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 platforms, researchers have begun to question whether 
the rapid spread of information facilitated through such websites, may have a significant 
influence on the way in which individuals form or in fact change their values and attitudes. As 
discussed above, the exchange of opinions, feelings, ideas, and attitudes has been made 
significantly easier through ICTs and users may choose to download or upload these at their 
own convenience without restrictions posed by time or space. To quote Bode and Dalrymple 
(2016:315) once more, “users are likely to influence and be influenced by their respective 
networks”, the functions of which are similar to those of agents of socialisation.  
Anduiza, Cantijoch and Gallego (2009) believe that although changes in attitudes and values 
among Internet users might not be directly linked to politics, they can affect citizens’ perception 
of it. Attitudinal changes, so Anduiza, et al. (2009: 867) contend, are the result of an 
“interiorization of the new skills or relational forms that are characteristic of the Internet”. 
Through interactions that span across location, ethnicity, religion, gender, or other 
sociodemographic differences, users interiorize certain interactive practices (these are not 
necessarily limited to political purposes but can include, but are not limited to, information 
searching, leisure, contacts, or general exchange) which then foster attitudinal changes that 
have an effect on political attitudes and activities (Anduiza, et al., 2009: 868). Thereby by 
virtue of interacting with others online, users might undergo attitudinal changes that affect 
political attitudes and behaviour.  
In 2014 Stoycheff and Nisbet explored the way in which Internet use impacted citizens’ 
perceptions of demand and supply of democracy. Using data from the 2007 Pew Global 
Attitudes Survey, the authors looked at data from a heterogeneous set of 34 countries that have 
recently transitioned to democracy or possess autocratic regimes. Their findings reveal that 
those citizens who have greater access to Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) express a greater demand for democracy, as well as a perceived lower supply of 
democracy than those who do not. It thus follows that ICT use impacts the way in which 
citizens demand and perceive democracy. Those who are more exposed to information online, 
tend to be more critical of their regime and express a higher demand for democracy. Therefore, 
the Internet can be considered to have significant impacts on political attitudes and value 
formation.  
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In relation to previously expressed arguments that the Internet may facilitate new forms of 
social capital through interactivity and exchange (Martin, 2008:5), the content creator and the 
content consumer “merge” in the absence of hierarchies (Yildiz, 2002:54). It becomes clear 
that emancipative values indeed seem to be on the rise. The theory on the formation of social 
capital suggests that through interaction on Web 2.0 platforms, users influence one another 
through the exchange of information, thereby influencing each other’s value orientations 
(Loader, 2007; Martin, 2008). Furthermore, Norris (2001:55) argues that cyberspace is 
dominated by postmaterialist value priorities, where users are more concerned with self-
actualization and issues concerning quality of life, self-expression, individual freedom, 
cosmopolitanism, and participatory democracy. Thereby, postmaterialist and emancipative 
values are more likely to spread faster among Internet users than non-users.  
Shawney (2017) makes similar arguments by claiming that contemporary social interaction via 
social media especially among younger generations has drastically changed. Young people 
today whom she calls “Generation too much information” have been born into “a new age of 
transparency”, one in which individuals are readily giving up privacy for the sake of 
convenience, be it through ordering products, or communicating with others online (Shawney, 
2017:26). The continuing practice of going online and being connected has turned into what 
she calls a “ritualized documentary practice” of individuals’ lives, which has gone so far that 
the “notion of privacy has become completely meaningless”. What has become particularly 
problematic, according to Shawney (2017) is the fact that some of the websites, particularly 
social media, are a space where users are becoming increasingly hostile, toxic, and unforgiving. 
The notion of free speech has gone so far that it has turned into a “shaming culture”, one in 
which not even politicians are left out. A small mistake can have damaging repercussions to 
public figures and the fact that every single information that has ever been posted online can 
be accessed at any time, adds to the unforgiving nature of the Internet. 
Swigger (2012) argues that a change in the basic value sets of citizens may lead to a number 
of policy changes that no longer protect the right of privacy, since this is decreasingly becoming 
a priority of users, paying tribute to Inglehart’s scarcity hypothesis. Furthermore, virtual 
relationships have the potential of altering “the way an individual responds to community and 
social life”, as online socialisation creates a dynamic different from those of traditional agents 
of socialisation (Swigger, 2012:590). Yet, some countries such as Britain are taking active steps 
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in policy making that allow citizens to force companies that dominate the web (Facebook, 
Twitter, Google) to delete personal information that has been posted (Shawney, 2017).   
Despite the scandal and users’ openness to sharing personal information online, the evident 
preference for the right to freedom of expression among social media users supports Norris’ 
(2001) argument that the Internet is dominated by users holding postmaterialist values. Kim 
(2006) found that individuals who hold more postmaterialist values also appear to be more 
interested in politics and are more likely to participate in alternative forms of political 
movements than individuals who hold materialist values. What is especially noteworthy is the 
fact that postmaterialists express high levels of political interest amid arguably declining 
political engagement. As such, Kim’s (2006) findings can be drawn back to Norris (2001) 
argument of the overrepresentation of postmaterialist individuals on the Internet; if the Internet 
is in fact dominated by such individuals and if one is to believe Martin’s (2008) argument on 
the formation of social capital online, then a rise in alternative forms of political movements 
can be expected.   
The majority of research examining the relationship between the spread of ICTs and levels of 
democracy focuses on the “macro relationship between Internet penetration and government 
institutions and the political process” rather than the formation of individual’s values, attitudes, 
and behaviours (Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014:250). The consequences of the omission of research 
on such formations are that researchers have yet to grasp the full potential and impact of the 
web on attitudes, values, and behaviour. Nevertheless, Johnson and Kaye (2003) found 
evidence to support the notion that the Internet may have strong influences on attitude 
formations and changes. Even though the dynamic between the web and attitudes has not yet 
been fully established, Johnson and Kaye (2003:27) believe that the use of the Internet serves 
as a “strong predictor of positive political attitudes”. Through the exposure to political 
information online, citizen interest in politics is heightened and as a result they develop 
attitudes that are conducive to building political efficacy and the willingness of citizens to 
engage in political matters. 
In this sense, we could apply two dominating theories regarding media consumption and 
political efficacy. The first theory, the media malaise theory (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; 
Mutz & Reeves, 2005) argues that the overall negative coverage on politics generates 
“cynicism and malaise” and leads to more “negative attitudes toward political instituins” 
(Chang, 2018: 1001). The virtuous circle theory (Aarts & Semetko, 2003; Norris, 2000; 2001) 
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on the other hand, claims that enhanced exposure to political information via the media leads 
to heightened interest in politics and more positive attitudes toward political institutions. Chang 
(2018) explores the applicability of these two theories on Internet use and other forms of media 
and finds that people who frequently read the newspaper, listen to the radio and use the Internet 
for political more information are more interested in politics (internal efficacy) and are also 
more likely to feel like they can impact political outcomes (external efficacy).  
Anduiza et al. (2009: 866) argue that the dynamic between the Internet and changes in attitudes 
depends on the notion of selective exposure. In this sense, even though politically related 
information may be readily available to Internet users, it is still up to the individual to decide 
whether to access that information. For example, receiving news bulletins and newsletters 
requires active subscription, therefore users need to take active steps to access these websites. 
Davis (2017: 280) writes that research has shown that people tend to “reside in echo chambers 
online”, meaning that they only tend to follow others who share their own views and beliefs 
and generally do not read articles that do not support their existing perception of reality or 
mindsets. The reason for this, so Davis (2017: 280) explains, is because agreeing with someone 
else and have that person agree with us, is a satisfying experience and thereby prevents people 
from critically assessing the things they see online.  
Runciman (2018:149) refers to this as “groupthink” – “People join because other people join: 
they want to be where the action is.” This “groupthink” can eventually lead to a “sense of 
tribalism” and identity politics and therefore all “social reinforcement” works in favour of our 
already existing attitudes and beliefs (Davis, 2017: 149). Based on this, Anduiza et al. 
(2009:866) believe that “the consequences for behaviour and political attitudes would only be 
valid for certain Internet users”, which demonstrates support for the reinforcement thesis, 
discussed below.  
Furthermore, there is a tremendous amount of user generated content that relates to politics, 
most of which relates to political satire. During the 2012 United States presidential campaign, 
Obama’s team realised the advertisement niche on social media, particularly YouTube. Of 
approximately 600 000 videos that were posted on the platform, only 5% of the views 
associated with the content were content from the official presidential campaigns, the rest being 
associated with user-generated videos (Waxman, 2012).12 Rill and Cardiel (2013) assert that 
                                                     
12 http://techland.time.com/2012/08/29/youtube-videos-mentioning-obama-and-romney-
reach-2-billion-vews 
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despite differing opinions on the impact of the Internet on political behaviour of citizens, it is 
undeniable that “satirical news programming may intersect with, or even affect” viewers’ 
perceptions of politicians as well as their attitudes and beliefs about political systems (see also 
Brewer & Cao, 2006; Holbert Hmielowski, Jain and Mori, 2007; Harrington, 2012).  
In fact, there has been a rise in preference for satirical news and comedy programs, particularly 
the United States. Animated programs such as The Simpsons, or Family Guy have gained 
increasing popularity and shows such as Saturday Night Live, The Daily Show, and The Colbert 
Report have begun to overtake conventional news programs as a source of political information 
(Lewis, 2002; Olbrys, 2005; Purdum, 2011). Rill and Cardiell (2013:1742) believe that this 
may be an indication that viewing “satirical political news programs” may lead to increased 
political knowledge as well as cynicism among viewers. Holbert, et al. (2011) agree that 
political satire, whether it spreads via the Internet or television, results in increased criticism 
toward politicians and politics in general.  
2.4 The Internet and Political Behaviour 
Dalton (2014), provides an overview of modes of political participation through which citizens 
can become engaged and involved in politics. Using Verba and Nie’s (1972) and Verba, Nie, 
and Kim’s (1978) work, Dalton (2014:38) provides six modes of political participation, the last 
two of which he adds himself. These modes consist of voting (casting a ballot at elections); 
campaign activity (promoting political candidates among other potential voters); contacting 
officials directly (perhaps to express feelings of dissatisfaction); communal activity (working 
with a group in the community); and finally protest action and other forms of unconventional 
modes of political action, as well as Internet activism. Therefore, Internet platforms can be seen 
as a facilitator of several modes of political participation and political movements. This 
becomes apparent when we consider the crucial role the Web played for mobilisation during 
the Arab Spring (Burlacu, Tiganus, 2012) or trending expressions of solidarity with Charlie 
Hebdo on Twitter after two terrorists killed 10 members of the French magazine (Herrera-
Viedma, Bernabé-Moreno, Martinez Sanchez, 2015). 
In March 2015, students from the University of Cape Town called for the “decolonisation” of 
the university which included inter alia the removal of the statue of British imperialist, Cecil 
John Rhodes. Under the hashtag movement #RhodesMustFall, a group of students organised 
themselves on social media (Bosch, 2017).  In October later that year, students of the University 
of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg responded to a government announcement about an 
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increase in tuition fees with the #FeesMustFall movement which spread throughout South 
African universities (Mudavanhu, 2017). These protests sparked off later movements such as 
#OpenStellenbosch at the Stellenbosch University which demanded the removal of Afrikaans 
as a tuition language at the university. Social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook 
were particularly useful for mobilisation purposes as Bosch (2017) showed.  
Luescher (2017:231) argues that through these movements “student activism in South Africa 
has taken on characteristics of [internet-aged] networked social movements”. The use of 
Internet-based communication, particularly social media such as WhatsApp, Twitter, 
Facebook, YouTube, and the like, so Luescher (2017:231) believes, “signals the advent of a 
new way of mobilising and organising student political power”. Indeed, the nationwide protests 
were so successful that they led to temporary university shutdowns. 
Castells (2015) points out an important shift in the way social movements are organised and 
practiced and explains that spaces of organisation overlap; those are the actual local spaces 
where action takes place and virtual spaces (cyberspace) where action is planned and debated. 
Furthermore, Castells (2015:316) points out cyberspace’s new forms of democratic power in 
that they “reconstruct the public sphere in the space of autonomy built around the interaction 
of local places and Internet networks”. 
It is reasonable to assume that a change in political values and attitudes is likely to cause a 
change in political participation (Anduiza, et al., 2009:858). Since the Internet has become 
available to the general public in the mid-1990s, scholars have been studying its effects on the 
political participation of citizens. Arguments vary between an optimistic view of the possible 
benefits of the Internet and sceptical claims that the Internet may even widen the gap between 
the “haves and have nots” (Kruikemeier, van Noort, Vliegenhart, de Vreese, 2013:904).  
Three main perspectives can be identified in the literature those being the mobilisation thesis, 
the reinforcement thesis, as well as the normalisation thesis. However, recently a fourth theory, 
the displacement thesis, has been introduced. Below, each thesis will be briefly discussed, and 
some case studies will be introduced, which made differing findings that support as well as 
reject the theories introduced here. Since there is “no agreement with regard to the 
measurement of political participation” online, there is hardly any overarching support for a 
single theory provided here and some studies even found support for various theses (Vissers, 
Stolle, 2014:938).   
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2.4.1 Mobilisation thesis 
The most positive view is held by “cyber-optimists”, who emphasise the possibilities of online 
activities for the involvement of “ordinary citizens in (…) democracy” (Norris, Curtice 
2006:2). This view often also called the “mobilisation thesis”, suggests that online activities 
may serve as a substitute mechanism for the facilitation of alternative channels of civic 
engagement. This could be achieved through political chat-rooms, remote electronic voting in 
elections, referenda, and the mobilisation of virtual communities which could have the 
potential to “revitalise levels of mass participation” (Norris, Curtice, 2006:2). This view argues 
that the more time an individual spends online, searching for political information, the more 
likely that individual is to engage in offline forms of participation such as voting or signing 
petitions.  
Research by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press has shown that an increasing 
amount of US citizens have turned to the Internet for political news due to a dissatisfaction 
with traditional news (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). Respondents reported that the reason for a 
preference for Internet use is because it enables individuals to search for any kind of 
information, rather than receiving selected themes in newspapers and television news. Drawing 
data from the 1996, 1998, and 2000 American National Election Studies, Tolbert and McNeal 
(2003:182) explore the impact of the Internet on political participation. Their findings show 
strong support for the mobilisation hypothesis as “individuals who use the Internet for political 
news are more likely to participate”. Not only do individuals who use the Internet for political 
news report higher levels of participation, but access to the web alone was a predictor of 
political engagement. As such, they find evidence for the “mobilizing potential of the Internet 
during elections” (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003:184).  
In light of a decline in political participation especially among younger generations in western 
democracies, coupled with the rise of the Internet, some arguments have been made that the 
web itself might be responsible for such a decline. However, Bakker and de Vreese (2011:453) 
believe that many of such assumptions are “biased by a disproportional focus on institutional 
and limited measures of participatory behaviour”. As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) 
have shown, participation has a number of dimensions and the kind of participation depends 
on time and resources available to citizens. The Internet, however, lowers opportunity costs of 
participation to a variety of users, most importantly the youth. Furthermore, online participation 
appears significantly more attractive to younger citizens than traditional forms of participation. 
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Therefore, the notion that young people are disinterested in politics and show no motivation to 
become involved, is overstated (Wring, Henn, Weinstein, 1999; Pirie & Worcester, 2000; 
Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd, 2004; Quintelier, 2007; Martin & Schmeisser, 2008; Cammaerts 
Bruter, Banaji, Harrison, Anstead, 2014). In fact, Bakker and de Vreese (2011:465) found that 
various types of Internet use are “positively linked to measures of political participation”. 
Although the causal direction of the relationship is unclear in their study, it remains that online 
activity may have beneficial effects on participation. 
Building on similar findings that Internet users tend to be younger and more educated, 
Yamamoto et al. (2015) conducted a web survey of university students in the US. Paying 
attention to social media and traditional media use, and online and offline political expression 
and participation, the authors explored the mobilising effect of web-based content. Their 
findings show support for the mobilisation thesis as a positive overall effect of the Internet on 
offline participation was measured. Respondents who frequently consume political news online 
were more likely to participate offline. Specifically, online expression had a mobilizing effect 
on participation. Yamamoto et al. (2015) explain that expressing political views online may 
increase levels of both, internal and external efficacy which in turn increase turnout (see also 
Velasquez & LaRose, 2015).  
De Vreese (2007:214) asserts that “it is not time spent online (…) that matters but rather the 
activities that are undertaken”. Therefore, whether an individual spends more time on average 
on the Internet than someone else does not predict whether he or she is more likely to be 
politically active, both, offline and online. What is of importance is the way in which such an 
individual engages with content that is seen online and whether that content stimulates 
participation. As such, differentiations need to be made in terms of studying political behaviour 
in relation to Internet activity. However, it proves difficult to measure such differences as most 
surveys question respondents more on whether they spend time online and less about what they 
do when they search the web. 
Research on the Internet and political behaviour so far has predominantly yielded support for 
the mobilisation thesis. Scholars believe that the Internet has far-reaching consequences not 
only in terms of society but politics, too. Meaningful political involvement requires an 
informed citizenry; with the rise of the Internet, citizens are increasingly able to freely access 
any kind of information, ranging from political news to entertainment and recreation. Through 
this increased access to information and interconnectedness enabled by the Internet, so scholars 
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believe, individuals are able to make informed decisions and are more capable to engage in 
politics.  
2.4.2 Reinforcement thesis 
Other theories proposed by “cyber-pessimists” challenge the mobilising effects of the Internet 
by arguing that the web will eventually “reinforce existing inequalities of power and wealth, 
generating deeper divisions between the information rich and poor” (Norris, Curtice, 2006:3). 
Furthermore, this “reinforcement thesis” maintains that the Internet may further contribute to 
a participation gap between “engaged and disengaged citizens” (Hoffman, Lutz, Müller, 
Meckel, 2017:1).  At worst, the Internet could create a “digital divide” by increasing the power 
of the elites while disenfranchising the poor who have little access to it (Johnson & Kaye, 
2003:10). 
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2010) explore the relationship between the Internet on both 
online and offline political participation. Their findings reveal similar results to those of Norris 
and Curtice (2006), pointing toward a digital divide that is strongly influenced by socio-
economic status. In this regard, online participation strongly mirrors offline participation as 
Internet access reflects socio-economic status components critical for political participation. In 
other words, less affluent individuals are commonly less likely to be politically active 
compared to more affluent people, a trend which is also prevalent in online participation (e.g. 
sharing political news, inviting others to join a political group online, following a politician on 
social media, donating campaign money online). Therefore, the authors found strong support 
for the reinforcement hypothesis on online political participation. Furthermore, Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady (2010) argue that close attention needs to be paid to what exactly merits the 
label of online participation, as such actions do not necessarily render the same effect as 
collective offline action. They therefore agree with Norris’ (2001: 230) argument that if 
political participation that has been facilitated through the Internet derives from the same kinds 
of people that are already active, “then a possible consequence of the process is the replication 
– or even – exacerbation of existing political inequalities”.  
Sylvester and McGlynn (2010), although finding support for the mobilisation thesis, had an 
interesting approach to demonstrate how the digital divide impacts participation. The authors 
found that while access to the Internet increases one’s likelihood of contacting government 
officials, location is a strong predictor of low Internet access. The consequences thereof show 
that people living in rural areas are less knowledgeable about how to navigate the web, 
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therefore they are also less likely to seek information online, including political content. 
Therefore, individuals who live in rural areas are less likely to contact officials online. As such, 
their findings support the reinforcement thesis, albeit their primary focus does not rest on 
income, age, and education, but location. This presents a new and distinct approach to Internet 
research and political behaviour, as most research in this field focuses on demographic 
variables such as age, income, race, and education. It should be noted, however that their 
political participation variables that showed significant relationships are limited to contacting 
government officials. This poses an important omission of possible other findings and limits 
their results.  
Ikeda, Rivhey, Teresi (2013), while acknowledging the positive impacts of the Internet on 
political participation, believe that such beneficial effects will be eradicated by the introduction 
and increased spread of smart phones. The authors believe that through the rising usage of 
“smart technologies”, which are meant to minimize and eventually even “eliminate the need 
for browsing” will result in users using mobile phones in a rather “homogenous” way, one 
which is limited to the applications that are installed on their smartphones (Ikeda, 2013:306-
307). As such, exposure to other news information that is often promoted through the use of 
Personal Computers (PCs) and the act of browsing the Internet, is non-existent on mobile 
phones. In their research, Ikeda et al. (2013) provide evidence for a “mobile divide” where 
young, less educated and less wealthy people tend to use mobile phones more than their 
counterparts. Therefore, due to limited exposure to political information, they are less likely to 
be informed about politics and thus less likely to participate. Their findings thus support 
elements of the reinforcement thesis; younger and less educated and less wealthy people tend 
to use mobile phones more than PCs for Internet access, thereby “reinforcing existing 
inequalities in power and wealth” (Norris, Curtice, 2003:3). 
The reinforcement thesis, although receiving large support in the early years of the Internet, 
seems to pose a rather weak stance in the overall literature and more recent research 
demonstrates the closing gap of the digital divide in established democracies (Vissers & Stolle, 
2015; Bode & Dalrymple, 2016). Given the fact that Internet access becomes available to a 
larger number of people through mobile phones (which also pose lower costs in terms of online 
activity), whether someone searches the web is no longer predetermined by their socio-
economic status and age. While the reinforcement thesis may certainly be found true in less 
developed countries, the same cannot be said in more advanced industrial democracies (Nam, 
2010). However, this might not be the case in less affluent societies.  
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2.4.3 Normalisation thesis 
The “normalisation thesis”, also represents a rather pessimistic view, by proposing that the 
appearance of the knowledge society has had little impact on changing the participation gap 
between engaged and disengaged citizens. It further states that technology has done little to 
alter the political status quo and that radical change is unlikely to happen as the Internet will 
eventually reflect a “politics as usual” scenario, where participation will be skewed towards 
more educated and wealthier users (Norris, Curtice, 2006; Hoffman, et al. 2017). As such, this 
thesis is quite similar to the abovementioned reinforcement thesis.  
Contrary to previous findings, Steinberg (2015:114) found evidence for a decline of the digital 
divide where socio-economic factors such as income, education, and race “do not appear to be 
as strongly associated with cyber participation as they are with traditional participation”. 
Additionally, he found that engagement in cyber participation enabled by the cheaper and 
easier means of engagement leads to a significantly increased likelihood of voting. Therefore, 
Steinberg (2015) found evidence that the access gap is closing, thereby challenging the 
reinforcement hypothesis. Yet, while access to and the use of the Internet has widened and 
expanded, he maintains that there remains an “issue of usage, whereby access does not 
necessarily lead to meaningful [political] usage” (Steinberg, 2015:114). Therefore he finds 
evidence in support of the normalisation hypothesis where more offline politically active 
individuals are also more likely to be politically active online.  
The normalisation thesis has received some support from a number of scholars, who believe 
that offline behaviour will strongly reflect online behaviour. A study conducted by Feezell, 
Conroy and Guerrero (2016) focussing on young people and their online behaviour, shows that 
those individuals who have a more “dutiful” sense of citizenship tend to use the Internet in 
ways that supports those attitudes than those who use it in an “actualizing” way. The former 
refers to political participation, motivated by “a sense of civic obligation”, while the latter 
refers to independent citizen action, while still “maintaining a concern for others” (Feezell, et 
al. 2016:97).  
While the normalisation thesis may seem like the most plausible approach to explain the 
relationship between Internet use and political participation, it does not seem to receive overall 
support from scholars. There appears to be agreement among researchers that the effects of the 
Internet are either mobilising or reinforcing in nature. Whether these findings are due to 
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wrongful measurement or actual evidence is yet to be established as there is no strict consensus 
to be found on how to measure Internet use in relation to political participation.  
2.4.4 Displacement Thesis 
Finally, the “displacement hypothesis” suggests that “time spent online could actually displace 
time formerly devoted to social and political purposes” (Hoffman, et al., 2017:1). This view 
holds that the more an individual spends time on the Internet or operating technological 
devices, the less likely he or she is to devote remaining leisure time to pursue civic activities. 
As a result, Internet use would contribute to the weakening, instead of the strengthening of 
citizens’ civic and political engagement. Yet, there exists little evidence to support this 
hypothesis.  
Some argue for negative implications of the Internet where users are increasingly becoming 
alienated from the outside world and consequently shut themselves out from actual political 
events that are relevant, thereby refocusing their value priorities (Davis, 1999; Noveck, 2000) 
which ultimately leads to a “generation lost to mediated isolation and irresponsibility” (Malila, 
2016:78). However, many of these claims have been found to be untrue in more recent studies.  
Hoffman et al. (2017:2) explored the way in which escapism, “a key motivation for media use 
that describes a temporary escape from life”, affects online political participation in their study 
which included over 700 Facebook users in Germany. Findings revealed that while the majority 
of respondents predominantly use Facebook for escapist purposes, they are likely to be 
confronted with political information. Particularly those users who use it for productive 
purposes are likely to become politically engaged while those who use the platform in a passive, 
non-interactive way shy away from online political participation. While these findings hold 
true for social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter, they apply less to platforms 
such as Snapchat or Instagram (whose main focus lies on the publishing of pictures, rather than 
written content). Therefore, Hoffman et al. (2012), while finding some evidence for the 
displacement thesis also found overwhelming evidence for the mobilisation thesis. These 
findings reveal that while users might visit these platforms for non-political reasons, they are 
likely to be exposed to content that may spark political interest and engagement.  
As the case studies in this literature review demonstrate, there is little evidence to suggest that 
the Internet has a displacing impact on citizens and their political involvement. Even if 
individuals use the Internet for recreational purposes only, this does not imply that they are 
participating less in politics as a result of limited time, taken up by searching the web. There 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
are few if any studies that fully support the displacement thesis and even those who take its 
possible effects into consideration make findings that show stronger support for other theses as 
the case study of Hoffman et al. (2017) demonstrates.  
2.5 Understanding the Dynamic between the Internet and Individuals 
The Internet containing various platforms, is a technology developed through human 
knowledge, thereby it is arguably a form of “social capital” on its own. (Delli Carpini, 2011). 
The Internet has had a significant breakthrough in since it was launched, demonstrating its 
potential for transformation across various fields, ranging from technology, economy, and 
society; as the Internet continues to grow, it “promotes change at the heart of the social 
structure: in politics, and the distribution of power across society” (Bertola, 2010:323). 
The Internet itself functions under a quite distinct architecture from that of traditional 
telecommunication networks, such as the telephone, television, or even telegraph. Contrary to 
these traditional networks which are controlled by a single few operators, constraints in terms 
of access of the Internet are quite different – instead of a one-way kind of communication, the 
Internet enables users to connect in a near infinite number of ways (Bertola, 2010:324).  
To date, researchers have struggled to determine the direction of the causal relationship 
between the Internet and political attitudes, values, and behaviour. It can be argued that the 
reason why it is so difficult to establish the direction of such a relationship is that it entails a 
cycle of interaction, creation, and observation where participants become consumers as well as 
creators through means of interaction. When a user uploads information online, he/she creates 
content, thereby becoming a content creator in the formation and discussion of information. 
However, while uploading information online, users also see other information, which they 
themselves have not generated, thereby becoming consumers, something Jenkins (2006) refers 
to as “participatory culture”. Through the “immediate and inexpensive access to media” across 
the globe, information online is becoming increasingly diversified, not to mention the relatively 
low levels of monitoring that enable users to freely express themselves, thereby exchanging 
differing views and ideas, up to a point where a number of governments have begun to 
“centralise content control over the internet” (Bertola, 2010:326). 
This argument is supported by Bode and Dalrymple (2016:315) who argue that social media 
“users are likely to influence and be influenced by their respective networks”. Consequentially, 
influential actors such as political candidates, for example, are likely to have a “great amount 
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of influence over” their followers, who in turn may influence their own followers. It is, 
therefore, worth pointing out that the Internet should be regarded in terms of its functions as a 
medium through which changes in attitudes, values, and behaviour are being enabled, rather 
than simply looking at the content which users upload. In other words, it can be seen as a 
facilitator of changes in attitudes, values, and behaviour.  
Looking at the rise of new media, it becomes clear that its emergence is very recent in 
comparison to that of old media. The Internet has come a long way in a very short amount of 
years since the creation of the first computer in 1958, which covered almost half an acre. 
Therefore, research on the medium has generated inconclusive results, with scholars and 
scientists disagreeing on what the impact of new media on the population may be. Taking into 
consideration that new media has only begun to emerge post-2004 with the launch of Facebook 
and YouTube, research on the medium has only been conducted for just over a decade.  
2.6 Internet use in South Africa 
The effects of Internet and social media use on democracy remain largely unexplored in the 
South African literature. Therefore, it is a relatively new field of research in the country. 
Research has focused mainly on qualitative approaches that seek to determine how hashtags 
are used to mobilise protestors. The quantitative data that is available is limited to access and 
usage and rarely explores real relationships between usage and political attitudes and values. 
This gap may largely be attributed to low access rates to the Internet in the country compared 
to advanced democracies that have almost universal access. Thus, research has been focused 
on who are the haves and the have nots in the development and emergence of the South African 
network society. As such, the literature cannot be divided into the various theories that revolve 
around Internet use and democracy. However, there are certain themes that stand out.   
One of the prominent themes is the strong focus on the digital divide in the country. There 
appears to be a consensus in the global literature that individuals with a higher socioeconomic 
standing are more likely to have greater Internet access. This does not only apply to broadband 
connections but also cellular and wireless connections (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003; Sylvester & 
McGlynn, 2010; Schlozman, Verba & Brady, 2010; Nam, 2010). Especially in the South 
African context, there is a strong focus on the digital divide that points out who has the highest 
levels of access to the Internet.  
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Thus, there a need to consider which segments of the South African population go online before 
any generalisations or assumptions about impacts and effects can be made. Wasserman (2002) 
points out that the Internet, a technology constructed by western, developed countries, is 
dominated by English websites. According to Internet World Stats (2018)13 English is the most 
spoken language online, constituting a quarter of all content, followed by Chinese and Spanish. 
Yet, English does not even fall among the top three languages spoken in South Africa 
(BusinessTech, 201514). Although English is the language mostly used in public life and the 
media, it is not as widely spread and understood as one might think. According to the South 
African Household Survey (2017), only 1.4% of black, 21.8% of coloured, 39.2% of white, 
and 91.5% of Indian South Africans speak English at home. In total, only 17.6% of all South 
Africans speak English outside the household. Therefore, it is likely that large segments of the 
population cannot access the Internet in a meaningful way because they do not understand the 
languages spoken on various platforms and websites.  
Beger and Sinah (2012) point out that the digital divide in South Africa is still dominated by 
race, socioeconomic status and geographical location. This can be attributed to apartheid 
policies which foresaw that only 10% of urban dwellers – who were mostly white and living 
in prosperous neighbourhoods – benefited from ICT developments (Bosch & Mutsvairo, 2017: 
74). As a result, many disadvantaged groups in South Africa did not reap the immediate 
benefits from the introduction of the Internet in 1994, as they had little to no access and 
therefore largely remained technologically illiterate. According to Statistics South Africa 
(2016)15, the black population in South Africa still lags behind in terms of educational 
attainment, while whites and Indians have the highest proportion of post-secondary level of 
education. Both groups also have the lowest proportion of individuals with the lowest levels of 
education. This indicates that although there has been a substantial growth in the black middle 
class in South Africa, the black population still faces hardships in terms of education and 
income, which in turn reflects on their access to the Internet and their ability to search for 
meaningful information online. 
Another factor that may exacerbate the extent of access to the web are costs. According to 
World Bank16, South Africa remains one of the most unequal economies in the world, with a 
Gini coefficient of above 0.6 in 2015. Furthermore, the richest 10% of South Africans hold 
                                                     
13 https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm?utm_source=lasindias.info/blog  
14 https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/104497/the-most-spoken-languages-in-south-africa/ 
15 http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report%2092-01-03/Report%2092-01-032016.pdf  
16 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview 
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approximately 71% of net wealth while the bottom 60% hold about 7%. Bearing these statistics 
and the general high costs of Internet access in South Africa in mind, we can conclude that not 
everyone in the country can afford to go online as frequently as the upper classes, not even via 
mobile phones. Conducting a study on South African activists’ use of nanomedia and digital 
media for mobilisation purposes, Bosch, Wasserman and Chuma (2018) find that the use of 
social media is not as popular as recent hashtag movements lead us to believe. While Twitter 
is mostly used to inform journalists of planned activities such as protests, it is not a popular 
tool for mobilising the masses. One activist interviewed mentioned that “they rarely use their 
social media accounts because Internet access is expensive and poor citizens often do not have 
money to purchase data, even when they have access to smartphones or tablets” (Bosch, 
Wasserman, Chuma, 2018: 2164).   
The digital divide further spans across age groups in South Africa. Research by the Pew 
Research Center indicates that in the world’s largest economies, the Millennial generation’s 
(term used to usually describe those individuals reaching adulthood in the early 21st century) 
access to the Internet is nearing almost 100%. By comparison, just about half of South African 
Millennials indicated that they have access to the Internet (Poushter, 2016). However, at the 
time of publication, strong evidence for a digital divide could be found, where younger people 
had higher access to the Internet. Of all respondents aged 18-24, 52% indicated that they had 
access to the web compared to a third of 35+-year-olds.    
Therefore, it is evident that there are several barriers that stand in the way of universal access 
to the Internet in South Africa. These barriers include language, geographical location, and 
severe economic, material and educational inequalities, coupled with age and high costs of 
going online. Due to these factors, we may see that different segments of the population have 
different levels of access and as a result, the web’s effects on political attitudes and behaviour 
might differ as well. 
2.7 Assessment of the Literature and Conclusion 
There appears to be a consensus that the Internet has facilitated a change in attitudes and value 
preferences among its users. The web itself, which has arguably pushed the process of 
globalisation to new dimensions, has aided in the spread of ideas and beliefs, which have 
consequently impacted the formation of attitudes and values. Stoycheff’s and Nisbet’s (2014) 
study confirms that people in newly established democracies and autocratic regimes, who use 
the Internet frequently are becoming increasingly critical of their own government, thereby 
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changing their attitude positions towards politicians and politics. Post-material and 
emancipative values are receiving rising support, especially among younger generations, who 
frequently visit the web. The absence of hierarchies on several platforms makes the Internet an 
attractive venue for discussion and deliberation for young people and through these processes; 
certain values are spreading faster and are adopted more frequently.  
Norris (2001) early on made the argument that the Internet is dominated by postmaterialists, as 
it is an attractive platform for those individuals who oppose certain hierarchies to express 
themselves. The overarching presence of such emancipative values is thus likely to enforce 
similar, already existing values among users which creates a stronger sense of postmaterial 
value priorities through the formation of social capital online (Martin, 2008). At the same time, 
regular Internet users appear to be far less reluctant to share personal information on the web 
and thereby their value of privacy declines as argued by Swigger (2012) and Shawney (2017). 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal pays tribute to the wide array of personal information 
individuals are ready to make available to anyone who wishes to access it. 
When it comes to the Internet and political behaviour, opinions differ widely; proponents of 
the mobilisation thesis maintain that the Internet has a large potential to mobilise citizens to 
engage both online and offline. The increased amount of information available to the public 
could lead to a more informed citizenry that makes better informed decisions. Proponents of 
the reinforcement thesis disagree and believe that already existing socioeconomic inequalities 
will be reflected by Internet usage where more wealthy citizens will reap the benefits of the 
web by having better access than poorer classes. Supporters of the normalisation thesis on the 
other hand believe that online political participation will reflect offline participation as those 
who are more likely to be engaged offline will also be engaged online. The displacement thesis 
predicts a quite different effect and maintains that the Internet will have distorting effect on 
political participation as time that could be used to engage in democratic action will be spent 
online. By reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that the mobilisation thesis has received 
most support, albeit with mixed results. Researchers appear to be undecided about the exact 
effect of the web on political behaviour due to the fact that research has yielded mixed 
outcomes. Taking into consideration that the web is a recent development in human history, it 
is likely that its exact effects will only be established in the future as its dynamic still needs to 
be understood in full.   
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In terms of the South African context, we can only make assumptions based on effects of the 
Internet on political attitudes and behaviour. Research in the country has shown the existence 
of a strong digital divide, where (mostly young) white and Indian people have the highest levels 
of access. Thus, it is plausible that these groups are affected the most by the Internet and social 
media as they are most likely to go online compared to coloured or black people.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Surveys have been revolutionised since their introduction in the 1940s and have ever since 
changed the way research is conducted. New research technology has since enabled the 
simplified measurement of public opinion and political culture based on empirical observations 
(Kavanagh, 1983:13) and statistical analysis tools now allow for the identification of 
behavioural and attitudinal patterns in relation to sociodemographic variables. The work of 
Almond and Verba (1963) and their colleagues have shown the immense value of survey 
research in political science and today, many researchers make use of survey analysis to 
demonstrate findings and prove hypotheses.  
Qualitative research through interviews or focus groups on the other hand, highlights the value 
of social interaction in bringing forth new ideas or approaches to certain issues. Topics can be 
explored in far more detail than through limited survey questions because the dynamic within 
this type of research is far more flexible and dynamic (Burnham, et al., 2008). 
In combination, both quantitative and qualitative research have the capacity to complement 
each other by making up for the other’s shortcomings. This research follows a multi-methods 
approach which combines quantitative with qualitative analysis. This will be done through an 
analysis of quantitative survey data, obtained from the Afrobarometer Round 6 survey of 2015, 
and complemented by a qualitative analysis of focus group discussions with students from 
Stellenbosch University.  
3.2 Part I: Quantitative Analysis 
3.2.1 Quantitative methods 
Quantitative data analysis is the most popular way of collecting data among social scientists. 
Data is obtained through means of survey questions from a relatively large sample of 
respondents that are representative of a larger population group. Answers are then given 
numerical values and transferred into a “computer-readable format” (Neuman, 2008:14). The 
value of quantitative data analysis is that it allows to make generalisations about an entire 
population and provide evidence of how two variables might be connected, thereby providing 
crucial insight into social patterns that are useful to government and other organisations 
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(Blaikie, 2010:23-24). Dependent and independent variables are clearly defined through 
hypotheses that seek to “test and validate theories through falsification17” (Wheeldon & 
Ahlberg, 2011:8). Quantitative studies typically use deductive18 approaches to analysis, 
meaning that hypotheses are formed, followed by the gathering and analysis of data based on 
“existing assumptions about knowledge” (Wheeldon & Ahlberg, 2011:9).  
Survey research has been widely used since the 1940s and has proven to be a particularly useful 
tool to collect data and provide evidence about social phenomena. Since then, surveys have 
revolutionized social sciences; Brady (2000) explains that sample surveys have the capacity to 
gather data about almost any topic so that only a few thousand randomly selected respondents 
can accurately represent opinions of populations reaching the millions. Brady (2000:47) also 
tells us that surveys are not only useful to provide descriptive accounts, but they can also 
“assess causes and impacts of events” thereby having the power to provide explanations for 
events or changes within societies. Consequently, he believes that surveys score very high on 
the following dimensions of research: Range of Applicability (the amount of data that can be 
gathered using this method); Linkage to Theory (the strength of the relationship between theory 
and method and whether both complement each other); Conceptual Richness (the flexibility of 
the method to study theoretical concepts and its ability to aid in the development of new ones); 
Capacity for Confirming Theories about Politics (referring to the method’s power of making 
causal inferences and confirming theories); and finally Policy Relevance (the ability of surveys 
to address policy questions) (Brady, 2000:48).  
Mattes (2013) notes that while there is a considerable amount of quantitative research carried 
out in South Africa by psychologists and sociologists, there is a lack of contributions made by 
political scientists. Of those who do publish their work on South African politics, society, and 
democracy, very few are situated in South Africa or are in fact South Africans. Mattes 
(2013:488) believes that this is not due to a lack of interest by researchers but rather due to a 
“lack of basic numeric literacy (…) and statistical skills”. This research study seeks to 
contribute to the filling of this gap or “minority tendency” through secondary data analysis of 
the Afrobarometer Round 6 survey.   
                                                     
17 Falsification refers to the manipulation of data or information so that the final outcome of analysis does not 
reflect accurate results (Wheeldon & Ahlberg, 2011). 
18 Theorising in a deductive direction means to begin one’s research on the basis of a “theoretical proposition 
that outlines the logical connection among concepts” and then moving on to concrete evidence or findings that 
stand to support or oppose already existing theories (Neuman, 2008:59). 
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Neuman (2008:30-333) lists further advantages of secondary data analysis. One of such 
advantages is that researchers can use the data to test their own independent hypotheses to 
determine trends within given populations. Furthermore, it is a cost-effective type of research 
as it relies on already obtained data, consisting of numerous variables (Singleton & Straits, 
2009:9-10). 
However, some disadvantages are that researchers sometimes use data that is not suited to 
measure particular research questions or hypotheses and as such should always consider which 
type of secondary data they are using (Neuman, 2008:333). Researchers also face the risk of 
ecological fallacy where units of analysis do not match, i.e. the units of analysis “for which the 
researcher has empirical evidence and the units for which he or she wants to make statements 
(Neuman, 2008:169). Other risks that may be encountered on secondary quantitative data 
analysis are the issues of reductionism 19 and spuriousness20. Additionally, the researcher 
should be wary of the way in which data were gathered and documented and should thus make 
use of reputable survey organisations (Neuman, 2006:306).  
3.2.2 Survey Research 
The quantitative analysis of this research is done on a cross-sectional21 level that only looks at 
data obtained from the Afrobarometer Round 6 of 2015 survey and theorises in a deductive 
direction, drawing from secondary data. The theoretical aspects that have been outlined in the 
literature review serve as a foundation on which research questions and hypotheses are formed. 
An analysis of the survey data is intended to contribute to the theory by determining whether 
one or more theories apply to the South African context.  
Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that focuses on conducting 
public attitude surveys focusing on democracy, governance, and economic conditions in 37 
African countries. It was founded in 1999 by Dr Michael Bratton, Dr Robert Mattes, and Dr E 
Gyimah-Boadi and initially surveyed 12 countries, including South Africa.22 Fieldworks are 
conducted on the basis of face-to-face interviews based on a random sampling method of up to 
                                                     
19 Reductionism refers to the efforts of a researcher to explain “macro-level events using evidence about 
individuals”, thereby using evidence of an individual to make generalisations about the population (Neuman, 
2008:169) 
20 Research outcomes are considered spurious when a researcher believes to have discovered a relationship 
between two variables, but actually oversee a third variable or factor that is the real cause (Neuman, 2008:171).  
21 A cross-sectional design looks at information involving a large number of cases at a single point in time in 
order to determine relationships between variables (Burnham, et al., 2008:59).  
22 http://afrobarometer.org/about  
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2,400 people. The sample is intended to represent a cross-section of the voting age population 
in all countries. The sample design is a “clustered23, stratified24, multi-stage25, area probability 
sample26” to ensure the inclusion of all population groups. All interviewers are trained prior to 
the beginning of their fieldwork and teams, consisting of four interviewers and one field 
supervisor, are deployed to ensure high-quality data (Afrobarometer, 2018).27 The survey is 
designed to tap several societal themes, ranging from tolerance, governance, and political 
participation to gender equality and identity.  
Therefore, the Afrobarometer is considered a suitable source of secondary data analysis, as it 
follows the procedures to ensure a true representation of the entire population and makes use 
of trained interviewers which lowers the risk of falsified outcomes. Data from the 
Afrobarometer is used in hopes of overcoming the above-mentioned limitations of quantitative 
survey analysis.  
3.2.3 Methodological foundation 
This study mostly draws from Stoycheff’s and Nisbet’s (2014) methodological approach, 
discussed in chapter 2 but also considers methodologies of other researchers. These 
methodologies primarily make use of survey results and therefore quantitative analysis. The 
primary dependent variables that can be observed throughout the literature are socio-
demographic variables, such as age, gender, race, education, religious affiliation, income, 
socio-economic status, and location of respondents (Bimber, 1999; Best & Kruger, 2005; 
Norris & Curtice; Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Moeller, et al., 2014). Due to limitations posed 
by the Afrobarometer questionnaire, only a few of these variables are included in this study 
(age, race, gender, education, and urban-rural location). 
Swigger (2012:590) argues that the rise of Web 2.0 and specifically social networking sites has 
a significant impact on the values that individuals hold. He argues that people, who are actively 
                                                     
23 Clustered sampling is a random sampling technique that consists of several stages and is used to include large 
geographic areas in which aggregated units are selected on a random basis of which samples are drawn 
(Neuman, 2006:233). 
24Stratification improves the accuracy of a sample because relevant information about the population already 
exists, which enables the division of the sample into “homogenous groups or strata” of which random samples 
are taken (Burnham, et al., 2008:104).  
25 Multi-stage sampling is similar to that of stratified sampling in the way that the population is divided into 
groups or areas from which the samples are drawn. Countries are usually divided into constituencies of which a 
sample is drawn and then “a sample of voters within the selected constituencies” (Burnham, et al., 2008:104). 
26 Area probability sampling refers to the equal likelihood of all people living in the same of being included in a 
sample (Burnham, et al., 2008:103). 
27 http://afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles  
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sharing information have begun to “value the right of free expression more and the right of 
privacy less”. His research provides evidence that the Internet, while becoming a fundamental 
aspect of most people’s everyday lives, has begun to shape and change the way people perceive 
several things, including values and beliefs. Norris (2001:55) argues that cyberspace is 
dominated by postmaterialist value priorities, where users are more concerned with self-
actualization and issues concerning quality of life, self-expression, individual freedom, 
cosmopolitanism, and participatory democracy. Thereby, postmaterialist values are more likely 
to spread faster among Internet users than non-users.  
Given the fact that the Afrobarometer Round 6 survey does not measure materialist versus 
postmaterialist value preferences per se, this study looks at variables that measure emancipative 
value preferences that look at respondents’ opinions regarding government control and female 
leadership. It also looks at the extent to which participants prefer different types of governments 
besides democracy.  
Johnson and Kaye (2003) measure political attitudes by looking at respondents’ political 
interest, campaign interest, intention to vote, trust in the government, and party closeness. 
Stoycheff and Nisbet (2014) also include measures of demand for democracy and perceived 
supply of democracy in their research to determine whether Internet exposure influences 
citizens’ perceptions of democracy. Similarly, this study looks at participants’ interest in public 
affairs, and the frequency of discussing politics with others while also looking at perceptions 
of democracy and satisfaction with democracy. To determine whether there is a difference in 
attitudes towards politicians among participants, measures of trust toward politicians and 
democratic institutions are included. These measures are based on findings that suggest that 
Internet users are more sceptical of political leaders and their intentions (see Tedesco, 2007; 
Knobloch-Westerwick & Johnson, 2014; Vissers & Stolle, 2014). Furthermore, party closeness 
is included as a dependent variable to assess whether online activity impacts citizens’ party 
preferences. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, Dalton (2014:38-39) lists six types of political action that 
citizens can take. Citing Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) Dalton (2014) 
lists 1) voting, 2) campaign activity, 3) contacting officials directly, and 4) communal activity 
as four general types of political behaviour and adds 5) protest and other forms of contentious 
politics as well as 6) Internet activism. This study closely follows Dalton’s (2014) identified 
modes of political participation by looking at participants’ membership in groups or 
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organisations and their attendance at community meetings, whether they voted, their campaign 
activity, how often they contact officials or leaders about an issue, and finally citizen action 
(which includes requesting action from government, contacting the media, contacting a 
government official to ask for help or make a complaint, and participating in a demonstration 
or protest march). Norris and Curtice (2006) take a particularly close look at voting, campaign-
, cause-, and civic-oriented forms of participation by grouping several modes of participation 
into one of these categories. Sylvester and McGlynn (2010) attempt to measure how Internet 
usage affects contacting officials, while Vissers and Stolle (2010) focus more on protest and 
other forms of contentious politics. The variables chosen for this study thus closely reflect those 
used in previous studies.    
3.2.4 Operationalisation of Variables 
All variable items and their respective coding categories can be viewed in Appendix B (page 
117) 
Independent and control variable 
Contrary to ordinary research that looks at many independent variables and how they affect 
one dependent variable, this research will focus on three independent variables (internet and 
social media use for political news, and a scale consisting of both, social media and general 
internet use for acquiring political news) and how it affects a large number of dependent 
variables (political values, attitudes, and behaviour). Question twelve of the Afrobarometer 
asks respondents “How often do you get news from the following sources?” A) “Radio”, B) 
“Television”, C) “Newspapers”, D) “Internet” and E) “Social Media such as Facebook or 
Twitter”. This research will only focus on the responses provided by response category D) and 
E). Answers will be filtered by respondents who indicated D) Internet and E) Social Media and 
will then be divided into users and non-users. The question measures usage on a 5-point scale 
coded 0)“Never”, 1)“Less than once a month”, 2)“A few times a month”, 3)“A Few times a 
week”, and 4)“Everyday”. Those respondents who indicated answers 4 to 1 will be regarded 
as Internet and Social Media users, whereas respondents who indicated 0 will be regarded as 
non-users. Most respondents that fall into the user category indicated that they use the Internet 
to obtain political news at least a few times a week (Internet 12.7%) or every day (Internet 
24.4%). “Don’t know” categories will be removed from inferential statistical tests (non-
descriptive analysis) to ensure that data results only represent users and non-users. The 
distribution of Internet users who indicated either 4), 3), 2), and 1) (48.8%) versus non-users 
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(51.2%), and Social Media users (47.8%) versus non-users (52.3%) will thus represent a more 
or less equal distribution of respondents, which is important for statistical tests. Furthermore, 
a scale variable consisting of both Internet and social media use (IntSocMe) is calculated and 
treated as a third independent variable28. A scale measuring both Internet and social media use 
might offer some additional insight that could tell us whether a combined use of Internet and 
social media for political news influences political attitudes and behaviour of respondents.  
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in this study are grouped together under political values, attitudes, and 
behaviour.  
1. Political values  
Political values are measured through a battery of questions where respondents are asked with 
which statement they agree the most. More specifically, emancipative value preferences are 
tested. Respondents who are more likely to believe that government should interfere when it 
comes to press freedom and freedom to join any organisation and oppose gender equality in 
terms of leadership, are believed to have lower emancipative value sets. Furthermore, 
respondents are asked questions pertaining to their valuing of democracy, as grounded in 
Nisbet’s and Stoycheff’s (2014) findings.  
                                                     
28 SPSS allows its users to collapse two or more indicators into a single variable by computing a new index. 
This is a useful tool when one wishes to measure a single concept through a set of indicators, to assess the 
degree to which concepts are conceptually different, to reduce a large number of variables or indicators to a 
smaller and more relevant list, and to aid in the process of constructing an index or separate variable (Field, 
2009:629). However, even though the wording in some questions in a survey might be similar, this does not 
imply that they measure the same concept so prior to creating a new variable or scale, it is paramount to conduct 
a factor analysis to determine whether there exist clusters of attitudes amongst respondents28. Prior to creating a 
separate variable consisting of measures of Internet and social media use for obtaining news, a factor analysis 
was conducted and the suitability of data for factor analysis was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix 
revealed that the coefficient of both variables took on a value of .771. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .528, 
while the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance of .000. The principal component analysis 
revealed the presence of two components, one of which had an eigenvalue exceeding 1 (1.771), explaining 
88.57% of variance. The component matrix revealed strong loadings (.941) for factor one. Additionally, a 
reliability analysis was performed, showing strong reliability statistics (Cronbach’s α= .870) of the two separate 
variables. After performing a factor analysis and reliability analysis, we can conclude that both variables are 
strongly related and thus we can move on to creating a scale (See Appendix xx for a detailed syntax of the 
procedure).  
 
Political values  
Q16: Government restrictions vs. freedom to join any organisation 
Q17: Media should be free to publish anything vs. government restrictions  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
50 
 
2. Political attitudes  
 Political attitudes are measured by looking at questions that measure citizen interest in public 
affairs, frequency of discussing political matters, their views of democratic processes in South 
Africa, citizens’ views of government and the country, as well as views of political institutions.  
Political attitudes 
Q13: Interest in public affairs 
Q14: Frequency of discussing political matters 
Q40: Perception of extent of democracy 
Q41: Satisfaction with democracy  
Q52 a,b,e,f,g,m,n: Trust in democratic institutions and officials 29  
Q53a-g: Perceptions of government officials’ involvement in corruption30 
3. Political behaviour  
Political behaviour is measured by looking at respondents ‘turnout, their campaign and 
communal activity, as well as citizen action.   
Political behaviour 
Q19: Membership in religious groups or voluntary organisations  
Q20: Attending community meetings, raising an issue  
Q21: Voting (reasons for not voting)31 
Q23a-d: Campaign activity  
                                                     
29 Trust has been recoded into a scale variable consisting of four separate variables measuring trust in 
government institutions and officials. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of many 
coefficients above .3. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .788, which meets the recommended value of .6, while 
the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance of .000. The principal component analysis 
revealed the presence of one component, which had an eigenvalue exceeding 1 (2.804), explaining 56.07% of 
variance. The component matrix revealed strong loadings (Q52a=.862; Q52b=.844; Q52f=.837; Q52e=.764) for 
factor one. Additionally, a reliability analysis was performed, showing strong reliability statistics (Cronbach’s 
α= .785) of the separate variables. After performing a factor analysis and reliability analysis, we can conclude 
that the variables (Q52a; Q52b, Q52f, Q52e) are strongly related and thus we can move on to creating a scale 
measuring trust (See Appendix xx for a detailed syntax of the procedure).  
30 Corruption has been recoded into a scale variable consisting of seven separate variables measuring trust in 
government institutions and officials. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the presence of many 
coefficients above .3. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .877, which meets the recommended value of .6, while 
the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance of .000. The principal component analysis 
revealed the presence of one component, which had an eigenvalue exceeding 1 (3.948), explaining 56.39% of 
variance. The component matrix revealed strong loadings (Q53a=.773; Q53b=.834; Q53c=.845; Q53d=.765 
Q53e=.710; Q53f=.657 Q53g=.649) for factor one. Additionally, a reliability analysis was performed, showing 
strong reliability statistics (Cronbach’s α= .872) 
31 Voting recoded into dichotomous variable with categories presenting “voted” and “did not vote”  
Q18: Men make better leaders vs. women should have equal chances of becoming leaders 
Q28: Approval of differing forms of government 
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Q24a-d: Contacting officials/ leaders about an issue 32 
Q27a-e: Citizen action  
 
Demographic variables 
Demographic variables will be employed to determine any sociological differences in usage 
based on age, gender, race, urbanity, and education. Age (Q1) is measured as a scale variable 
ranging from 18 to 95. For the purpose of a simplified analysis, age will be recoded into a new 
variable, grouping different age cohorts together. The new variable will measure respondents’ 
age in five different categories representing 1) 18-24, 2) 25-34, 3) 35-44, 4) 45-54, 5) 55+ age 
groups. Gender (Q101) is a dichotomous variable, with male coded 1) (49.9%) and female 
coded 2) (50.1%). Race (102) is a 5-point variable representing black/African, white/European, 
coloured/mixed race, South Asian, and other respondents. Because very few cases represent 
“other” race groups, and because no specific groups are named, this attribute will be removed 
from the analysis. Education33 (Q97) is measured on a 10-point scale ranging from no formal 
education to post-graduate education, which will be recoded into 4 categories coded 1) Post-
secondary/tertiary education, 2) Completed secondary school, 3) Incomplete secondary 
school, 4) Primary or less. Urbanity (URBRUR) is a dichotomous variable, with urban coded 
low (66%) and rural coded high (34%).  
3.2.5 Statistical Tests 
Crosstabulations are employed to make inferences about the impact of the Internet on the 
independent variables. Crosstabulations are the most popular way to demonstrate bivariate 
analysis and provide an appropriate statistical measure to summarise data and direction of the 
correlation. The value of crosstabulations is that they can be used descriptively to compare 
                                                     
32 Contacting officials and leader has been recoded into a scale variable consisting of four separate variables 
measuring frequency of contacting government officials. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed the 
presence of many coefficients above .3. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .768, which meets the 
recommended value of .6, while the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance of .000. The 
principal component analysis revealed the presence of one component, which had an eigenvalue exceeding 1 
(3.948), explaining 56.39% of variance. The component matrix revealed strong loadings (Q24a=.701; 
Q24b=.771; Q24c=.823; Q24d=.817) for factor one. Additionally, a reliability analysis was performed, showing 
strong reliability statistics (Cronbach’s α= .737) of the variables. After performing a factor analysis and 
reliability analysis, we can conclude that the variables (Q24a, b, c, d) are strongly related and thus we can move 
on to creating a scale measuring contact. 
33 Original variable consisting of 1) No formal schooling; 2) Informal schooling only; 3) Some primary 
schooling; 4) Primary school completed; 5) Some secondary school / high school; 6) Secondary school / high 
school completed; 7) Post-secondary qualifications, other than university; 8) Some university; 9) University 
completed; 10) Post-graduate 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
52 
 
groups by looking at and comparing frequencies that fall into each category, as well as 
inferentially to examine a relationship between two variables through statistical tests.   
The choice of correlation coefficients (summary statistics) is based on the levels of 
measurement of different variables. On an ordinal by ordinal level, Spearman’s rho is used and 
on an ordinal by nominal level, Cramer’s V is considered. The correlation coefficients 
determine the strength and direction of the associations or relationships between two variables 
and significance level (the significance level must be less than p=.05) which suggests that the 
probability of obtaining our results by chance is less than .05% and allows one to reject the null 
hypotheses (that there is no relationship between our variables).  
To make the analysis clearer and to reduce cases, scale variables will be computed for measures 
of contacting officials (Q24), trust (Q52), and perceptions of corruption (Q53). This is done by 
first conducting a factor analysis (or extraction) to determine which variables represent clusters 
of attitudes among respondents. Kaiser’s criterion34 is used to assist in the decision concerning 
how many factors are retained for building a scale. Additionally, scree tests35 are used for a 
visual representation of the eigenvalues of each factor. Furthermore, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO)36 is included as is the Barlett’s Test of Sphericity37. 
In the correlation matrix, only variables with a correlation coefficient of .3 and above are 
selected to be included in the creation of a scale. In order to determine the reliability of each 
scale, Cronbach’s alpha is used and only values of .7 or higher will be deemed acceptable in 
proceeding to build a scale (Field, 2009:675).  
3.3 Part II: Qualitative analysis 
3.3.1 Qualitative methods 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, assumes that meaning is “personal and subjective and 
to be best understood through social interaction” (Wheeldon & Ahlberg, 2011:80). It typically 
                                                     
34 Kaiser’s criterion or the eigenvalue rule presents factors and how they load together. Only factors with an 
eigenvalue of 1.0 or above are retained. The eigenvalue of a factor represents the proportion of total variance 
explained by each factor (Field, 2009:640). It is kept in mind that Kaiser’s criterion faces some criticism in the 
sense that it tends to “overestimates the numbers of factors to retain” (Field, 2009:641). However, this obstacle 
is overcome with the aid of scree tests. 
35 A scree test plots each factor’s eigenvalue and thus allows for an inspection of the plot to determine at which 
point the curve changes its direction (Field, 2009:641).  
36 The KMO statistic can take on values between 0 and 1. A value of .6 and above is considered to represent 
“distinct and reliable factors” (Field, 2009:647).  
37 Barlett’s measure tests the null hypothesis that “the original correlation matrix is an identity matrix” and 
therefore tests for levels of significance (Field, 2009:660).  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
relies on individual accounts to make sense of phenomena and events and research is conducted 
in an inductive38 direction. Qualitative research involves several research techniques, including 
interviews, focus group discussions, or direct observations, to name a few (Bless, Higson-Smit, 
2006). This study will make use of focus group discussions to enrich the quantitative findings.  
It was mentioned earlier that previous research on the relationship between the Internet and 
political behaviour predominantly relies on quantitative measures that explore the what in the 
relationships between predetermined variables. This limits researchers’ findings as they are 
confined to use strictly defined variables in surveys instead of exploring the possibility of the 
existence of other important variables. This research study seeks to fill the gap in qualitative 
research in the overall literature by exploring the how and the why. Given South Africa’s large 
youth bulk, this cohort is a suitable target group. Ideally, the outcome of this study should 
answer the following questions; how do young university students engage with political 
information online? Why is the web more appealing to them than conventional news media?  
Litosseliti (2003:1) defines focus groups as a “carefully planned discussion designed to obtain 
perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening environment”. Focus 
groups serve to explore specific topics and participants’ views, attitudes and experience relating 
to that topic through group interaction. Because they represent a more natural environment 
based on conversation flow and exchange, they offer some advantages over methods such as 
interviews and participant observation. Just like in real life, members of the group discussion 
are likely to influence and be influenced by others. Therefore, the emphasis of focus groups 
rests primarily on the interaction among individuals. What makes this so unique and valuable 
is that this might allow the researcher to “uncover new, open-ended pathways for discussion” 
through minimal intervention (Litosseliti, 2003:3,5).  
Most importantly, while focus groups should follow a set line of questions, they do allow for 
flexibility. This means that the moderator does not need to follow a strict questionnaire as is 
often the case in formal interviews but can deviate somewhat from the prescribed questions if 
an interesting topic should arise (Litosseliti, 2003:17).  
The interaction among individuals can be very helpful for researchers to understand how some 
individuals feel about a certain topic. Participants “bounce ideas off each other and can agree 
                                                     
38 Inductive reasoning seeks to either develop or confirm a theory by exploring empirical evidence and working 
“towards more abstract concepts and theoretical relationships” (Neuman, 2006:60). Part of an inductive 
reasoning is grounded theory building which involves the formulation of new theoretical ideas, rather than 
testing already existing ones (Wheeldon & Ahlberg, 2011:9).  
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or disagree”, thus demonstrating different views or stimulating thought among other 
participants who will, in turn, present their view in the discussion (Burnham, et al., 2008:130). 
Therefore, topics can be explored in far more detail than in a survey because no strictly 
prescribed set of questions are asked, but new ideas and viewpoints can be explored that the 
researcher may previously not have thought of (Burnham, et al., 2008:129-132).  
Like all research methods, focus groups have limitations. One limitation is that it is impossible 
to be certain of how representative the groups are of the selected population. Therefore, 
representativeness cannot be guaranteed and “results are qualitative and indicative, rather than 
valid for the whole population” (Burnham, et al., 2008:134). Thus, they can by no means 
replace surveys to make predictions about behaviour. Furthermore, over-dominant group 
members can distort data as they leave little room for other members to express their views 
(Berg, 2001:188). Litosseliti (2003:21) suggests that the best method to deal with over-
dominant participants is to moderate them firmly, yet non-intrusively and to fall back to the 
topic guide to make sure the discussion remains on track. Furthermore, rules of behaviour 
should be clearly outlined prior to the discussion as to ensure that all participants are aware of 
certain ground rules, such as “asking people not to talk at the same time” or interrupting each 
other (Litosseliti, 2003:21).  
Additionally, participants should be carefully selected in accordance with the research question 
or hypotheses in order to “avoid a disruptive mismatch among participants and between topics” 
(Litosseliti, 2003:22). It is also possible that group members may withhold certain information 
or provide misinformation to avoid embarrassment or to admit to a lack of knowledge. It 
therefore requires a good moderator to “grasp the various contextual parameters” by paying 
attention to people’s language, body language, and emotional or visual cues (Litosseliti, 
2003:24). This can be achieved through a friendly and open environment and by ensuring 
participants that there are no right or wrong answers, that every contribution is valid and to 
encourage them to be forthcoming with their views and opinions.   
The advantages and disadvantages of qualitative and quantitative research approaches 
respectively are debated, and each appears to have its own strengths and limitations. Neuman 
(2006:13) contrasts both approaches and points out their differences; a quantitative approach 
measures objective facts with a focus on variables while the qualitative approach focuses on 
social reality and cultural meaning. Furthermore, quantitative research places a high emphasis 
on reliability of outcomes and the absence of values, the separation of theory and data, and an 
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independence of context, while qualitative research places emphasis on authenticity, is not 
opposed to the presence of values, allows data and theory to be fused and is situationally 
constrained. The largest difference between the two approaches is the number of cases; 
qualitative research studies few cases and subjects and places its analysis on subjects whereas 
quantitative research relies on statistical analysis (Neuman, 2006:13). Thus, the main 
advantage of a mixed methods approach is that inferences can be made based on quantitative 
outcomes and can be studied in further detail through qualitative research and vice versa.  
3.3.2 Focus Groups 
Once relationships based on quantitative analysis have been determined, the second part of the 
research study aims to focus on qualitative data collection through focus group discussions 
with students at Stellenbosch University. Following H1's assumption that Internet users tend 
to be younger, this seems to be an appropriate focus group that could offer valuable insight into 
the nature of young people’s engagement with the Internet. It might also offer useful insight 
into the political behaviour of this cohort, which appear to be less engaged in politics than its 
older counterparts (Wattenberg, 2016; Tracey, 2016; Resnick & Casale, 2014; Malila, 2016; 
Dalton, 2007; Schoemann & Puttergill, 2007; Mattes 2012; Mattes & Richmond, 2015; 
Seekings, 2014). 
In order to recruit participants, ethical clearance will be sought from Stellenbosch University 
first, followed by a request at the University to allow the researcher to conduct focus group 
discussions with students from the department of political science. This serves to determine 
whether there exist differences in the way students engage with the Internet and social media. 
For the purpose of this research study, a focus group discussion was conducted with humanities 
postgraduate students at Stellenbosch University.  
Burnham, et al., (2008:133) suggest that the best method to record the data during focus group 
is to video and tape record the discussion. This makes it easier for the researcher to “identify 
the contributions of each individual” and to “capture the enthusiasm, intensity and dynamics 
of group interactions”. This method also makes the transcription and analysis of data easier for 
the researcher. Therefore, this study makes use of video recordings during group discussions. 
The information obtained during these discussions was handled with confidentiality and 
participants were guaranteed anonymity. Participants were asked for permission to video 
record the group discussion for research purposes. Any data that has been collected during the 
interviews that could disclose participants’ identity, or otherwise sensitive information is stored 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
 
on a password-secured personal computer which only the researcher will have access to. The 
venue for discussions should ideally be an open, friendly, and neutral environment that enables 
members of discussions to feel comfortable and safe. This requirement was met to the best of 
the researcher’s abilities. 
Focus group discussions serve to enrich the outcome of this study through more in-depth 
discussion of the Internet and social media use. They are aimed at gaining a better 
understanding of the way in which university students engage with content online and how this 
affects their attitudes, values, and behaviour. Despite the weaknesses of focus group 
discussions mentioned above, it is nevertheless expected that the outcome will provide rich and 
meaningful information and valuable insights in the way in which especially young university 
students engage with the Internet and social media. 
3.3.3 Discussion Procedure 
Upon arrival at the venue of discussion, all participants were handed consent forms which they 
were asked to read and sign to affirm that they understand what the research is about, their role 
in the study, as well as possible risks associated with participating. Before the discussion was 
initiated, participants were given labelling stickers on which they were asked to write their first 
name to make it easier to engage with each other on a first name basis. Thereafter, participants 
were asked to be seated in one of the chairs provided in the setting and to quickly introduce 
themselves to others to get to know one another. Seats were organised in a circle so that 
participants all faced one another and refreshments in the form of coffee, water, and doughnuts 
were freely available.   
Before the discussion was initiated, the moderator provided an overview of the purpose of the 
focus group and the expected duration of the discussion. Furthermore, ground rules which were 
also outlined in the consent form were established. Those rules stated inter alia that participants 
were free to leave the discussion at any given time if they felt uncomfortable. Everyone present 
was reminded that should anyone at any point during the interview insult or attack another 
participant on grounds of race, gender, background, political affiliation or other, he or she will 
be asked to leave immediately. All students available were encouraged to engage with each 
other in an open, polite, and orderly fashion and in a way that allows everyone to participate 
and to be heard. Participants were reminded that everyone has different opinions and that no 
single point of view would be discredited, discarded, or seen as unimportant or irrelevant. 
Participants were also informed that the discussion was to be videotaped for the sole purpose 
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of research. Assurance was given that recordings were only available to the researcher and her 
supervisor.  
3.3.4 Focus Group Questions 
We know from the literature and the findings of this research that young, educated people are 
most likely to use the Internet and social media. We shall also see that both mediums decrease 
their levels of trust in politicians and increase their belief that government officials are likely 
to be involved in corruption. At the same time, we do not find many other significant 
correlations between Internet and social media use and civic values, attitudes, and behaviour 
compared to other age groups. This raises further questions that might not be answered through 
quantitative measures alone but might be answered through focus groups. These questions inter 
alia ask why are young people less likely to trust politicians the more time they spent online? 
What leads them to believe in high levels of corruption among government officials? If the 
Internet and social media do not significantly affect their attitudes, values and behaviour, are 
there other variables which might be affected that we have not previously thought of?  
To make focus group discussions take on a more natural flow, Krueger (1998:21) distinguishes 
between five different types of questions with distinct purposes.  These categories are opening, 
introductory, transition, key, and ending questions. The opening question is designed to be 
answered quickly and to give each participant an opportunity to speak before moving on to 
more in-depth questions. This type of question is not intended to give any useful insight to by 
measuring attitudes of respondents but rather create a “sense of community in the group” 
(Krueger, 1998:23).  
Introductory questions “introduce the general topic of discussion” and often give participants 
an opportunity to think about their experience related to the research topic. These types of 
questions are designed to spark conversation among participants but are not necessarily 
designed to be analysed. Usually, they are open-ended questions that allow members of focus 
group discussions to tell others what they think or how they feel about the topic (Krueger, 
1998:24).  
Transition questions quite simply serve to link introductory and key questions by asking 
participants to go into more detail about their experiences with, or feelings about the topic at 
hand. These questions typically “make the connection between the participant and the topic of 
investigation” (Krueger, 1998:25).  
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Key questions constitute the body of focus group discussions and typically consist of two to 
five questions. They are the ones that require the most attention in the analysis and therefore 
the most amount of time throughout the discussion as these questions seek to tap the underlying 
thing that the researcher is trying to measure (Krueger, 1998:25).  
Finally, ending questions “bring closure to the discussion” and allow participants to reflect on 
previous comments (Krueger, 1998:26). These questions can either be “all-things-considered” 
questions that can help participants clarify their point of view, “summary questions” where the 
moderator gives participants a short summary of the key points that emerged from the 
discussions and asks them whether it is accurate, or “final questions” which functions as a type 
of insurance question (Krueger, 1998: 25-26).  
Opening Questions:  
 Tell us who you are, where you are from, and what you are writing your research project 
on.  
Introductory Questions:  
 Do you have a social media account?  
 Do you have access to the Internet outside of university?  
Transition Questions:  
 Where do you primarily get your political news from?  
o Why do you prefer the Internet and social media as source of political news?  
Key Questions  
 Would you say that the Internet and social media have made you more critical and 
distrusting of politicians and institutions?  
 Do you think the Internet and social media have made you more politically active and 
informed?  
o Would you say that social media has the potential to dissuade you from voting?  
 Do you think the Internet and social media have the potential to improve democracy?  
 Thinking about your own beliefs and views, do you sometimes expose yourself to 
different points of view that do not reflect your own?  
Ending Question 
 What is your favourite and least favourite thing about social media?  
 
3.4 Multi-methods research 
3.4.1 Combining quantitative and qualitative methods 
In his book, Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods, Morgan (2014:4) warns his 
readers of the difficulties related to combining different methods in a research study. He 
explains that the use of two methods not only involves more work but integrating them 
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effectively so that each complements the other is a challenge on its own. Simply presenting 
more results or different kinds of results does not necessarily improve the quality of one’s work. 
Particularly the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods can be challenging 
because researchers are often seduced by the distinct strengths of each approach and fall into 
the trap of methodological eclecticism, or “an anything goes approach” and in the end fail to 
integrate both findings in a meaningful way (Morgan, 2014: 4).  
It is therefore essential to identify the kind of integration of methods that is suitable for a 
specific research study. Morgan (2014: 10-11) mentions three types of mixed methods 
approaches that each have distinct characteristics and strengths. The first one is a convergent 
approach, where the same research question is addressed “using both a survey and qualitative” 
approaches. The second methodology of using mixed methods is that of additional coverage, 
where “different methods (are assigned) to different purposes” so that the project can “pursue 
a wider range of research goals” than would be possible with any single method (Morgan, 
2014:73). Finally, sequential contributions work quite similarly to additional coverage, 
however the former assigns different purposes to each method while the latter uses the “results 
of one method to enhance the effectiveness of another” (Morgan, 2014: 11).  
Therefore, this research study makes use of sequential and additional coverage. The insights 
gained through the quantitative analysis serve as a foundation upon which focus group 
questions are formulated. In other words, statistical outcomes should tell us which areas to 
address in order to pose meaningful questions to group participants. Yet, both quantitative and 
qualitative findings are assigned equal importance in the outcome of the study and simply serve 
the purpose to enrich overall findings.  
Blaikie (2010:218) explains that some writers regard the use of mixed methods as a “third 
methodological movement”, apart from quantitative and qualitative studies. He summarises the 
advantages of mixed methods. First and foremost, the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative research can mitigate the shortcomings of one method through the strengths of 
another and thus produce “more comprehensive evidence” that compliments each other 
(Blaikie, 2010:219). Mixed methods also help to answer several aspects of a research question 
that cannot be answered by a single approach. This means that depending on whether the 
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researcher seeks to investigate in an inductive or deductive direction, mixed methods can help 
to produce results in all of these directions at the same time by offering abductive reasoning39.  
Miles and Huberman (2002:396) suggest that,  
 “both quantitative and qualitative inquiry can support and inform each other in important ways. 
Narratives and variable-driven analyses need to interpenetrate and inform each other. Realists, 
idealists and critical theorists can do better by incorporating other ideas than remaining pure.”  
Nie and Erbring (2000) suggest that time individuals spend online is less relevant than what 
they are doing online, i.e. which websites they visit and how they engage with those websites. 
This is because meaningful interaction with politically related information is required to impact 
values, attitudes, and behaviour. Therefore, the quantitative aspect of this study aims to answer 
whether people who do get their news online differ from those who obtain them elsewhere, 
whereas the qualitative aspects seek to answer how individuals are shaped by their online 
experiences.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodologies used to measure the relationship 
between Internet and social media and civic attitudes, values and political behaviour. It outlines 
the benefits and shortcomings of both, quantitative and qualitative research in the social 
sciences. Furthermore, the chapter lays out the methodological foundations upon which this 
study is based, and the specific steps undertaken to obtain reliable outcomes for the quantitative 
data analysis and points out which variables will be used to test the hypotheses. Lastly, this 
chapter explains the discussion procedure of the qualitative focus group discussions and which 
questions will be asked during the session and finally argues that if used together, both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies can complement each other by mitigating each 
other’s shortcomings. The following chapter focuses on the quantitative analysis of data 
obtained from the Afrobarometer Round 6 of 2015 survey.  
 
  
                                                     
39 Abductive research on the other hand, can answer both, the ‘what’ and the ‘why, however it tends to answer 
the ‘why’ by “producing understanding rather than an explanation” (Blaikie, 2010:85-88). Abductive reasoning 
typically relies on the “expertise, experience, and intuition of researchers” (Wheeldon, Ahlberg, 2011:117).  
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Chapter 4: Quantitative Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 explores whether a relationship between Internet and social media use and political 
attitudes and behaviour exists. This is achieved through quantitative measures that explore 
correlations between the dependent and independent variables. The first part deals with the 
demographic aspects of Internet and social media use by looking at age, education, gender, 
race and location of respondent. Thereafter, the findings of research question 1 are discussed 
and interprepeted in relation to the global literature. Following this, research question 2 is 
addressed and alternative measures of determining relationships suggested and implemented 
through the introduction of a third research question. Finally, findings are compared to those 
of previous studies to gain an understanding of the context of the results.  
4.2 Research Question 1 
Before we can move on to choose the appropriate statistic to determine relationships, we must 
inspect whether the data in the sample is normally distributed. This needs to be done because 
the appropriate measures of correlation depend on the distribution of the data. Inspection of the 
values of skewness and kurtosis show that the data used in this sample is non-parametric, 
therefore non-parametric measurements are used. In the table below, each demographic 
variable shows the values of correlation (Spearman’s rho) between Internet, social media, and 
the scale consisting of Internet and social media use (IntSocMe) and the dependent variables. 
Spearman’s rho is especially useful because it can be used to calculate correlations between 
ordinal by ordinal and ordinal by scale variables.  
Research question 1 of this study asks, Which demographic groups predominantly use the 
Internet and social media to source political news? Table 1 displays the bivariate correlations 
for the demographic groups and Internet and social media use. It should be noted that in this 
case, the demographic groups will be treated as independent variables since the Internet or 
social media use cannot affect ones likelihood of being male or female, for example.  
Correlations for demographic variables  
Age 18-24 (1); 25-34 (2); 35-44 (3); 
45-54 (4); 55+ (5) 
 
Internet  -.295** 
Social Media  -.358** 
IntSoc -.348** 
Education Primary or less (1); 
Incomplete secondary schooling (2); 
Internet  .475** 
Social Media  .427** 
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Completed secondary schooling (3); 
Post-secondary/tertiary education 
IntSoc .486** 
Gender Male (1); Female (2) 
Internet  -.058** 
Social Media  -.026** 
IntSoc -.047* 
Race40 Black/African (1); 
White/European (2); Coloured/mixed 
race (3); South Asian/Indian (4) 
Internet  .254** 
Social Media .123** 
IntSocMe .187** 
Location  Urban (1); Rural (2) 
Internet  -.205** 
Social Media  -.147** 
IntSocMe -.187** 
Table 1: Correlation table for Internet and social media use, and Internet and social media scale and demographic variables 
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 states that regular Internet and social media users are more likely to be younger 
and more educated than non-users. The strong, negative correlations between Internet, social 
media, and our Internet-social media scale indicate that use decreases as age increases. 
Similarly, we find strong correlations between education of respondent and Internet and social 
media use. The more educated the respondent, the more likely he or she is to use the Internet 
or social media to source political news. Therefore, we find support for Hypothesis 1 and the 
existence of a digital divide in South Africa that is dominated by age and education.   
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 states that gender of respondent does not determine access to or frequency of 
Internet and social media use. Indeed, we find quite weak, negative correlations between 
Internet, social media, and IntSocMe use and gender of respondent, indicating that men are 
more likely to go online. While the correlations are significant, they are also weak, indicating 
that there is only a slight difference in terms of usage between men and women.  
4.2.3 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 states that there is a difference in terms of Internet and social media use based on 
race. We find weak to moderate correlations between race and using the Internet to source 
political news and a weak correlation between using Social Media and our IntSocMe scale and 
race. The cross table and charts below provide us with further insight.  
Crosstabulation for Internet use by race 
 Never 
Less than 
once a month 
A few times a 
month 
A few times a 
week 
Every day Total 
       
Black 55,6% 4,5% 7,3% 11,9% 20,7% 100,0% 
                                                     
40 Relationships measured using gamma as a measure of association  
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 82,1% 80,0% 74,7% 70,6% 63,6% 75,5% 
       
White 19,2% 4,1% 5,9% 14,2% 56,6% 100,0% 
 3,5% 9,0% 7,5% 10,2% 21,3% 9,2% 
       
Coloured 50,5% 2,8% 8,9% 15,3% 22,4% 100,0% 
 11,7% 8,0% 14,4% 14,2% 10,8% 11,8% 
       
Indian 40,2% 3,7% 7,3% 18,3% 30,5% 100,0% 
 2,7% 3,0% 3,4% 5,0% 4,3% 3,5% 
       
Total  1214 100 174 303 583 2374 
 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
Table 2: Crosstabulation showing row and column percentages  Internet use by race 
Margin of error: 2.05%  
Table 4 shows the frequency of usage for each race group. The first significant thing we observe 
is that the large majority of white respondents (70.8%) uses the Internet either every day, or a 
few times a week, compared to 48.8% of Indian, 37.7% of Coloured, and 32.6% of black 
respondents. The bar chart below also shows us that for black respondents, the proportion of 
those that never use the Internet is significantly larger than responses for any other category. 
By comparison, the gap in terms of frequency of usage narrows for all other race group and for 
white respondents, the proportion of those who use the Internet every day is larger than any 
other proportion. Therefore, we see that the race groups that use the Internet to source political 
news the most are white and Indian respondents. The groups that are the least likely to use the 
Internet are coloured and black respondents.  
The same pattern applies to social media use. Of all respondents, black people are the least 
likely to use social media to source political news, followed by coloured and Indian 
respondents. White respondents are significantly more likely to use social media every day 
than any other race group.   
Therefore, we find that there is a difference in terms of Internet and social media use based on 
race, where white respondents are most likely to go online, followed by Indian respondents. 
Hypothesis 3 which states that there is a difference in terms of use based on race is therefore 
supported. 
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Bar chart Internet use by Race 
 
Figure 1:Bar chart showing percentages of Internet use by Race 
 
Bar chart Social Media use by Race  
 
Figure 2: Bar chart showing percentages for Social Media use by Race 
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 states that Internet and social media users are more likely to live in urban, rather 
than rural areas. There is a negative correlation between all three independent variables and 
location of respondent, meaning that the more someone goes online, the less likely they are to 
live in rural areas. The bar chart for Internet use by location displays a clear linear relationship 
between Internet use and location of respondent. As usage increases, the proportion of 
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respondents who live in rural areas decreases. While the proportions of rural and urban 
respondents fluctuate for social media use, we can still see that urban respondents are more 
likely to use social media than rural respondents. Hypothesis 4, therefore, finds support. 
Stacked bar chart Internet use by Location  
 
Figure 3: Stacked bar chart showing percentages of Internet use by location 
 
Stacked bar char Social Media use by Location 
 
Figure 4: Stacked bar chart showing social media use by location 
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4.3 Interpretation: Research Question 1 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
Bakker and de Vreese (2011:452) point out that Internet use is “not a unidimensional concept 
and thus does not – if at all – affect all groups in society similarly”. Instead, its effects depend 
on a variety of “personal and social characteristics” that are unique to each individual and how 
they choose to access the medium. South Africa is no exception when it comes to distinct 
characteristics that determine access and use of the Internet and social media. One group that 
appears to be a consistent predictor of Internet use are young people. Rainie (2012) claims that 
the use of social media has gained increasing popularity among young adults and is often 
preferred as a source of political information. Norris and Curtice (2006) believe that a “digital 
divide” of online activity among Internet users, where younger and more educated people 
appear to be more active, has ensued. Yamamoto et al. (2015: 895) share this opinion and claim 
that particularly young adults make advanced use of social media to grow social capital that 
develops “user-generated political content” by expressing political views and engaging in 
debates online.  
Hoffman (2017) also finds that people who use the Internet more frequently tend to have higher 
levels of education. Moeller, de Vreese, Esser and Kunz (2014:696) support this statement by 
claiming that “digital natives” or “netizens”, i.e. people who spend a lot of their time browsing 
the Internet, tend to be more educated. These findings hold for most studies and find support 
in this research study. There appears to be a digital divide in the South African context as 
already pointed out by various scholars (Bosch, 2010; 2012; Bosch & Mutsvairo, 2017; Gwaze, 
Hsu, Bosch and Luckett, 2018; Bosch, Wasserman, Chuma, 2018; Bosch, 2018), where 
younger people are more active online. We also find support for the normalisation thesis which 
states that the more educated benefit more from online activity and are also more likely to be 
active online.  
4.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
When it comes to the gender of the respondent, the large majority of available studies on the 
Internet and politics find no meaningful relationship between gender of respondent and Internet 
use. Although men have slightly more access globally than women, their interaction with the 
medium does not differ remarkably. Published data by Statista (2017) shows that Internet 
access in terms of gender in South Africa displays no large differences. Men (51%) have only 
slightly higher access to ICTs than women (49%). This may also explain the small differences 
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in Internet and social media usage to source political information among men and women. 
Given that men have slightly higher access, they are also slightly more likely to use the Internet 
or social media to obtain political news.  
4.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
When it comes to the race of the respondent and Internet and social media use, we find that 
white respondents are more likely to go online than any other race group. Of all race groups, 
black respondents are the least active online, followed by coloured and Indian respondents. 
According to Statistics South Africa (2016)41, the black population in South Africa still lags 
behind in terms of educational attainment, while whites and Indians have the highest proportion 
of post-secondary level of education while both groups also have the lowest proportion of 
individuals with the lowest levels of education. Bosch and Mutsvairo (2017: 74) point out that 
the digital divide in South Africa “mostly reflects one’s race, socioeconomic status and 
geographical status”. This indicates that although there has been a substantial growth in the 
black middle class in South Africa, the black population still faces hardships in terms of 
education and income, which in turn affects their access to the Internet and their ability to 
search for meaningful information online. This provides support for the reinforcement thesis 
which states that previous socioeconomic inequalities are reflected by Internet use as well. 
4.3.4 Hypothesis 4 
Sylvester and McGlynn (2010) have shown that certain segments of the population, especially 
those living in rural areas, have lower access to ICTs than people living in urban areas. This 
may be caused by the difficulty of setting up broadband connections in rural areas due to a lack 
of infrastructure and uneven terrain. This claim finds support in the results above, although to 
a somewhat lower extent than anticipated. The analysis showed quite a distinct linear 
relationship between Internet use and location. Bosch and Mutsvairo (2017: 74) assert that 
during the apartheid era, only those living in “prosperous urban areas” benefited from ICT 
developments, and after the “introduction of commercial Internet services in 1994”, only those 
living in those prosperous areas truly benefitted. The unequal access to ICTs and now Internet 
and social media is thus still affected by location.   
                                                     
41 http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report%2092-01-03/Report%2092-01-032016.pdf 
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4.4 Research Question 2 
Having established which demographic is more active online, we can move on to determine 
whether the Internet and social media do influence political attitudes and behaviour of citizens. 
Research Question 2 of this study asks, “Is there a measurable difference between Internet and 
social media users versus non-users in terms of their political attitudes and their behaviour?”. 
Correlations between Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of 
political attitudes and behaviour 
 Dependent variables  
Internet  Social 
Media 
IntSoc 
H5 
Interest in politics Not at all interested (0); Not very interested 
(1); Somewhat interested (2); Very interested (3) 
.074** .059** .074** 
Discussing politics Never (0); Occasionally (1); Frequently (2) .119** .106** .120** 
H6 
Freedom to join organisations42 Agree very strongly with 
statement 1 (1); Agree with statement 1 (2); Agree very strongly 
with statement 2 (3); Agree with statement 2 (4) 
.017 .033 .025 
Freedom of press43 Agree very strongly with statement 1 (1); 
Agree with statement 1 (2); Agree very strongly with statement 2 
(3); Agree with statement 2 (4) 
-.023 -.026 -.028 
Female leadership44 Agree very strongly with statement 1 (1); 
Agree with statement 1 (2); Agree very strongly with statement 2 
(3); Agree with statement 2 (4) 
.041* .010 .027 
H7 Extent of democracy Not a democracy (1); A democracy, with 
major problems (2); A democracy, but with minor problems (3); A 
full democracy (4)  
-.024 .010 -.007 
Satisfaction with democracy Not at all satisfied (1); not very 
satisfied (2); Fairly satisfied (3); Very satisfied (4) 
.002 .037* .020 
Trust (Scale) Not at all (low); a lot (high) -.099** -.069** -.101** 
Corruption (Scale) None (low); all of them (high) .101** .082** .092** 
H8 Reject one-party rule Strongly disapprove (1); disapprove (2); 
Neither approve nor disapprove (3); approve (4); Strongly approve 
(5) 
-.066** -.063** -.072** 
Reject military rule Strongly disapprove (1); disapprove (2); 
Neither approve nor disapprove (3); approve (4); Strongly approve 
(5) 
-.005 -.013 -.010 
Reject one-man rule Strongly disapprove (1); disapprove (2); 
Neither approve nor disapprove (3); approve (4); Strongly approve 
(5) 
-.034 -.033 -.033 
Reject Apartheid Strongly disapprove (1); disapprove (2); 
Neither approve nor disapprove (3); approve (4); Strongly approve 
(5) 
.051** .043* .050** 
H9 Member of religious group Not a member (0); Inactive Member 
(1); Active member (2); Official leader (3) 
.082** .060** .076** 
Member of voluntary association Not a member (0); Inactive 
Member (1); Active member (2); Official leader (3) 
.060** .069** .064** 
                                                     
42 Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. Statement 2: We 
should be able to join any organization, whether or not government approves of it.   
43 Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control. 
Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers 
harmful to society.  
44 Statement 1: Men make better political leaders than women, and should be elected rather than women. Statement 
2: Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.  
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Attend a community meeting Would never do this (0); Would if 
had the chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several times (3); Often (4) 
-.034 -.042* -.041* 
Join others to raise an issue Would never do this (0); Would if 
had the chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several times (3); Often (4) 
-.044* -.033 -.040* 
Voting Voted (1); Did not vote (2) .060** .052* .060** 
Attend a campaign meeting No (0); Yes (1) .006 .037* .017 
Attend a campaign rally No (0); Yes (1) -.020 .001 -.007 
Persuade others to vote No (0); Yes (1) .007 .015 .011 
Work for candidate or party No (0); Yes (1) .013 .025 .020 
Contact (Scale) Never (low); Often (high)  -.013 .001 -.004 
Request government action Would never do this (0); Would if 
had the chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several times (3); Often (4) 
.015 .006 -.004 
Contact media Would never do this (0); Would if had the chance 
(1); Once or twice (2); Several times (3); Often (4) 
.088** .116** .108** 
Contact official for help Would never do this (0); Would if had 
the chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several times (3); Often (4) 
.037 .060** .049* 
Attend demonstration or protest Would never do this (0); Would 
if had the chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several times (3); Often 
(4) 
.011 .056** .035* 
Table 3: Correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of political attitudes and 
behaviour 
Table 2 displays the bivariate correlation for measures of political attitudes and behaviour and 
Internet, social media use and the Internet social media scale. We quickly come to realise that 
correlations are quite weak or non-existent. These result could mean one of three things. Either 
Internet penetration in South Africa is simply not strong enough to exert any effects on the 
population and this research is conducted to early. Alternatively it could mean that those South 
Africans that read their news online are not affected by the content. Or it could indicate that we 
are not measuring the relationship correctly.  
We know from the literature as highlighted in chapter two that the digital divide in South Africa 
is quite large and runs across several sociodemographic variables. For example, we saw that 
the Internet is dominated by English content that many South Africans do not understand and 
therefore cannot browse the web in a meaningful way (Wasserman, 2002). Furthermore, 
educational attainment stands in the way of technological literacy for mostly black and 
coloured citizens. White and Indian South Africans are the most likely to have higher levels of 
education that provide them with an advantage to engage with the Internet through 
technological literacy and higher levels of income (Statistics South Africa, 201645). 
These financial inequalities also impact accessibility in South Africa because not everyone can 
afford to go online due to the high costs (Bosch, Wasserman, Chuma, 2018). We find evidence 
in this research that reflect these earlier findings. For example, the proportion of white 
                                                     
45http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report%2092-01-03/Report%2092-01-032016.pdf  
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respondents (56.6%) who use the Internet every day is about the same as black respondents 
(55.6%) who never use it. Therefore, there are clear differences in terms of access and usage 
when it comes to sourcing political news on the Internet or social media.  
Furthermore, Poushter (2016) shows that the digital divide in South Afriaca spans across age 
and we too, saw earlier that young people are more likely to use the Internet and social media 
every day compared to older respondents. For example, the statistics in this study indicate that 
roughly two thirds (62.6%) of 18-24-year olds frequently use the Internet to source political 
news compared to 31% of 45-54-year olds or 19.8% of 55+-year olds. We could thus deduce 
from these findings that by virtue of their higher levels of usage, some population groups (e.g. 
young, white people) are more likely to be affected by Internet and social media than others.  
Hence, what if we compare correlations across groups to see whether there are measurable 
differences between Internet and social media users versus non-users in terms of their political 
attitudes and their behaviour based on age and race? Although there are no studies conducted 
in more advanced economies that suggest that comparing correlations among demographic 
groups might display differences, the South African literature suggests strong indicators of a 
digital divide. This digital divide is likely to affect the way in which political content online 
`influences different groups in South Africa. 
4.5 Research Question 3 
Out of the assumptions that there may be in-group differences in terms of age and race arises a 
third research question, Are there measurable differences between Internet and social media 
users versus non-users in terms of their political attitudes and behaviour based on age and 
race?  
4.5.1 Comparing Correlations 
In some cases, a variable can consist of inherently different categories that differ in many 
aspects and have little in common other than their common denominator. For instance, we 
might want to find out whether there is a difference in attitudes among religious men and 
women regarding abortion. In this case, we would want to compare correlations between the 
two (religious) genders. To do this, we activate the split file command in SPSS. This function 
splits a single variable into its categories. Once this option is activated, SPSS will produce an 
output of a correlation for each category of the split file variable. This means that we are now 
looking at three different variables; the dependent, independent, and split variable. This way, 
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we can determine whether the correlation between religiousness and attitudes toward abortion 
differ between men and women, for example (Field, 2009:191).  
In this research study, age and race are used as a split file. This means that all bivariate 
correlations will be calculated according to the various categories within the age and race 
variables (e.g. this will show us the bivariate correlation between Internet use and interest in 
public affairs for black, white, coloured, and Indian respondents, or respondents aged 18-24-
years old, 25-34-years old, and so forth).  
The tables below present the findings for the bivariate analysis for Internet, social media, and 
a scale of Internet and social media use and measures of political attitudes and behaviour based 
on age and race.  
4.5.2 Hypothesis 5 
Correlations for political efficacy and political interest based on age 
Table 4: Correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of political efficacy and interest 
based on age  
We move on to determine relationships for hypothesis 5 which states that people who spend 
more time online are more likely to discuss politics and express an interest in public affairs. 
The first table displays the bivariate correlation between Internet, social media, and the 
Internet-social media scale for measures of internal efficacy based on age. The first thing we 
can take away from the table is that people aged 55+ are the most likely to be influenced by 
going online. We see moderate, positive relationships for all independent variables, meaning 
that the more time they spend online, the more likely they are to be interested in public affairs 
and discuss politics. People aged 35-44 show the second strongest correlation, followed by 25-
34-year olds. 18-24- and 45-54-year olds show almost no correlation at all. The effects of 
Internet and social media use on internal levels of efficacy mostly hold for older age cohorts, 
particularly those 55+, however, we also see some effects for those aged 25-34 and 35-44. 
Therefore, we find partial support for H5 in terms of age.  
Correlations for political efficacy and political interest based on race 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ 
Interest in public affairs Not at all 
interested (0); Not very interested (1); 
Somewhat interested (2); Very 
interested (3) 
Internet -.023 .111* .131** .018 .154** 
Social Media .022 .060 .128** .035 .110* 
IntSocMe  -.001 .099* .138** .033 .138** 
Discussing politics Never (0); 
Occasionally (1); Frequently (2) 
Internet .005 .170** .080* .097* .278** 
Social Media .033 .109** .121** .076 .231** 
IntSocMe  .018 .155** .108** .078 .264** 
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  Black  White  Coloured  Indian  
Interest in public affairs Not 
at all interested (0); Not very 
interested (1); Somewhat 
interested (2); Very interested (3) 
Internet .110** .046 .068 .204** 
Social Media  .083** .012 .089 .117 
IntSoc .105** .038 .071 .189* 
Discussing politics Never (0); 
Occasionally (1); Frequently (2) 
Internet .126** -.076 .166** .247** 
Social Media  .102** -.052 .246** .298** 
IntSoc .122** .012 .200** .304** 
Table 5: Correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of political efficacy and interest 
based on race  
Table 7 displays the bivariate correlation between Internet, social media, and the Internet-social 
media scale for measures of internal efficacy based on race of respondent. The group which 
seems to be most affected by going online are Indian respondents who show moderate to strong, 
positive correlations for both dependent variables. Internet and social media use appear to only 
affect coloured respondents in terms of discussing politics. For black respondents, we also see 
weak, positive correlations and no correlations for white respondents at all.   
When it comes to race, there is overall support for H5. Apart from white respondents, the 
likelihood of all other race groups to discuss politics and be interested in public affairs increases 
the more they use the Internet and social media or a combination of both.  
4.5.2 Hypothesis 6 
Correlations for emancipative values based on age 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ 
Freedom to join organisations46 
Agree very strongly with statement 1 (1); 
Agree with statement 1 (2); Agree very 
strongly with statement 2 (3); Agree with 
statement 2 (4) 
Internet .037 -.069* .073* .046 .121* 
Social Media .110* -.053 .072* .097* .122* 
IntSoc  .074 -.064 .074* .065 .115* 
Freedom of press47 Agree very strongly 
with statement 1 (1); Agree with statement 
1 (2); Agree very strongly with statement 2 
(3); Agree with statement 2 (4) 
Internet -.044 -.027 .025 -.012 -.060 
Social Media -.034 -.072* .018 .046 -.037 
IntSoc  -.055 -.047 .022 .005 -.067 
Female leadership48 Agree very 
strongly with statement 1 (1); Agree with 
statement 1 (2); Agree very strongly with 
statement 2 (3); Agree with statement 2 (4) 
Internet .166** .048 -.008 .009 .002 
Social Media .135** .014 -.041 -.023 -.066 
IntSoc  .158** .035 -.022 -.021 -.024 
Table 6: Correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of emancipative values based on 
age  
                                                     
46 Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. Statement 2: We 
should be able to join any organization, whether or not government approves of it.   
47 Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control. 
Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers 
harmful to society.  
48 Statement 1: Men make better political leaders than women, and should be elected rather than women. Statement 
2: Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.  
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Hypothesis 6 states that Internet and social media users show greater support for emancipative 
values (less deference to authority posed by the government) than non-users. Overall, we see 
rather weak correlations among all age groups. Going online seems to mostly affect 18-24-year 
olds in terms of female leadership. The more they go online, the more likely they are to support 
the notion that women should have equal opportunities to be elected as leaders as men. The 
other significant thing we can take away from the table is that respondents aged 55+ are affected 
by going online and their belief in freedom of expression. We see a positive correlation between 
all three independent variables and the desire to join any organisation without government 
restrictions, meaning that the more time they spend online, the more likely this group believes 
that one should be able to join any organisation. Although we find other significant correlations 
for other age groups, they are rather weak. As such, there is some support for H6, but this only 
holds for people aged 18-24 and 55+ and only in terms of freedom of expression and gender 
equality.   
Correlations for emancipative values based on age 
  Black  White  Coloured  Indian  
Freedom to join organisations Agree 
very strongly with statement 1 (1); Agree with 
statement 1 (2); Agree very strongly with 
statement 2 (3); Agree with statement 2 (4) 
Internet -.032 .085 .000 .236* 
Social Media  -.012 .134* -.028 .012 
IntSoc -.015 .152* -.006 .166 
Freedom of press Agree very strongly with 
statement 1 (1); Agree with statement 1 (2); 
Agree very strongly with statement 2 (3); 
Agree with statement 2 (4) 
Internet -.007 -.134* -.076 -.279** 
Social Media  -.028 .061 -.007 -.063 
IntSoc -.015 .082 -.050 -.216** 
Female leadership Agree very strongly 
with statement 1 (1); Agree with statement 1 
(2); Agree very strongly with statement 2 (3); 
Agree with statement 2 (4) 
Internet .015 .024 .101 .206* 
Social Media  .015 -.039 -.056 -.057 
IntSoc .014 -.007 .023 .109 
Table 7: correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of emancipative values based on 
age 
Table 9 displays the bivariate correlation between measures of emancipative values and going 
online based on race. Again, we see that Indian respondents display the strongest correlations. 
The more they use the Internet, the more likely they are to believe that one should be able to 
join any organisation without government restrictions. There is a significant, negative 
correlation for Indian respondents between Internet use and the IntSoc scale and freedom of 
the press. This means that the more this group of respondents goes online, the more likely they 
are to believe that the press should be able to publish anything without government control. 
We see a similar pattern among white respondents. The more they use social media or a 
combination of social media and Internet, the more likely they are to believe that one should 
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be able to join any organisation and the more they use the Internet, the more they support 
freedom of the press. There are no significant relationships for coloured or black respondents.   
When it comes to the race of the respondent, there is overall support for H6. Specifically, white 
and Indian respondents are positively affected by Internet use and support for emancipative 
values. Only white and Indian respondents believe that one should be able to join any 
organisation without government restrictions and it is also only these respondents who reject 
the notion of government control on the media and press.  
4.5.3 Hypothesis 7 
Correlations for measures of perceptions of democracy and political institutions and 
incumbents based on age 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ 
Extent of democracy Not a 
democracy (1); A democracy, with 
major problems (2); A democracy, 
but with minor problems (3); A full 
democracy (4) 
Internet -.088* .007 -.076* .026 .041 
Social Media -.051 .050 -.043 .045 .040 
IntSoc  -.082 .034 -.073* .040 .040 
Satisfaction with democracy Not 
at all satisfied (1); not very satisfied 
(2); Fairly satisfied (3); Very satisfied 
(4) 
Internet .082 .047 -.084* .020 -.056 
Social Media .078 .100** -.033 .041 -.029 
IntSoc  .081 .083* -.069 .045 -.050 
Trust (Scale) Not at all (low); a lot 
(high) 
Internet -.096* -.007 -.090* -.115* -.160** 
Social Media -.104* -.022 -.026 -.019 -.127* 
IntSoc  -.103* -.011 -.068 -.069 -.161** 
Corruption (Scale) None (low); all 
of them (high) 
Internet .102* .105** .094* .097* .083 
Social Media .177* .067 .036 .096* .061 
IntSoc  .140** .096** .076* .110* .087 
Table 8: Correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of perceptions of democracy and 
political institutions based on age  
Hypothesis 7 states that the more time someone spends online seeking political information, 
the more likely they are to be critical and distrustful of government. Looking at table 10, we 
see that going online affects people aged 18-24 in terms of their levels of trust49 and perceptions 
of corruption50. The more time this age cohort spends online, the less likely they are to trust 
officials and incumbents and the more likely they are to believe that they are involved in 
corruption. We see similar effects for all other age groups, however mostly for those aged 45-
54 and 55+. The more people aged 45-54 years old use the Internet and social media, the more 
likely they are to believe that most or all government officials are involved in corruption. On 
the other hand, the more time people aged 55+ spend online, the less likely they are to trust 
officials and incumbents. Extent and satisfaction only display weak correlations for age groups. 
                                                     
49 For detailed description of the computation of trust as a scale variable, please see chapter 3. 
50 For detailed description of the computation of corruption as a scale variable, please see chapter 3. 
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Again, we find partial support for H7, however, the age groups that are mostly affected are 18-
24 and 55+-year-olds.   
Correlations for measures of perceptions of democracy and political institutions and 
incumbents based on race 
  Black  White  Coloured  Indian  
Extent of democracy Not a democracy 
(1); A democracy, with major problems 
(2); A democracy, but with minor 
problems (3); A full democracy (4) 
Internet .010 .197** .036 -.231* 
Social Media  .020 .151* .127* -.046 
IntSoc .016 .170** .084 -.160 
Satisfaction with democracy Not at 
all satisfied (1); not very satisfied (2); 
Fairly satisfied (3); Very satisfied (4) 
Internet .052* .013 .082 .095 
Social Media  .041* .104 .159** .203* 
IntSoc .049* .046 .122* .184* 
Trust (Scale) Not at all (low); a lot 
(high) 
Internet -.042* .072 -.100 -.026 
Social Media  -.049* .082 -.047 -.160 
IntSoc -.049* .117 -.096 -.081 
Corruption (Scale) None (low); all of 
them (high) 
Internet .078** -.061 -.015 -.089 
Social Media  .096** -118 -.031 -.071 
IntSoc .095** -.086 -.016 -.034 
Table 9: Correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of perceptions of democracy and 
political institutions based on race  
Table 11 shows the bivariate correlation based on race. When it comes to extent of democracy, 
white people who spend more time on the Internet and social media, tend to believe that South 
Africa is a democracy. Indian Internet users, on the other hand, show opposite effects; the more 
they use the Internet, the less likely they are to believe that South Africa is a full democracy. 
Furthermore, we see weak to moderate positive correlations between going online and 
satisfaction with democracy for coloured and Indian respondents. The more they use social 
media and a combination of social media and Internet, the more likely they are to be satisfied 
with democracy in South Africa. We see only weak correlations for black respondents and their 
levels of satisfaction with democracy, trust, and perceptions of corruption. However, the data 
does suggest that the more time this race group spends online, the more likely they are to be 
satisfied with democracy, the less trusting they are of government institutions and officials, and 
the more likely they are to believe that these institutions and officials are involved in high levels 
of corruption. 
Therefore, we only find weak support for H7, however only for black respondents. Apart from 
Indian respondents, it appears that the more time people from most race groups spend online, 
the more likely they are to believe that South Africa is a full democracy and the more likely 
they are to be satisfied with democracy.  
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4.5.4 Hypothesis 8 
Correlations for preferences for different kinds of government based on age  
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ 
Reject one-party rule Strongly 
disapprove (1); disapprove (2); 
Neither approve nor disapprove (3); 
approve (4); Strongly approve (5) 
Internet -.038 .002 -.027 -.231** -218** 
Social Media -.114* -.052 -.077 -.108* -161** 
IntSoc  -.064 -.026 -.018 -.187** -.205** 
Reject military rule Strongly 
disapprove (1); disapprove (2); 
Neither approve nor disapprove (3); 
approve (4); Strongly approve (5) 
Internet -.002 .060 -.024 -.084 -.057 
Social Media -.090* .042 -.012 -.101* .010 
IntSoc  -.024 .057 -.020 -.099* -.037 
Reject one-man rule Strongly 
disapprove (1); disapprove (2); 
Neither approve nor disapprove (3); 
approve (4); Strongly approve (5) 
Internet -.071 -.028 .045 -.111* -.170** 
Social Media -.204** -.024 .029 -.028 -.087 
IntSoc  -.136** -.027 .048 -.068 -.149** 
Reject Apartheid Strongly 
disapprove (1); disapprove (2); 
Neither approve nor disapprove (3); 
approve (4); Strongly approve (5) 
Internet .007 .058 .122** .088 .095* 
Social Media -.077 .050 .140** .153** .106* 
IntSoc  -.028 .062 .149** .105* .102* 
Table 10: correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and preference for different kinds of 
government based on age  
Hypothesis 8 states that Internet users are more likely to express a preference for democracy 
over any other form of government. Internet and social media sugges causality on rejection of 
authoritarian regimes and appear to be strongest for people aged 45-54 and 55+ years old. There 
is a negative correlation between all three independent variables and support for one-party rule, 
indicating that the more time these age cohorts spend online, the less likely they are to support 
one-party rule. Social media seems to affect 18-24-year olds when it comes to one-man rule; 
the more frequently this cohort uses social media, the more likely they become to reject one-
man rule. Similar effects can be observed in terms of Internet use for people aged 45-54 and 
55+ years old.  
However, when it comes to approval of apartheid, some interesting results arise where we see 
approval among those, who spend more time online, specifically the 35-44, 45-54 and 55+ 
cohorts. Additionally, the negative correlation between Internet use and the IntSoc scale for the 
55+ age group shows lower levels of support for democracy, the more time they spend online. 
Therefore, when it comes to age, H8 is neither proven nor disproven. The age groups that show 
the strongest rejection of authoritarian rule are those aged 18-24, 45-54 and 55+. However, we 
also find that some of these groups show support for apartheid, and for the 55+ age cohort, 
there is a decline in support for democracy the more they use Internet and social media.    
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Correlations for measures of perceptions of democracy and political institutions and 
incumbents based on race 
  Black  White  Coloured  Indian  
Reject one-party rule Strongly 
disapprove (1); disapprove (2); Neither 
approve nor disapprove (3); approve (4); 
Strongly approve (5) 
Internet -.044* -.051 -.042 -.075 
Social Media  -.064* -.015 -.003 -.016 
IntSoc -.059** -.014 -.026 -.064 
Reject military rule Strongly disapprove 
(1); disapprove (2); Neither approve nor 
disapprove (3); approve (4); Strongly 
approve (5) 
Internet -.010 -.080 -.021 -.276** 
Social Media  -.030 -.028 .011 -.101 
IntSoc -.022 -.066 -.055 -.220* 
Reject one-man rule Strongly 
disapprove (1); disapprove (2); Neither 
approve nor disapprove (3); approve (4); 
Strongly approve (5) 
Internet -.016 -.042 -.049 -.048 
Social Media  -.034 -.037 -.016 .141 
IntSoc -.020 -.049 -.038 .028 
Reject Apartheid Strongly disapprove 
(1); disapprove (2); Neither approve nor 
disapprove (3); approve (4); Strongly 
approve (5) 
Internet -.012 .105 -.136* .013 
Social Media  .014 .065 -.161** .171 
IntSoc .003 .092 -.164** .076 
Table 11: Correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and preference for different kinds of 
government based on race 
Table 13 displays the bivariate relationship between Internet and social media use and support 
for authoritarian regimes and for democracy. Very few noteworthy correlations appear for race 
group. What can be taken away from the table is that, based on the negative correlation for 
military rule and Internet use, the more Indian respondents use the Internet, the more likely 
they are to reject military rule. Similarly, there is a negative correlation between all three 
independent variables and rejection of apartheid for coloured respondents. The more time this 
group spends on the Internet and social media, the less likely they are to approve of apartheid.  
Therefore, there is some support for H8 in terms of race. We find a rejection of apartheid among 
coloured respondents and rejection of military rule among Indian respondents, who frequently 
go online. However, there are no other significant correlations that could lead us to make the 
final conclusion that Internet and social media use increase support for democracy in South 
Africa.   
4.5.5 Hypothesis 9 
Correlations for measures of political behaviour based on age 
  18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ 
Member of religious group Not a 
member (0); Inactive Member (1); 
Active member (2); Official leader (3) 
Internet .114* .181** .120** .026 -.016 
Social Media .023 .151** .133** .043 -.056 
IntSoc  .082 .182** .139** .016 -.015 
Member of voluntary association 
Not a member (0); Inactive Member 
(1); Active member (2); Official leader 
(3) 
Internet .021 .175** .115** -.045 -.018 
Social Media .057 .155** .149** -.045 -.014 
IntSoc  .030 .182** .134** -.065 -.025 
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Attend a community meeting Would 
never do this (0); Would if had the 
chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several 
times (3); Often (4) 
Internet .027 -.039 .044 -.080 -.121* 
Social Media .039 -.058 .033 -.118* -.091* 
IntSoc  .035 -.048 .035 -.113* -.118* 
Join others to raise an issue Would 
never do this (0); Would if had the 
chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several 
times (3); Often (4) 
Internet -.003 -.055 .024 -.028 -.127** 
Social Media .072 -.040 .038 -.061 -.137** 
IntSoc  .044 -.047 .032 -.050 -.123* 
Attend a campaign rally No (0); Yes 
(1) 
Internet -.050 .006 .032 -.095* -.046 
Social Media -.025 .050 .078* -.031 -.017 
IntSoc  -.025 .034 .054 -.073 -.044 
Attend a campaign meeting No (0); 
Yes (1) 
Internet -.052 -.028 -.006 -.033 .050 
Social Media -.017 .010 -.005 -.029 .050 
IntSoc  -.037 -.008 -.009 -.026 .051 
Persuade others to vote No (0); Yes 
(1) 
Internet -.020 .013 .029 -.033 .054 
Social Media .012 .005 .029 .016 .040 
IntSoc  -.006 .012 .029 -.024 .054 
Work for candidate or party No (0); 
Yes (1) 
Internet -.040 .019 -.006 .053 .107* 
Social Media .056 -.009 -.001 .095* .143** 
IntSoc  -.005 .007 -.006 .069 .112* 
Contact 51 (Scale) Never (low); Often 
(high) 
Internet -.045 -.010 .050 -.011 .009 
Social Media -.077 .003 .087* .007 .023 
IntSoc  -.060 .002 .068 -.008 .006 
Voting Voted (1); Did not vote (2) 
Internet -.004 .011 .002 .132** -.011 
Social Media .052 .009 -.031 .117* .014 
IntSoc  .015 .009 -.008 .148** -.013 
Request government action Would 
never do this (0); Would if had the 
chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several 
times (3); Often (4) 
Internet .070 .092** .002 -.012 -.008 
Social Media .060 -.050 .009 .023 .041 
IntSoc  .078 -.074* .003 .002 .002 
Contact media Would never do this 
(0); Would if had the chance (1); Once 
or twice (2); Several times (3); Often 
(4) 
Internet .110* .053 .033 .077 .141** 
Social Media .094* .088* .108** .081 .141** 
IntSoc  .112* .082* .065 .083 .148** 
Contact official for help Would never 
do this (0); Would if had the chance 
(1); Once or twice (2); Several times 
(3); Often (4) 
Internet .138** .044 .057 -.021 .043 
Social Media .153** .070* .106** .034 .024 
IntSoc  .155** .063 .071* -.001 .046 
Attend demonstration or protest 
Would never do this (0); Would if had 
the chance (1); Once or twice (2); 
Several times (3); Often (4) 
Internet -.064 -.080* -.002 .006 .056 
Social Media -.027 -.020 .023 .057 .102* 
IntSoc  -.034 -.052 .000 .028 .069 
Table 12: Correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of political behaviour based on 
age 
Table 14 displays the bivariate correlation for measures of political behaviour and Internet and 
social media use based on age. At first glance, we see that going online predominantly affects 
people aged 25-34 and 35-44 and their group membership. We see moderate, positive 
correlations between Internet, social media and the IntSoc scale for membership of a religious 
                                                     
51 For detailed description of the computation of contact as a scale variable, please see chapter 3 
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group and membership of a voluntary association or community group. This indicates that the 
more these groups use the Internet or social media, the more likely they are to be a member of 
a group.  
When it comes to attending a community meeting and joining others to raise an issue, we see 
negative correlations for 45-54 and 55+-year-olds, indicating that the more they go online, the 
less likely they are to do either of those things. However, there is a positive correlation between 
Internet and social media use and working for a candidate or party for those aged 55+. This 
means that the more they use the Internet and social media, the more likely they are to work 
for a candidate or party. Internet and social media use only show an effect on voting for people 
aged 45-54. There is a positive correlation between these variables, indicating that the more 
time they spend online, the more likely they are to vote.  
Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between our independent variables and contacting 
the media for those aged 55+, showing that Internet and social media use increases their 
likelihood to contact the media. We see the same effects for the 18-24-year-old cohort and 
some weak, positive relationships for the 24-35, and 35-44-year old cohorts. There is also a 
positive, moderate correlation between Internet and social media use and contacting an official 
for help for people aged 18-24, also showing that Internet and social media use increases their 
likelihood to contacting an official.  
Overall, we find that each group is positively affected by Internet and social media use in terms 
of political behaviour in one way or another. Apart from the 45-54 and 55+ cohorts, who are 
negatively affected by going online in terms of their likelihood to attend a community meeting 
and raising an issue, we see some mobilising effects of Internet and social media use. Therefore, 
the results show partial support for H9 in terms of age.   
Correlations for measures of political behaviour based on race 
  Black  White  Coloured  Indian  
Member of religious group Not a 
member (0); Inactive Member (1); Active 
member (2); Official leader (3) 
Internet .108* -.045 .268** .141 
Social Media .063** -.035 .231** .209* 
IntSoc  .091** -.038 .261** .197* 
Member of voluntary association 
Not a member (0); Inactive Member (1); 
Active member (2); Official leader (3) 
Internet .081** .099 .254** -.071 
Social Media .081** -.049 .253** .016 
IntSoc  .081** -.004 .258** -.043 
Attend a community meeting Would 
never do this (0); Would if had the 
chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several 
times (3); Often (4) 
Internet .023 .009 .175** .234* 
Social Media -.021 -.127* .208** .195* 
IntSoc  .000 -.082 .192** .260** 
Internet -.005 -.023 .208** .202* 
Social Media -.023 .005 .226** .097 
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Join others to raise an issue Would 
never do this (0); Would if had the 
chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several 
times (3); Often (4) 
IntSoc  -.013 -.007 .220** .193* 
Attend a campaign rally No (0); Yes 
(1) 
Internet .041* .031 .068 .152 
Social Media .062** .019 .122* .174 
IntSoc  .057** .016 .091 .164 
Attend a campaign meeting No (0); 
Yes (1) 
Internet .018 -.049 .040 .014 
Social Media .026 -.198** .083 .057 
IntSoc  .029 -.165** .058 .031 
Persuade others to vote No (0); Yes (1) 
Internet .043* -.020 .001 .000 
Social Media .039 -.094 .015 .000 
IntSoc  .043* -.093 .002 .000 
Work for candidate or party No (0); 
Yes (1) 
Internet .037 .042 .062 .000 
Social Media .038 -.040 .073 .000 
IntSoc  .040* -.033 .065 .000 
Contact  (Scale) Never (low); Often 
(high) 
Internet .040* -.096 .193** -.208* 
Social Media .011 -.082 .266** -.082 
IntSoc  .031 -.127* .233** -.167 
Voting Voted (1); Did not vote (2) 
Internet .085* .010 .004 .211* 
Social Media .108** .118* .042 .057 
IntSoc  .105** .049 .024 .144 
Request government action Would 
never do this (0); Would if had the 
chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several 
times (3); Often (4) 
Internet .015 .171** .188** .384** 
Social Media .003 .193** .174** .287** 
IntSoc  .012 .183** .182** .382** 
Contact media Would never do this (0); 
Would if had the chance (1); Once or 
twice (2); Several times (3); Often (4) 
Internet .088** .145* .197** .477** 
Social Media .109** .166** .204** .330** 
IntSoc  .102** .173** .217** .474** 
Contact official for help Would never 
do this (0); Would if had the chance (1); 
Once or twice (2); Several times (3); 
Often (4) 
Internet .042* .164** .202** .333** 
Social Media .042* .155* .273** .217* 
IntSoc  .038 .145* .245** .328** 
Attend demonstration or protest Would 
never do this (0); Would if had the 
chance (1); Once or twice (2); Several 
times (3); Often (4) 
Internet .061** .160* .058 .196* 
Social Media .083** .257** .075 .076 
IntSoc  .075** .238** .064 .188* 
Table 13: Correlation table for Internet and social media use and IntSoc scale and measures of political behaviour based on 
race 
The first striking thing we can take away from the table is the positive effect of going online 
on group membership for coloured people, meaning that the more they use the Internet and 
social media, the more likely they are to join a group. We see the same effects for black 
respondents to a weaker extent and only social media and the IntSoc scale positively affect 
Indian membership of religious groups. Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between 
attending a community meeting and all independent variables for coloured and Indian 
respondents, and social media use negatively affects the likelihood of white respondents to 
attend a community meeting.  
When it comes to attending a campaign rally, black respondents seem to be affected by all three 
independent variables, however, the correlations are very weak. White respondents are 
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negatively affected by social media use and attending a campaign rally, indicating that the more 
time they spend on social media, the less likely they are to attend a campaign rally.  
On the one hand, going online seems to increase coloured people’s likelihood of contacting 
government officials. On the other hand, Internet use decreases Indian people’s likelihood of 
contacting officials while IntSoc decreases the likelihood of white respondents. Black people 
appear to be affected the most when it comes to voting. The positive correlations indicate that 
the more time this race group spends online, the more likely they are to vote, however these 
relationships are rather weak. Furthermore, reading news on social media seems to increase 
white people’s likelihood of voting while the same appears to be true for Indians and reading 
political news on the Internet.  
The next striking aspect that can be taken away from the table is that Internet and social media 
use show a moderate correlation between citizen action for white people. We see that the more 
time white respondents spend online, the more likely they are to request government action, to 
contact the media, to contact an official for help and to attend a demonstration or protest march. 
We see similar effects for Indian respondents with partially strong, highly significant 
correlations. Internet and social media use also positively affects coloured people’s likelihood 
of doing either of those things, except attending a demonstration or protest march. For black 
people, on the other hand, we see only weak correlations.   
In comparison to all other race groups, Indian people seem to be especially affected by Internet 
and social media to obtain political news or a combination of both. This applies especially to 
requesting government action, contacting the media and contacting an official for help. This 
might be related to their higher levels of education relative to black and coloured people for 
example. However, more research will have to be conducted to determine the full extent of this 
relationship.  
Apart from white people, who become less likely to attend a community and campaign meeting 
the more they go online, we see that the Internet and social media have a strong mobilising 
effect on all race groups. This includes group membership, attending community and campaign 
meetings and rallies, contacting officials and incumbents, voting, requesting government 
action, contacting the media and officials for help, and attending a demonstration or protest 
march. Therefore, when it comes to race, there is overall strong support for H9.  
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4.6 Interpretation: Research Question 3 
Having established the bivariate correlations between the dependent and independent variables, 
we can now move on to analyse the results to answer our research question and hypotheses. 
There are two main observations to be made. One, although young people are the most likely 
to use the Internet and social media, they are the least likely to be influenced by them. Two, 
although white people are more likely to use the Internet or social media every day, they seem 
to be least affected by them.  
Throughout, we see that particularly people aged 55 and above are consistently affected by 
Internet and social media use, even though they are the age group which is least likely to go 
online. Conversely, while the 18-24 age group displays some significant correlations, they tend 
to be weak. Where this cohort seems to be affected the most is their belief in gender equality, 
their levels of trust in officials and incumbents, their perceptions of corruption, their rejection 
of one-man rule and their likelihood to contact the media and to contact an official for help.  
Although black respondents most frequently display significant correlations between Internet 
and social media use and measures of political values, attitudes, and behaviour, they tend to be 
weak overall. Despite the fact that of all groups, white respondents are the group that uses 
Internet and social media most frequently, they produce almost no significant correlations in 
terms of attitudes and values. Yet, their likelihood of requesting government action, contacting 
the media and officials, and attending a demonstration or protest march increases the more time 
they spend on the Internet and social media. The two race groups that display the strongest 
correlations are in fact coloured and Indian respondents. We find moderate to strong 
correlations for measures of values, attitudes, and behaviour. These findings can be linked back 
to the digital divide in South Africa and levels of education in the country. According to 
Statistics South Africa (2016)52, the black population in South Africa still lags behind in terms 
of educational attainment, while whites and Indians have the highest proportion of post-
secondary level of education while both groups also have the lowest proportion of individuals 
with the lowest levels of education. The differences in education thus reflect on Internet access 
and technological literacy. By virtue of their higher levels of education, Indian and white 
respondents show stronger correlations. However, we also see that coloured respondents show 
quite a few significant correlations. Reasons for this are not immediately clear and might need 
                                                     
52 http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report%2092-01-03/Report%2092-01-032016.pdf  
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some further investigation. Bearing these trends in mind, the following sections aim to provide 
an interpretation of the most prominent findings and how they relate to the literature.  
4.6.1 Hypothesis 5 
Earlier, we saw that there are competing theories about media effects on political attitudes. 
First, the media malaise theory (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997; Mutz & Reeves, 2005) argues 
that the overall negative coverage on politics generates “cynicism and malaise” and leads to 
more “negative attitudes toward political institutions” (Chang, 2018:1001). The virtuous circle 
theory (Aarts & Semetko, 2003; Norris, 2000;2001) on the other hand, claims that enhanced 
exposure to political information via the media leads to heightened interest in politics and more 
positive attitudes toward political institutions. Chang (2018) explores the applicability of these 
two theories on Internet use and other forms of media and finds that people who frequently 
read the newspaper, listen to the radio and use the Internet for political information are more 
interested in politics but are less satisfied with democracy.  
This study finds support for the virtuous circle theory in relation to interest in politics. The 
more both demographic groups use the Internet and social media, the more likely they are to 
be interested in and discuss politics with others. This applies to both, age and race of 
respondent. Specifically, respondents above the age of 24 show an increase in levels of internal 
efficacy, which may also be attributable to socialisation and lifecycle effects. In terms of race, 
black, coloured and Indian respondents show a heightened interest in public affairs and an 
increase in discussing politics. Therefore, we can say that most age and race groups are part of 
a virtuous circle through Internet and social media. This raises the question as to whether these 
findings set Internet and social media apart from traditional mass media such as newspapers, 
or TV. Further studies will need to investigate whether there are large differences between 
online media and traditional media and how they affect citizens in South Africa.  
4.6.2 Hypothesis 6 
Norris (2001:55) argues that cyberspace is dominated by postmaterialist value priorities, where 
users are more concerned with self-actualization and issues concerning quality of life, self-
expression, individual freedom, cosmopolitanism, and participatory democracy. Thereby, 
postmaterialist values are more likely to spread faster among Internet users than non-users. 
This seems to be the case in the South African context as well, albeit not as pronounced as it 
might be in more established democracies. Welzel (2006:871) argues that “democratization is 
essentially an emancipative process, for it manifests human freedom by empowering people 
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with civil and political rights”. Such an emancipative process, he argues, leads to mass attitudes 
of “liberty aspirations” which are more powerful in facilitating progress toward 
democratization than any other indicators such as GDP or social capital. 
There is overall support for measures of emancipative values for both, age and race, however 
not as pronounced as expected. These rather weak correlations could also tell us another story, 
which is that South Africans are simply not as influenced by postmaterialist/emancipative 
values online as people in other democracies might be. It is quite possible that because South 
Africans tend to value democracy instrumentally rather than intrinsically (Steenekamp, 2017), 
postmaterialist and emancipative value preferences are not as widely spread despite increasing 
levels of Internet access in the country.   
4.6.3 Hypothesis 7 
We have briefly touched on the concept of echo chambers and selective exposure in chapter 1 
and the outcome of the analysis lead us to investigate it in more detail. Justwan, Baumgaertner, 
Carlisle, Clark and Clark (2018) pay particularly close attention to so-called “echo chambers” 
on social media sites and the way in which they affect users’ satisfaction with democracy. Echo 
chambers online represent “ideologically congruent and homogenous environments” in which 
political opinions are enforced rather than debated (Justwan, et al., 2018:425). This means that 
individuals are more likely to engage with groups of people that represent their own point of 
view, rather than with people that would challenge those views. Due to these reinforcing and 
“ambivalence-reducing properties”, social media echo chambers have the strength to impact 
satisfaction with democracy; more specifically, they tend to boost satisfaction with democracy 
among supporters of a victorious party and reduce satisfaction among supporters of a losing 
party (Justwan, et al. 2018:426). This stands in partial contrast to Stoycheff’s and Nisbet’s 
(2014) argument about the “window-opening” properties of the Internet, where people who 
spend more time online are more likely to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in 
their country.  
Yet, we receive mixed results that relate to levels of satisfaction and levels of trust and 
perceptions of corruption. If we look at the correlations between Internet and social media use, 
we find that people who spend more time online have lower levels of trust in officials and 
believe that most of them are involved in corruption. These findings also contradict our 
previous results that speak for the virtuous circle theory and instead support the media malaise 
theory. If anything, people who are satisfied with democracy should be more likely to trust 
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government officials, but we find the opposite to be true. Specifically, those aged 18-24 show 
a simultaneous distrust of politicians and a belief in high levels of corruption. Using mixed 
methods, Bosch (2013: 124) finds that in a national survey interviewing people aged 15 and 
30, there were very low levels of trust in traditional institutions and high levels of perceptions 
of corruption. However, when conducting focus groups, Bosch (2013) finds that most 
participants had little understanding of the functionality of these institutions and were unable 
to name instances of corruption. The quantitative analysis supports Bosch’s (2013) findings, 
however, qualitative insights will provide further insight.  
Yet, we see quite high levels of satisfaction with democracy among coloured, Indian and black 
respondents. Considering the fact that the African National Congress (ANC) enjoys quite a 
strong support base among South African voters and considering the outcome of the analysis 
that Internet and social media users tend to be more satisfied with democracy, there is reason 
to believe that echo chambers are prevalent among South African Internet and social media 
users.  
However, because the correlations for age groups between trust and corruption and Internet 
and social media use are stronger than the correlation between satisfaction with democracy and 
social media use, we can conclude that people who go online more frequently to find political 
news are more distrustful and critical of government officials, supporting Stoycheff and 
Nisbet’s (2014) argument about the “window-opening” properties of the Internet, where people 
who spend more time online are more likely to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works 
in their country.  
4.6.4 Hypothesis 8 
We saw that the analysis of the variables relating to hypothesis 8 (Internet and social media 
users are more likely to express a preference for democracy over any other form of government) 
showed mixed results. Although there is a general disapproval of any forms of authoritarian 
rule, especially among age groups, there is also some support for Apartheid among people aged 
between 35 and 55+. These represent interesting findings and appear to be controversial, 
considering South Africa’s history with Apartheid. Steenekamp (2017:67) finds that there 
“appears to have been a value shift” in the country where the “gap between support for 
democratic rule and authoritarian rule has narrowed”. This might explain why some Internet 
and social media users tend to show some support for Apartheid and why some groups express 
low levels of support for democracy (Q30). If we link these findings to those of Gouws and 
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Schulz-Herzenberg (2017) we could speculate that support for Apartheid and low levels of 
support for democracy can be attributed to declining levels of diffuse support for democracy. 
However, other studies will need to be conducted in order to determine the full extent of these 
relationships.  
4.6.5 Hypothesis 9 
Jensen (2013:250) believes that group formations and group mobilisations online hold great 
potential because theoretically, “every person or group can advocate their opinions or ideas to 
a potentially unlimited audience”. Schlozman et al. (2010:490) agree by claiming that the 
Internet reduces “almost to zero the additional costs of seeking to organize” groups, no matter 
their nature (e.g. political, religious, scientific,). This does not only include online groups but 
also offline groups. An Internet user who seeks to join a community or group of their interest 
may simply search for related information online and be presented with a wide array of possible 
options that would fit their interest. Many organisations post their information and contact 
details online by creating their own websites, thereby allowing potential new members to locate 
and contact them easily. We also find support for these claims in this study. People who go 
online more frequently, tend to be more involved in religious groups or voluntary associations 
and to attend community meetings. This may be because their ease of accessing information 
that relates to such activities is made significantly easier through the Internet.   
Bosch (2010: 270) points out that networking sites such as Facebook are increasingly being 
used to recruit members. Amandla! People’s Media’s Facebook group, for example, directs 
members to “its print publications, radio and TV items and events” while the Social Justice 
Coalition Facebook group invites online members to events and addresses issues around which 
their campaigns run to raise awareness. In a different study, Bosch (2013: 127) shows that a 
number of focus group participants use Facebook to “engage with religious interest groups” 
and that “religion often became a proxy for a sense of community and civic identity”. Her 
findings apply in this study as well, particularly to the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups and coloured 
respondents.  
When it comes to certain political activities, many scholars have found that online and offline 
forms of participation or engagement complement each other or even have equivalents. 
Anduiza et al. (2009:862)53 for example, find that contacting government officials or the media, 
can be done through many mediums, ranging from telephone, letter, or email, the latter of 
                                                     
53 See also Tolbert & McNeal (2010) and Sylvester & McGlynn (2010) 
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which presents itself with the lowest cost or effort. In this research study, we also find some 
significant associations and correlations between contacting officials and the media, showing 
that users are more likely to do so than non-users. Therefore, we can assume that Internet and 
social media users take advantage of these mediums by tweeting at or emailing news agencies 
or politicians.  
Similar trends hold true for citizen mobilisation online; Kim (2006:40) finds that the rise of the 
Internet coincided with a rise of demonstrations and protest activities in South Korea. This 
trend can be attributed to the new opportunities provided to citizen empowerment through the 
web. The perhaps most popular example that highlights the relationship between social media 
and protests is the Arab uprising in late 2010. Tufekci and Wilson (2012:369) find that people 
who participated in the protests, mostly learned about it through a “certain type of media use” 
and that social media use significantly increased their likelihood of attending protests. We also 
find more recent cases that highlight the power of the Internet and social media to mobilise. 
These examples include Sudan, which blocked social media “amid growing calls for its long-
time president to step down” (News24, 2010)54, and Zimbabwe and the DRC which cut the 
Internet connection in their countries in response to civilian unrest related to political 
dissatisfaction.  In the South African context, we also find support for the relationship between 
Internet and social media use and attending a demonstration or protest, especially among 
students who mobilised online to protest an increase in student fees and to advocate for the 
removal of Afrikaans as a tuition language at the Stellenbosch University. Therefore, our 
findings regarding the positive correlation between social media use and participating in a 
demonstration or protest march and joining others to raise an issue, represent plausible 
outcomes that are reflected in past events and the existing literature.   
4.7 Summary of findings 
This section serves to summarise the findings of the quantitative analysis to provide an 
overview of the most significant relationships between using the Internet and social media to 
source political news.  
4.7.1 Demographic findings 
Internet and social media users tend to  
                                                     
54 https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/explainer-109-a-busy-year-for-african-internet-shutdowns-20190121  
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 Be younger, more educated, white and Indian and live in urban areas  
4.7.2 Political Attitudes 
 Internet and social media seem to increase interest in public affairs and likelihood of 
discussing politics among 25-34, 35-44 and 55+-year olds as well as black, coloured 
and Indian respondents 
 There are somewhat weak correlations between Internet and social media use and 
support for gender equality in terms of leadership among 18-24-year olds  
 The more time they spend online, the more 55+-year olds and Indian respondents tend 
to disagree that government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its 
policies  
 Indian respondents also believe that the media should have the right to publish any 
views without government control the more they read political news online 
 Overall, Indian respondents appear to be positively affected the most by Internet and 
social media use when it comes to emancipative values 
 Increased use of the Internet and social media seems to erode trust in politicians and 
increase perceptions of corruption among 18-24-year olds. This also holds for black 
respondents  
 Internet and social media use negatively affects levels of trust for those aged 55+ and 
it increases the likelihood of 25-34-year olds to believe that officials and institutions 
are involved in corruption  
 The more time white respondents spend browsing the Internet and social media for 
political news, the more likely they are to believe that South Africa is a full democracy; 
yet the more time Indian respondents spend on the Internet, the less likely they are to 
believe that South Africa is a full democracy  
 Internet and social media use increase the likelihood of 45-54- and 55+-year olds to 
reject one-party rule  
 Yet, it also increases the likelihood of those aged 35-44; 45-54 and 55+ to approve of 
Apartheid 
 The more time Indian and coloured respondents spend on the Internet and social media, 
the more likely they are to disapprove of military rule and Apartheid, respectively 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
Political Behaviour 
 Internet and social media use increase the likelihood of those aged 25-34 and 35-44 to 
be a member of a religious group or voluntary association  
 This also holds for coloured and Indian respondents. They are also more likely to attend 
a community meeting and joining others to raise an issue 
 Internet and social media use increase the likelihood of those age 55 and above to work 
for a candidate or party and it also increases the likelihood of those aged 45-54 to vote 
 Coloured respondents are more likely to contact an official or institution the more time 
they spend online and black, white and Indian respondents become more likely to vote 
the more time they spend online 
 All race groups become more likely to either request government action, contacting the 
media or an official for help. This correlation is especially strong for Indian respondents 
relative to all other race groups 
 Internet and social media use also appears to positively affect 18-24-year olds in terms 
of contacting the media and officials; this also applies to those aged 55 and above in 
terms of contacting the media 
 Lastly, white respondents appear to be affected the most when it comes to Internet and 
social media use and their likelihood attending a demonstration or protest. Indian 
respondents also seem to be positively affected 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has given a detailed analysis of the relationship between the Internet and social 
media and political attitudes and behaviour. Overall, we find that Internet and social media use 
is mainly determined by age, education and race of respondent. Those who live in urban areas 
are also more likely to use the Internet and social media to source political news. The findings 
in the quantitative analysis allow us to answer RQ2 – Is there a measurable difference between 
Internet and social media users versus non-users in terms of their political attitudes and their 
behaviour? – with an indecisive ‘no’. While there are some significant correlations between 
using the Internet and social media to source political news and political attitudes and 
behaviour, they are not particularly strong.  
However, exploring relationships for different age and race groups appears to be a solution in 
terms of establishing whether online media has impacted different groups’ poltical attitudes 
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and behaviour. Indeed, we find some significant correlations for all groups, regardless of age 
and race. Interestingly, the 55+ age group seems to consistently show significant correlations, 
indicating that this cohort is affected most by online political news media. Indian and coloured 
respondents also show the strongest correlations compared to other race groups. It was 
expected that this would hold for white and Indian respondents, considering that these cohorts 
are the most likely to have access to the Internet, given the digital divide in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, the findings presented above allow us to answer RQ3 - Are there measurable 
differences between Internet and social media users versus non-users in terms of their political 
attitudes and behaviour based on age and race? - with yes, there are measurable differences. 
However, given the low penetration rate of the Internet in South Africa compared to more 
advanced democracies, these relationships are weak to moderate in strength. Future studies will 
have to be conducted to monitor the longitudinal effects of Internet and social media use for 
political news on South Africans.  
Furthermore, we do not know what causes these relationships and we also do not know the 
direction of such relationships. For example, does Internet and social media use increase the 
likelihood of people to be interested in public affairs or are those who are interested in public 
affairs more likely to read their political news online? The qualitative analysis in Chapter 5 will 
hopefully shed some more light on unexplored relationships between the Internet and politics.  
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Chapter 5: Qualitative Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The following chapter provides an overview of the focus group discussion that served as an 
additional source of data for the overall study. First, the reader is reminded of why focus groups 
are considered a suitable methodology to explore the research question, apart from the 
quantitative measure and the value of focus groups is briefly discussed. Thereafter, the focus 
group procedure is laid out, which involves the discussion procedure as well as the transcription 
process. The main section deals with the overall findings of the focus group discussion and is 
structured according to the most prominent themes that arose during the discussion as opposed 
to the discussion protocol. These themes are the use of social media and the Internet as a source 
of political information, social media, trust and perceptions of politicians, social media, 
democracy and selective exposure and finally social media and online hierarchies. Following 
this, the reader is provided with a summary of findings to provide an overview of the most 
dominant ideas and themes that arose during the focus group. Finally, a brief account of the 
researcher’s focus group experience is provided, containing positive experiences and 
difficulties and how they were overcome.  
5.2 Why Focus Groups? 
In chapter 3 we looked at the different kinds of mixed methods research, those being 
convergent, additional and sequential coverage. It was mentioned that this study makes use of 
a mix of additional and sequential coverage. It makes use of additional coverage because 
“different methods (are assigned) to different purposes” so that the project can “pursue a wider 
range of research goals”. The research goals in the quantitative section are to determine 
relationships between using the Internet and social media to source political news, and political 
attitudes and behaviour. The research goals of the qualitative section on the other hand, seek to 
determine what may cause these relationships. Sequential contributions use the “results of one 
method to enhance the effectiveness of another” (Morgan, 2014: 11). Applying this logic to the 
research study at hand, we use the results of the quantitative measures to formulate questions 
for focus group discussions. We need to know what exactly it is we need to ask participants if 
we wish to make any meaningful findings.   
It was mentioned earlier that previous research on the relationship between the Internet and 
political behaviour predominantly relies on quantitative measures that explore that what in the 
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relationships between predetermined variables. This limits researchers’ findings as they are 
confined to use strictly defined variables in surveys instead of exploring the possibility of the 
existence of other important variables. We hope to overcome this gap through the qualitative 
method employed in this research study that seeks to explore the how and the why. More 
specifically, how do young university students engage with political information online? What 
are their motivations to be politically engaged online? Why is the web more appealing to them 
than conventional news media?  
5.3 The value of Focus Groups 
Litosseliti (2003:1) defines focus groups as a “carefully planned discussion designed to obtain 
perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening environment”. Focus 
groups serve to explore specific topics and participants’ views, attitudes and experience relating 
to that topic through group interaction. Because they represent a more natural environment 
based on conversation flow and exchange, they offer some advantages over methods such as 
interviews and participant observation. Just like in real life, members of the group discussion 
are likely to influence and be influenced by others. Therefore, the emphasis of focus groups 
rests primarily on the interaction among individuals. What makes this so unique and valuable 
is that this might allow the researcher to “uncover new, open-ended pathways for discussion” 
through minimal intervention (Litosseliti, 2003:3,5).  
Most importantly, while focus groups should follow a set line of questions, they do allow for 
flexibility. This means that the moderator does not need to follow a strict questionnaire as is 
often the case in formal interviews but can deviate somewhat from the prescribed questions if 
an interesting topic should arise (Litosseliti, 2003:17). Therefore, the flexibility of focus groups 
allow researchers to elaborate on certain points that seem to be important while at the same 
time, consider other aspects that the researcher has previously not thought of. 
5.4 Focus Group Process 
5.4.1 Discussion Procedure 
The venue that was chosen to conduct the focus group in was the lecture room were 
participants’ honours classes take place. Therefore, they were familiar with their surroundings 
and possibly more relaxed and open. The room itself is nicely lit through the windows at the 
back and contained a long table where all participants found seating. The seating arrangement 
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turned out to be quite beneficial for the discussion because everyone could see each other by 
sitting around the table.  
Once everyone was seated, the research objectives were presented to all participants, their role 
in the study was explained and their anonymity in the final publication guaranteed55. 
Participants were also reminded not to disclose any information with outsiders that they would 
deem as hurtful to other participants. Furthermore, everyone present was asked to sign a 
consent form relating to the points mentioned above. Thereafter, few introductory exercises 
were performed such as asking participants to tell everyone a bit about themselves and their 
own research project. Due to the fact that participants attended the same class, they were all 
familiar with one another and therefore name tags were not necessary.  
Thereafter, the discussion was initiated by asking transition questions in order to get a feeling 
of everyone’s engagement with the Internet and social media. Once it was established that all 
participants have access to the Internet outside of university and that everyone has a social 
media account, the discussion continued to address the key aspects of the study. Throughout, 
all participants conducted themselves in a pleasant and respectful manner, were polite and let 
everyone finish speaking before they made their contributions. Although some respondents had 
to be asked to keep their answers short to avoid their domination of the discussion, no one had 
to be asked to leave, felt uncomfortable or left out of their own free will.  
5.4.2 Transcription 
The first step that needs to be taken in the analysis of focus group discussions is the 
transcription. During this process, video or tape recordings are replayed and each respondent’s 
contribution is written out in full. During this process, it is possible that the transcriber may 
have to pick up “incomplete sentences, half-finished thoughts, parts of words, odd phrases” 
and other features that come through face to face discussions (Stewart, Shamdasani & Rook, 
2007: 111). While it may be quite easy for someone listening to understand these incomplete 
phrases or thoughts, they can be difficult to follow once written out. Some editing might be 
required to fill gaps in the spoken word however, it is important that the essence of the 
respondents’ comments remain.  
                                                     
55 All names mentioned in this study are marked by an asterisk (*), indicating that the names were replaced by 
pseudonyms. As mentioned in chapter 3, all participants were asked to sign a consent form which also reassured 
them that their real names will not be used in the final interpretation of the research.  
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While transcripts reflect the content of the discussion, they may at times fail to convey the 
character of the discussion; that is the tone of respondents, nonverbal communication, and 
gestures that can significantly alter the entire message of a comment and therefore its 
interpretation. For this reason, the moderator may add further observational data to the 
transcript such as non-verbal cues that might give further insight to the interpretation of the 
message (Stewart, et al., 2007: 111).  
The transcription of the focus group discussion for this research also required some alterations 
and editing. This included grammar, incomplete sentences and odd wording. It should be noted 
that these alterations were simply made for the purpose of an improved reading experience and 
a high value was placed on ensuring that the meaning and essence of a comment did not go lost 
in the process of editing it.  
Due to the distinct dynamic of each focus group discussion, participants may find certain topics 
more appealing or more interesting than other topics. In some cases, a participant may bring 
up an entirely new point of view that the moderator wants to know more about and encourage 
people to elaborate on that view. For this reason, the moderator may wish to terminate some 
topics or expand others or even introduce completely new questions that fit the overall 
discussion (Stewart, et al., 2007: 113).  
This has been the case with this study’s focus groups as well. Although close attention was 
paid to follow the overall guiding questions, there were some variations to adapt to comments 
some participants made. In some cases, respondents were asked to elaborate on some of the 
points they have raised which encouraged other participants to add comments. Litosseliti 
(2003: 92) notes that throughout the analysis and transcription process, certain trends and 
patterns arise. While the researcher may ask specific questions, participants tend to fall back 
on previous comments or bring up reoccurring themes that are important to them. While the 
group discussion closely followed a given set of questions, one building upon another, the 
findings are mostly guided by general themes that arose during the discussion.  
5.5 Findings 
The questions that were asked during the discussion were based on the quantitative findings of 
this research. We saw that the most significant findings related to young people’s use of the 
Internet and social media to source political news. Therefore, we might want to find out what 
makes online news so appealing to young people. Furthermore, we found significant 
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correlations between going online and levels of trust and perceptions of corruption. Here, it 
seems like specifically the 18-24-years old cohort showed consistent correlations. Hence, we 
want to find out what it is about social media and the Internet that makes them trust politicians 
and institutions less. Additionally, there were some significant correlations relating the 
rejection of authoritarian regimes, so we might assume that this cohort supports democratic 
rule. As such, we look at what their opinions are relating to the beneficial (or detrimental) 
influence of the Internet and social media on democracy. In the same vein, some respondents 
brought up the issue of selective exposure, something we cannot measure through quantitative 
methods. It thus gives some useful insight to the content this cohort exposes itself online.  
5.5.1 Social Media and the Internet as a Source of Political News 
At the beginning of the discussion, all participants were asked where they primarily get their 
political news from and all participants agreed that their primary source is social media. While 
the Internet is used on occasion to verify information, participants did not admit to actively 
going on the Internet to search for political news. As Jemma* put it,  
“I think online is better. Because when things pop up you go ahead and read it. But in my free 
time I won’t go and turn on the radio.” 
Other participants also remarked that they prefer the Internet and social media to find political 
news because they feel less “controlled” and “politically aligned”. This has to do with the fact 
that participants believed that news that are covered in conventional sources need to undergo a 
screening process by government institutions which decides whether these news are 
appropriate for publication. Yet, participants seemed to be aware of the dangers that news 
articles pose online. Some pointed out that fake news is a real threat that one needs to watch 
out for and others claimed to make active attempts at debunking certain information that is 
shared online. On the other hand, some participants asserted that they used mobile news apps 
such as News24, Eyewitness News or BBC News. However, they also said that they mostly 
just looked at the first few headlines of notifications on their devices and only read articles that 
spark real interest. Therefore, a lot of important political information may go unnoticed to 
readers if the headlines do not speak to them.  Others mentioned the diversity of information 
online. Lucas* for example, finds that 
“… you cannot really control what you are hoping to learn. You know if you google something 
you can get straight to the point. If I want to know about a certain issue I’m not just going to sit 
and wait until it pops up on TV or the radio.”  
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Social media also seems to be a tool for participants to inform themselves about politicians and 
parties. Jemma* pointed out that it is much easier to go on someone’s Twitter account and read 
up on their policies, rather than spending too much time going on their website and reading 
their manifesto. Therefore, social media is used as a time-efficient, easy to navigate tool to 
source information. Chris* said that,   
“I personally don’t just go on google to find out something about someone; I tend to go on 
social media to get informed. For example, with political parties you can usually see 
immediately what they stand for. And as opposed to reading long manifestos on their websites, 
I can just build my own opinion at one glance at their social media account.” 
Most political parties and candidates who have a social media account inform their followers 
about what they stand for and what their ideals and objectives are. Therefore, it appears that 
participants prefer to use politically related social media accounts as a shortcut to get informed 
as opposed to reading long manifestos. Even though this might appear to be an effective and 
time-efficient method to get informed, there may be some negative implications associated 
with this.  
One of such implications is that simple Twitter posts for example, only allow a text to be 280 
characters long and therefore, posts are extremely simplified and often cannot bring across an 
entire message. Furthermore, most party social media accounts only provide a brief snapshot 
of what they stand for and what their agendas are and as a result, a lot of information about 
parties or incumbents may be lost or even misinterpreted by readers. Although party 
manifestos, constitutions or agendas can span several pages, they do not only provide a 
snapshot of those parties but often go into depth about how certain changes, policies or agendas 
are to be achieved, an integral part of what constitutes politics.  
This finding also supports the claim that voters are “cognitive misers” who search for 
“informational cues and mental shortcuts” in order to reach a voting decision (Gunther, Beck 
& Nisbet, 2019:1). In-so-doing, voters tend to pay, and are also more likely to be influenced 
more attention to negative information as opposed to positive information (see also Lau, 1982; 
Zaller, 1992; Redlawsk, 2004).  
5.5.2 Social Media, Trust, and Politicians 
A general reoccurring theme throughout the discussion was the relationship between social 
media and politicians’ image. What became quite clear was that participants placed high value 
on politicians’ integrity based on their social lives. When asked whether the Internet and social 
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media have made them more critical and distrusting of politicians, there was a general 
agreement among participants. Grace* found that there has always been distrust toward 
politicians in the past, however the rise of social media has amplified that distrust and now 
reassures her to “be right to distrust them”. Sarah* mentioned that even though an official might 
have done something wrong that could cloud her perception of him or her, she still believes 
that “the basic quality of honesty should be there” for her. When an incumbent has done 
“something wrong”, she believes that “their being honest about it instead of denying the 
obvious”, heightens her perception of them.   
Furthermore, integrity and honesty in politicians seemed to be a determining factor for 
respondents when it comes to supporting them and whether they would be seen as fit for office. 
James* pointed out that  
“If you are able to hurt the people closest to you, I don’t expect you to have compassion or 
empathy for the people as a whole. So, your character in your personal life shows me what you 
are capable of and your ability to look after the population. Because I don’t want someone that 
is vindictive. If they are going to be in power, they are going to have to be close to perfect if I 
am going to trust them at all.”  
There also seems to be some sense of immediacy when it comes to politicians and their 
performance. Although most participants agreed that most if not all politicians are corrupt and 
not trustworthy, there was some value placed on their competence and their ability to perform 
well in office. Olivia* for example, said that  
“In politics, we are never going to find anyone that is perfect, so we choose the better devil. So, 
I think it is based on who is going to give me what I need the quickest or who is nearer to 
bringing me closer to the goal that I want to achieve for my country and myself as well.”  
This indicates that there is a need for immediacy of achieving goals in order for participants to 
support incumbents. Whoever can bring desired change the fastest way is seen as a right fit for 
office. Others such as Mary* believed that people place too much value on politicians’ personal 
life than their ability to run the country.  
“Looking at a politician’s personal life seems to shape people’s opinions on him dramatically 
when he’s a cheater or a sexist. And to me that doesn’t mean that he is a bad politician. I mean, 
what does his personal life have to do with his job? I just think that people focus too much on 
these things instead of on what he is meant to do which is run the country.”   
Yet, despite social media’s ability to uncover cases of corruption and misbehaviour of 
politicians, Jane* felt like it has also empowered politicians and took away power from 
traditional, reputable news media. She said that,  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
“It’s interesting how it allows them to control the narrative. For example, when a news story 
breaks on a Thursday and the paper only comes out on a Sunday, they can tweak the information 
before you can even form an opinion before there is even news cover it.”  
Indeed, many politicians are often quick to resort to social media to make their stances known 
to the public. Political figures such as US President Donald Trump, EFF leader Julius Malema 
or ANC leader and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa are known to update their Twitter 
statuses on a regular basis to provide a direct link to the general population. However, this 
statement somewhat contradicts previous statements about conventional news being controlled 
and “politically aligned”. Statements made by politicians online are bound to be politically 
aligned and to follow an agenda of gaining more support. Therefore, it appears that participants 
seem to think that any form of news or political information they come across are in some way 
controlled and do not provide all necessary details. 
An interesting point raised by Jemma* was that the constant posting of information online and 
“all that noise” make her “not want to vote anymore”. Upon this, a probing question was asked, 
“do you believe that social media has the potential to dissuade you from voting?”. Most 
participants agreed and said that they though that it “has the potential for that”. Jemma* 
summarised it quite clearly,  
“You see all these political parties and politicians posting online, one flaming the other and 
saying how bad they all are. And at the same time, I just think to myself that none are better 
than the other. They are all corrupt and dishonest in one way or another. So, who am I going to 
vote for? I feel like sometimes there isn’t even a real choice.”  
Lucas* added to the aspect of social media and politics that,  
“It is not a one-way street. Of course, you have that aspect of increased level of sharing of ideas. 
But I think it is a tool that can inhibit a desire to be politically active due to the nature in which 
politics is discussed and conducted.”  
In this regard, we may find some support for the media malaise theory which states that 
coverage of politics as “horse-race” can lead to lower levels of trust and cynicism (Cappella & 
Jamieson, 1997; Robinson, 1976; Heywood, 2013:185). Indeed, participants did display low 
levels of trust and cynicism toward politicians and politics as a whole. This agreement 
highlights the quantitative findings of this study were particularly respondents aged 18-24-
years old had low levels of trust in politicians and institutions and believed that most of them 
are involved in corruption. It appears that regardless of the source which covers political news, 
respondents naturally hold negative attitudes toward incumbents and regular coverage on cases 
of corruption or even personal scandals reinforces their beliefs that politicians are not to be 
trusted.  
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5.5.3 Social Media, Democracy and Selective Exposure 
A central theme to the discussion was the relationship between social media and democracy. 
When asked whether participants believed that social media and the Internet have the potential 
to improve democracy, Emily* said,  
“I definitely think so. I think social media creates a space for people to have easy access to 
knowledge but also engage with it and form their own opinions. It creates a platform of 
accountability, for example if something starts to trend on Twitter and maybe that politician 
who is involved can be held accountable.” 
Some felt like the potential of social media is that it creates exposure and therefore increases 
involvement in other activities that relate to politics. For example, seeing a party’s agenda on 
their social media account provides them with immediate knowledge about that party which 
they can in turn use to inform and influence family and peers about voting choices.  
Yet, others believed that social media can give a “false representation of how politically 
involved someone is”. Because of the ease of sharing information on such platforms, there 
might be an overestimation of political involvement of users. James* finds that social media 
can be more polarising in some respects. He justifies this by claiming that,   
“(…) if we think about how algorithms dictate what we get to see and the opinions we see. So, 
you get a perception that everyone is kind of the same but due to these algorithms, we do not 
necessarily get to see many other aspects.” 
Indeed, the group discussions suggest that most participants are subject to selective exposure 
and online echo chambers. When asked whether they sometimes expose themselves to content 
online that does not reflect or complement their own beliefs and opinions, participants 
generally admitted to doing so. Sarah* mentioned that while she does find herself unfollowing 
people that do not share her own views, she knows that she is not exposing herself to different 
points of views.  
“I think the world is better when you just hear the news you want to hear. When I look at 
Facebook news that I don’t want to hear I get angry and I get frustrated, so I find myself deleting 
my Facebook friends that I don’t agree with. And now I think to myself don’t do it; you have 
to be exposed to it. And you see it on Twitter as well. Do I follow people I don’t agree with? 
No! And I think a lot of people feel the same way, especially when they are not taught to think 
critically.”  
On the other hand, some participants felt like there is no way around seeing content online that 
they do not support or do not agree with. Because they are connected to so many people, they 
are bound to be exposed to opinions that are not their own. Furthermore, participants also seem 
to follow politicians on Twitter not for the sake of support but rather amusement. One 
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participant admitted to following US President Trump because he “sounds like a little boy 
throwing a tantrum” which is sometimes “quite entertaining”. Hannah* said that when it comes 
to South African politics, she tries to follow all relevant parties not because she likes or supports 
them, but because she wants to see what they have to say. She added, 
“What I find in South Africa is that there are a lot of fear inducing pages that are really racist 
that create this conversation that South Africa has a genocide. Now I am weary of people who 
come into my space and like this stuff. For example, if I see someone that I feel neutral about 
post something that I do not agree with, my perception of that person tends to change 
completely, and I start to dislike them and unfollow them.”   
Therefore, there is reason to assume that participants tend to expose themselves to reinforcing 
social environments that agree with their point of views. Davis (2017: 280) explains that the 
reason for residing in echo chambers is because agreeing with someone else and have that 
person agree with us, is a satisfying experience and thereby prevents people from critically 
assessing the things they see online. As referred to in Chapter 2, this “groupthink” can 
eventually lead to a “sense of tribalism” and identity politics and therefore all “social 
reinforcement” works in favour of our already existing attitudes and beliefs (Davis, 2017: 149). 
Therefore, finding that most participants do not expose themselves to opposing viewpoints may 
have negative implications in the sense that identity and group politics might be strengthened 
by social media. Yet, we cannot make generalisations about the entire population based on 
these findings however, the global literature suggests that selective exposure is prevalent 
among most Internet and social media users.  
5.5.4 Social Media and Online Hierarchies 
The ending question “what is your most favourite and least favourite thing about social media” 
which was intended to conclude the topic, brought up a range of new avenues to explore. 
Initially, respondents only gave short ended questions such as “It’s endless”, “It’s fast and it 
allows me to stay informed and connected with my friends” and “I love the videos”. However, 
Sarah’s* comment sparked off a new conversation.  
“The fact that much of the internet is uncensored. If someone tweets something they have just 
witnessed, then I get that raw information instead of waiting for the filtered coverage by 
newspapers.”  
Upon this, several participants responded that it also depends on who provides that raw 
material. Lucas* said that  
“It really depends on who is posting updates on Twitter for example, because you see that some 
people really dominate the Twittesphere and have different agendas and intentions.” 
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When asked to elaborate, he continued that there are different factions on Twitter.  
“You have all these different kinds of Twitter sections. You get black Twitter, feminist Twitter, 
right Twitter, left Twitter, trans Twitter, music Twitter, or political Twitter. And each section 
has some sort of thought leaders that dictate what the new trend is that everyone should follow.” 
Thinking back to previous arguments in the literature which stated that online, the content 
creator and the content consumer “merge” in the absence of hierarchies (Yildiz, 2002), a 
probing question was asked. “So, would you say that there is some sort of hierarchy on social 
media where, whenever an online influencer ‘calls the shots’, everyone follows?”. This sparked 
overall agreement in the room with participants nodding, murmuring and responding with “yes, 
definitely”. James added*, 
“I think that is one of my least favourite things on social media. I mean everyone has different 
interests and ideas and beliefs so everyone has a different kind of attitude to certain things. But 
it feels like sometimes things are brought up that are not in your immediate interest and if you 
don’t jump on that bandwagon, you can be singled out. I mean it’s easier to point fingers at 
someone online than in person and it’s easier to start a fight or argument in the comment section. 
So, it can get really toxic really quickly if you don’t know how to distance yourself from certain 
topics that are sensitive.”  
It appears that some respondents are experiencing a kind of love-hate relationship with social 
media. On the one hand, social media allows for an immediate consumption of information, 
news and updates and on the other, there are certain trends that need to be followed online in 
order to maintain one’s status. Mark* added, “I think we have to make a distinction here based 
on who people are and what is an opinion. Because there is bigotry and then there is an 
opinion.” When asked to elaborate, he continued,  
“Well I really think it depends on who those so-called influencers are because some of them 
have valid opinions and others have somehow made it to the top of social media with millions 
of followers who are susceptible to any kind of news they see online. Doesn’t matter if it is 
backed by evidence or not. So, I think it is becoming increasingly important to maintain a 
critical approach to everything you see online because with the spread of fake news you can’t 
take anything at face value anymore.” 
This leads us to assume that some participants are weary of the content they see online and 
how they let it affect their values and attitudes. It is indeed a positive finding considering the 
spread of fake news online and hateful speech that is prevalent in chat rooms and comment 
sections. Yet, it must be kept in mind that this caution of online content might only be limited 
to educated individuals who have acquired critical thinking skills. The almost endless capacity 
of online information naturally takes on positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, the 
Internet facilitates the spread of information and allows its users to inform themselves on 
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important topics. On the other hand, there is a vast amount of hate speech and false information 
that seeks to create divisions within society and lead to conflict.  
5.6 Summary of findings 
The findings of the focus group discussion overall support and confirm the quantitative findings 
of this research study. Although no generalisations can be made concerning the entire 
population, we can draw some parallels.  
 Participants prefer to obtain their political news from social media. Some of them use 
the Internet to verify information that they come across on Twitter or Facebook, 
however they are more likely to resort to being informed on social networking sites.  
 Some participants make use of news apps, however only to the extent that they browse 
through the headlines and only read those articles that spark real interest.  
 The reason why online political news are preferred over conventional news sources is 
because the Internet allows them to search for any information about which they wish 
to find out more.  
 It appears that social media and online political news has made participants more 
critical and distrustful of politicians. They seem to believe that social media gives them 
a justification for being distrustful of them because incumbents are exposed more 
easily.  
 This also seems to transcend a personal level. If an incumbent is seen as unlikable or 
has a negative personal history, participants are less likely to support him or her. While 
some respondents agreed to this statement, others expressed that their personal life does 
not matter to them if they do their job right. However, this only seemed to be a minority. 
 The sheer amount online and the partial negative content relating to politicians and 
political parties seems to discourage some respondents from voting.  
 Participants generally believe that the Internet and social media have the potential to 
improve democracy by providing more information to the public but are also weary of 
the information they see online.  
 Participants seem to be subject to selective exposure, where they prefer to only expose 
themselves to information, ideas and beliefs that resonate with their own. The personal 
image of someone else also seems to be easily influenced by the way they conduct 
themselves online.  
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 Some respondents seem to have a kind of love-hate relationship online. On the one 
hand, they enjoy many aspects of social media and the Internet. On the other, they 
dislike the fact that some thought leaders dictate what is trending.  
5.7 The Focus Group Experience 
The perhaps most challenging aspect of the focus group discussion was the recruitment of 
participants. The initial aim of the study was to conduct at least three focus groups with 
Stellenbosch University students. However, this proved to be exceptionally difficult. The first 
obstacle was to find suitable gatekeepers such as heads of departments at the university that 
would pass on the information to students. Not all people that were contacted responded to 
emails and even personal visits did not turn out to be successful. Those who were contacted 
and did respond, indicated that they passed the relevant information on to students. Yet, none 
came forward to participate in the focus groups, not even given the possibility of winning a 
cash prize.  
The ones that did agree to participate, were political science and international relations honours 
students to whom I had direct contact and a personal relationship. The group discussion with 
these students was a pleasant experience. All participants were happy to engage in the 
discussion and appeared to be genuinely interested and motivated to make their contributions 
to the study. In some instances, I had to step in to make sure that everyone would get a turn to 
speak and share their experiences. All participants conducted themselves in a wonderfully 
respectful and considerate manner, letting others finish their sentences, raising their hands 
when they had a contribution to make and politely agreed or disagreed. In no instance did the 
discussion become negatively heated or hateful.  
To record the discussion, I used both a voice recorder and a camera recorder. However, the 
latter turned out to be somewhat unhelpful because it did not have enough storage space to 
record the entire discussion which lasted 1 hour and 15 minutes. For this reason, the voice 
recordings were used as a primary means of collecting data and turned out to be surprisingly 
simple to navigate. Voices were clear and it was easy to determine which participant made 
which contribution.  
Another challenging aspect concerning the focus group was to distance myself from the general 
discussion and to only function as an observer and convener and not as a participant. Having 
grown up in the age of social media, I could relate to many things that were said during the 
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discussion and in some instances, I felt the urge to also share my experiences and comments. 
This was also the case because some things that were said did not resonate with my own 
personal experience or feelings and I often felt like expressing my own thoughts on the topic. 
Yet, I constantly had to remind myself of my role during the discussion and refrain from 
making personal comments. Even though this was a difficult task to overcome, I decided to 
channel the urge to share my own thoughts through asking probing questions that would bring 
me closer to the content that I was truly interested in. I believe that in the end, I did manage to 
distance myself from the overall discussion and remain within my role as a convener.  
Overall, the focus group planning procedure and the actual discussion was a wonderful learning 
experience. I quickly came to realise that finding a gatekeeper was more difficult than 
anticipated and that distancing myself from the overall topic was a challenging task. However, 
I enjoyed the overall procedure and was pleasantly surprised by how students engaged with the 
topic at hand. In hindsight, I might have done things differently such as planning the focus 
groups more in advance to ensure that enough data can be captured. I would also have asked a 
more experienced convener to aid me in the discussion or to prepare me for what was lying 
ahead of me. However, in the end, the experience I have gained is irreplaceable.  
5.8 Conclusion 
The focus group discussion served to enrich the outcome of the overall study in several aspects. 
It gave some insight into why young people tend to prefer online political news over 
conventional news, the primary reason being that the content is not restricted, and participants 
can read up on anything that they wish to know more about. Furthermore, social media appears 
to have made participants more distrustful of politicians because it exposes political scandals 
more quickly and therefore adds to and enforces the reservoir of existing negative opinions 
about them. Furthermore, incumbents’ personal life seems to be of a high importance to 
participants, due to the belief that if someone does not treat those around him or her well, then 
they might not treat citizens well either. There is overall consensus that the Internet and social 
media have the potential to improve democracy and democratic outcomes through the spread 
of information. However, at the same time, participants appear to be prone to selective exposure 
which has the potential to enhance identity politics and alienation from different points of view, 
an aspect that can have a detrimental impact on democracy. Lastly, participants seem to have 
mixed views about social media. On the one hand, they enjoy the possibilities it offers and on 
the other, they dislike its polarising properties and the need to follow online influencers.  
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Future research needs to be conducted in order to find out more about aspects of trust, selective 
exposure and online hierarchies to determine the exact impact they might have on young 
people. However, it is believed that the discussion marked an important step in the South 
African context by providing researchers with a point of reference of relevant topics.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 of this research study begins by setting out the importance of news media in a fully 
functioning democracy and introduces the concept of Internet and social media as possible 
influencers on political attitudes, behaviour and outcomes. This influence, however, only holds 
when the Internet is expressly used to source political information, therefore the level of 
measurement of Internet and social media use is an important aspect to consider when trying 
to determine relationships. Possible risks associated with online consumption are briefly 
highlighted and the relevance of studying online influences on politics is explained. The 
research problem that guides this study is that alongside an increased access to the Internet, we 
see a shift in attitudes and political behaviour among South Africans. Although those shifts 
may be due to poor government performance, it is possible that the Internet and social media 
have had a role to play in those changes, given the global literature on the effects of the Internet 
on democracy.  
Furthermore, we set out our research questions that seek to determine which groups in South 
Africa predominantly use the Internet and social media, and whether there is a measurable 
relationship between online political news consumption and political attitudes and behaviour. 
In order to measure such relationship, two methodological approaches are introduced, those 
being a quantitative research approach my means of statistical analysis using SPSS, and a 
qualitative approach using focus group discussions with students from Stellenbosch University.  
Chapter 1 concludes by setting out the significance of the study based on the drawn-up 
hypotheses relating to the two research questions guiding the study. Each hypothesis is 
addressed, and implications discussed should they find support or rejection.   
6.2 Literature Review 
Chapter 2 is divided into several sections that seek to explain the connection between the 
Internet and political outcomes. It starts off by highlighting various examples that demonstrate 
how the Internet and social media have gained an increasing importance in political campaigns 
and how incumbents are increasingly using social media as a tool to create links to the public. 
Furthermore, the chapter looks at the link between political values and attitudes and the 
Internet. Several studies such as the ones by Stoycheff and Nisbet (2014) and the concept of 
‘window-opening’ facilitated through online content, Norris’ (2001) notion of the 
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overdominance of postmaterialists online, and Shawney’s (2017) “generation too much 
information”, are discussed.  This section also briefly addresses the media malaise theory and 
the virtuous circle theory and how they could potentially relate to the Internet, and highlights 
risks of selective exposure and echo chambers online.  
Chapter 2 also addresses the four dominating theses relating to the link between the Internet 
and political behaviour. These are the mobilisation, reinforcement, normalisation, and 
displacement thesis. The mobilisation thesis states that more time an individual spends online, 
searching for political information, the more likely that individual is to engage in offline forms 
of participation such as voting or signing petitions. The reinforcement thesis suggests that 
existing inequalities will only be reinforced through Internet use and that the divide between 
the haves and have nots will be exacerbated by the Internet. Furthermore, the normalisation 
thesis argues that radical change through increased Internet access is unlikely to happen as the 
Internet will eventually reflect a “politics as usual” scenario, where participation will be 
skewed towards more educated and wealthier users (Norris, Curtice, 2006). Lastly, the 
displacement thesis states that “time spent online could actually displace time formerly devoted 
to social and political purposes” (Hoffman, et al., 2017:1). This view holds that the more an 
individual spends time on the Internet or operating technological devices, the less likely he or 
she is to devote remaining leisure time to pursue civic activities. Of all four theses, the 
mobilisation seems to find the biggest support, however this only holds if the Internet is used 
to source political information.  
Furthermore, this chapter attempts to address the confusion relating to the dynamic between 
the Internet and individuals and suggests that because information does not flow unidirectional. 
Instead, the content consumers and content creators are likely to influence and be influenced 
by another, thereby forming a new dimension of socialisation.  
Lastly, some literature relating to the Internet and politics in South Africa is addressed. We 
find that the research done so far mainly focuses on qualitative approaches that examine 
individual uses of social media to mobilise people behind a common cause, such as the 
university hashtag movements. Yet, no studies have been conducted that focus on how the 
Internet and social media may shape political attitudes and behaviour of South Africans, which 
further justifies this study.  
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6.3 Methodology 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methodological foundation of the research study. It starts 
off with the quantitative analysis, highlighting the benefits and drawbacks of secondary data 
analysis as well as survey research. Thereafter, the chapter lists the variables that are used to 
measuring relationships between Internet and social media use to source political news 
(independent) and political attitudes and behaviour (dependent). It further describes which 
statistical tests will be used to measure relationships, those being Spearman’s rho at an ordinal 
by ordinal level and gamma at an ordinal by nominal level.   
Next, the chapter moves on to describe the qualitative analysis of the study in the form of focus 
groups. This section also lists several advantages and disadvantages of qualitative research, the 
discussion procedure of the focus groups and the questions that participants were asked. 
Finally, a brief account is provided of the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods 
and how the two can complement each other by compensating for each other’s shortcomings. 
Furthermore, the kind of method used to integrate both approaches is explained, which is a 
combination of additional and sequential coverage. The insights gained through the 
quantitative analysis serve as a foundation upon which focus group questions are formulated. 
In other words, statistical outcomes are used to formulate questions  
6.4 Quantitative Analysis 
The first part of the quantitative analysis set out to answer the first research question of this 
study which is “Which demographic groups predominantly use the Internet and social media 
to source political news?”. The results of the analysis show that the strongest relationships can 
be found for age, education, race and location, thereby allowing us to deduce that Internet and 
social media users tend to be younger, more educated and live in urban areas. The 
crosstabulation provided on page 102 shows that the race groups which use Internet and social 
media to source political news most frequently are white and Indian respondents. Coloured and 
black respondents use the mediums far less frequently by comparison. To answer the question 
in full; The demographic groups that predominantly use the Internet and social media to source 
political news are young, educated, white and Indian respondents who live in urban areas.  
The second part of the analysis sought to answer research question two which asks, “Is there a 
measurable difference between Internet and social media users versus non-users in terms of 
their political attitudes and their behaviour?”. We saw that the relationships between the 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
109 
 
dependent and independent variables were quite weak and, in many instances, non-existent, 
thereby suggesting that either Internet penetration in South Africa is simply not strong enough 
to exert any effects on the population and this research is conducted to early. Alternatively, it 
could mean that those South Africans that read their news online are not affected by the content. 
Or it could indicate that we are not measuring the relationship correctly. While the first two 
possibilities seemed quite plausible, given the relatively low Internet penetration in South 
Africa (mainly due to high costs and poverty that prevails in many parts of the country), we 
take the analysis a step further to determine whether differences between groups can be found.  
This step leads us to formulate the third research question, “Are there measurable differences 
between Internet and social media users versus non-users in terms of their political attitudes 
and behaviour based on age and race?”. In order to answer this question, we split age (recoded) 
and race into their separate categories and run correlations. The results show that there are clear 
differences in terms of the impact of the Internet and social media and political attitudes, values, 
and behaviour for each group in question. Although the correlations were certainly not strong 
or significant for each dependent variable in question, there were cases that suggest that using 
the Internet and social media for political news does have an impact on the dependent variables.  
The results indicate that significant correlations could be found especially for the 25-34, 35-44 
and 55+ age cohorts, and mostly Indian and coloured respondents, which indicates that online 
news media can have the potential to influence political values, attitudes and behaviour, albeit 
only specific groups of the population. Although a summary of findings was presented at the 
end of Chapter 4, it is worth pointing them out once more.  
When it comes to measures of emancipative values, we saw that online political news media 
seem to increase support for gender equality in terms of leadership among 18-24-year olds and 
the more they use online news media, the more 55+-year olds and Indian respondents tend to 
disagree that government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies. 
Furthermore, Indian respondents also believe that the media should have the right to publish 
any views without government control the more they read political news online. Overall, Indian 
respondents appear to be positively affected the most by Internet and social media use when it 
comes to emancipative values.  
When it comes to interest in public affairs and the discussing politics, the Internet and social 
media seem to have the potential to positively impact those attitudes mostly for those aged 25-
34, 35-44 and 55+ as well as for black, coloured and Indian respondents. Additionally, we find 
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that increased use of the Internet and social media seems to erode trust in politicians and 
increase perceptions of corruption among 18-24-year olds. This also holds for black 
respondents. Internet and social media use also negatively affects levels of trust for those aged 
55+ and it increases the likelihood of 25-34-year olds to believe that officials and institutions 
are involved in corruption  
The more time white respondents spend browsing the Internet and social media for political 
news, the more likely they are to believe that South Africa is a full democracy; yet the more 
time Indian respondents spend on the Internet, the less likely they are to believe that South 
Africa is a full democracy  
Internet and social media use increase the likelihood of 45-54- and 55+-year olds to reject one-
party rule. Yet, it also increases the likelihood of those aged 35-44, 45-54 and 55+ to approve 
of Apartheid. On the other hand, the more time Indian and coloured respondents spend on the 
Internet and social media, the more likely they are to disapprove of military rule and Apartheid, 
respectively 
 When it comes to measures of political behaviour, we also find a number of significant 
correlations. For example, Internet and social media use increase the likelihood of those aged 
25-34 and 35-44 to be a member of a religious group or voluntary association. This also holds 
for coloured and Indian respondents. They are also more likely to attend a community meeting 
and joining others to raise an issue 
Internet and social media use increase the likelihood of those age 55 and above to work for a 
candidate or party and it also increases the likelihood of those aged 45-54 and black, white and 
Indian respondents to vote and coloured respondents are more likely to contact an official or 
institution the more time they spend online. 
Furthermore, all race groups become more likely to either request government action, 
contacting the media or an official for help. This correlation is especially strong for Indian 
respondents relative to all other race groups. Internet and social media use also appears to 
positively affect 18-24-year olds in terms of contacting the media and officials; this also applies 
to those aged 55 and above in terms of contacting the media. Lastly, white respondents appear 
to be affected the most when it comes to Internet and social media use and their likelihood 
attending a demonstration or protest. Indian respondents also seem to be positively affected. 
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To answer the third research question, we can say that there are measurable differences between 
Internet and social media users versus non-users in terms of their political attitudes and 
behaviour based on age and race. This applies mostly to respondents aged 25-34, 35-44 and 
55+, however we also find some significant correlations for other age groups, albeit not as 
frequently. The strongest relationships we find for people from different race groups pertain to 
Indian, coloured, and white respondents. This comes as no surprise, given that Indian and white 
respondents tend to have the highest levels of education in South Africa and can be expected 
to spend more time online. Future research will have to determine why coloured respondents 
seem to be affected to such a degree by online news media, given their relatively low levels of 
use compared to Indian and white respondents.  
6.5 Qualitative Analysis 
The qualitative analysis follows a less strict structure compared to the quantitative analysis. 
Instead of providing the answers of each respondent according to the questions that were asked, 
they are instead structured according to themes of the discussion. The first theme of the 
discussion was Social Media and the Internet as a Source of Political News. Here, respondents 
indicated that social media and the Internet are preferred as a source of political news because 
they provide more ad hoc information that feels less controlled. Responses suggest that online 
news sources are preferred because they feel less controlled, compared to conventional news 
sources and because participants can access information at any given time.  
The second theme was Social Media, Trust and Politicians and looked at reasons why younger 
people might be so distrustful and cynical of politics. It appears that online information 
provides a justification of sorts for young people, which confirms their suspicion. This may be 
due to the frequency of scandalous news revolving around incumbents and therefore, we find 
evidence in support of the media malaise theory that states that coverage of politics as “horse-
race” can lead to lower levels of trust and cynicism (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Robinson, 
1976; Heywood, 2013:185). 
The third theme covered Social Media, Democracy and Selective Exposure. Although 
participants appeared to believe that online media has the potential to improve democracy by 
making relevant information more readily available, they were also weary of the spread of fake 
news. Furthermore, social media and ‘the coverage of politics as a horse-race’ lowers their 
likelihood or intention to vote during elections. This stands in combination with low levels of 
trust toward incumbents as respondents seem to feel like all politicians are not to be trusted and 
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therefore do not deserve their vote. Additionally, we find that some respondents are prone to 
echo chambers online, where they tend to expose themselves only to views and opinions that 
reflect their own. Although some participants were aware of the fact that they should be 
exposed to different points of views, they maintained that once they dislike someone or 
something, they withdraw their online support.  
The last theme that is covered in Chapter 5 looks at Social Media and Online Hierarchies. 
Contrary to the findings of Yildiz (2002:54) that online the content creator and the content 
consumer “merge” in the absence of hierarchies, our findings suggest that those hierarchies are 
not necessarily absent. Instead, respondents indicate that most of the content online is 
dominated by certain online influencers who dictate which trends to follow. Some respondents 
indicated a dislike toward these structures as failure to follow certain trends or disagreement 
with them may lead to social exclusion.  
6.6 The findings in comparative perspective and recommendations 
We find that despite the negative correlation between Internet and social media use and age, 
(where younger people are more likely to source their political news online than older 
respondents), young people are actually less likely to be influenced by Internet and social 
media. In turn, those aged 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and above show stronger, more 
significant correlations. This might indicate that young people already hold certain attitudes 
that are not brought about by increased Internet and social media use. Instead, these attitudes 
and values might be reinforced through online content.  
It might have been more beneficial to conduct additional focus groups with older generations 
to determine where the differences between the cohorts lie. This might have told us more about 
the attitudes and behaviour of the cohorts and how increased use of the Internet and social 
media to source political news influences those political attitudes and behaviour.  
One thing that we can say for certain is the fact that being online erodes trust of young people 
as both research approaches have found evidence to support this claim. Simultaneously, 
younger people are also more likely to believe that most officials and institutions are involved 
in cases of corruption. As such, the Internet and social media might negatively affect 
democracy in the long run through a gradual erosion of trust in incumbents of younger cohorts. 
Officials running for office might do well to determine what deems them trustworthy in the 
eyes of potential young voters if they wish to uphold higher levels of turnout.  
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Furthermore, more research should focus on certain online influencers and their followers. 
Previous statements by researchers such as Yildiz (2002) about the absence of hierarchies 
online will need to be reformulated. Although it might be true that there is no governing body 
online that establishes rules on how to behave online, there nevertheless appear to be certain 
personalities that set trends and standards for their followers. Who those influencers are and 
what their follower demographic looks like will have to be determined in order to gain a clear 
understanding of certain online groups and how their political attitudes and behaviour might 
differ. 
In hindsight, using the Afrobarometer survey to determine relationships might not have been 
the best choice as it is limited in is questionnaire in terms of Internet and social media use and 
attitudes and behaviour that resonate with that usage. Additionally, more focus groups with 
different demographic cohorts might be another beneficial approach because this allows us to 
gain a more in-depth understanding of certain attitudes and differences in those attitudes that 
cannot be measured through surveys alone. Yet, herein lies the value in academic research 
because it allows us to deduce which research approaches do and do not work.  
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Appendix A 
Independent variables  
12. How often do you get news from the following sources? 
 Everyday  A few 
times a 
week  
A few 
times a 
month  
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
Never Don’t 
Know  
A. Newspaper 4 3 2 1 0 9 
B. Television 4 3 2 1 0 9 
C. Newspapers  4 3 2 1 0 9 
D. Internet  4 3 2 1 0 9 
E. Social Media such as 
Facebook or Twitter  
4 3 2 1 0 9 
 
Dependent variables  
13. How interested would you say you are in public affairs?  
Very interested  3 
Somewhat interested 2 
Not very interested 1 
Not at all interested 0 
Don’t know 9 
 
14. When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss 
political matters  
Frequently 2 
Occasionally  1 
Never 0 
Don’t know 9 
 
16. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or 
statement 2.   
Statement 1: Government should be able 
to ban any organization that goes against 
its policies 
Statement 2: We should be able to join 
any organization, whether or not the 
government approves of it.  
Agree Very Strongly 
With Statement 1 
(1)  
Agree with 
Statement 1 (2) 
Agree Very Strongly 
With Statement 2 
(3)  
Agree with 
Statement 2 (4) 
Agree with Neither  5 
Don’t know  9 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
115 
 
17. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or 
statement 2.   
Statement 1: The media should have the 
right to publish any views and ideas 
without government control.  
Statement 2: The government should have 
the right to prevent the media from 
publishing things that it considers harmful 
to society  
Agree Very Strongly 
With Statement 1 
(1)  
Agree with 
Statement 1 (2) 
Agree Very Strongly 
With Statement 2 
(3)  
Agree with 
Statement 2 (4) 
Agree with Neither  5 
Don’t know  9 
 
18. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose statement 1 or 
statement 2.   
Statement 1: Men make better political 
leaders than women, and should be 
elected rather than women.  
Statement 2: Women should have the 
same chance of being elected to political 
office as men.  
Agree Very Strongly 
With Statement 1 
(1)  
Agree with 
Statement 1 (2) 
Agree Very Strongly 
With Statement 2 
(3)  
Agree with 
Statement 2 (4) 
Agree with Neither  5 
Don’t know  9 
 
19. For each group, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active 
member, an inactive member or not a member   
 Official 
leader  
Active 
Member  
Inactive 
Member  
Not a 
Member  
Don’t 
Know  
F. A religious group that meets outside 
of regular worship services 
3 2 1 0 9 
G. Some other voluntary association or 
community group 
3 2 1 0 9 
 
20. Here’s a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, 
please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things in the past year. 
If not, would you do this if you had the chance?    
 Often Several 
times 
Once or 
twice  
Would if 
had the 
chance  
Would 
never 
do this  
Don’t 
Know  
A. Attended a community 
meeting 
4 3 2 1 0 9 
B. Got together with others to 
raise an issue  
4 3 2 1 0 9 
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21. Understanding that some people were unable to vote in the most recent 
national election in May 2014, which of the following statements is true for 
you  
Recoded 
You were too young to vote  8 2 Did 
not vote You were not registered to vote  0 
You voted in the elections  1 1 Voted  
You decided not to vote  2 2 Did 
not vote  You could not find the polling station  3 
You were prevented from voting  4 
You did not have time to vote  5  
You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters’ 
register 
6 
Did not vote for some other reason  7 
Don’t know 9  
 
23. Thinking about the last national election in May 2014, did you:  
 No  Yes  Don’t know 
A. Attend a campaign rally  0 1 9 
B. Attend a meeting with a candidate or campaign staff 0 1 9 
C. Try to persuade others to vote for a certain presidential 
or legislative candidate or political party?  
0 1 9 
D. Work for a candidate or party?  0 1 9 
 
24. During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the 
following persons about some important problem or to give them your 
views? 
 
 Never  Only 
once 
A few 
times  
Often  Don’t 
Know  
Recoded into 
scale variable 
(don’t know 
excluded) 
A. A local government 
councillor  
0 1 2 3 9 
B. A Member of Parliament  0 1 2 3 9 
C. An official of a government 
agency  
0 1 2 3 9 
D. A political party official  0 1 2 3 9 
 
20. Here’s a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens when they are 
dissatisfied with government performance. For each of these, please tell me whether 
you, personally, have done any of these things in the past year. If not, would you do this 
if you had the chance?    
 Often Several 
times 
Once or 
twice  
Would if 
had the 
chance  
Would 
never 
do this  
Don’t 
Know  
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A. Joined others in your 
community to request 
action from government 
4 3 2 1 0 9 
B. Contacted the media, like 
calling a radio program or 
writing a letter to a 
newspaper 
4 3 2 1 0 9 
C. Contacted a government 
official to ask for help or 
make a complaint  
4 3 2 1 0 9 
D. Refused to pay a tax or fee 
to government 
4 3 2 1 0 9 
E. Participated in a 
demonstration or protest 
march 
4 3 2 1 0 9 
 
28. There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the 
following alternatives?     
 Strongly 
Disapprove 
 
Disapprove Neither 
Approve or 
Disapprove 
Approve Strongly 
Approve 
Don’t 
Know  
A. Only one 
political party is 
allowed to stand 
for election and 
hold office  
1 2 3 4 5 9 
B. The army comes 
in to govern the 
country  
1 2 3 4 5 9 
C. Elections and 
Parliament are 
abolished so 
that the 
President can 
decide 
everything  
1 2 3 4 5 9 
D. If the country 
returned to the 
old system we 
had under 
Apartheid 
1 2 3 4 5 9 
 
30. Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?   
STATEMENT 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government 3 
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STATEMENT 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be 
preferable  
2 
STATEMENT 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government 
we have 
1 
Don’t know 9 
 
41. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa? Are 
you:  
Very satisfied 4 
Fairly satisfied  3 
Not very satisfied  2 
Not at all satisfied  1 
South Africa is not a democracy  0 
Don’t know  9 
 
52. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say?  
 Not 
at 
all  
Just 
a 
little 
Somewhat A lot Don’t 
Know / 
Haven’t 
heard 
enough 
Computed 
into scale 
variable 
(don’t know 
excluded) 
A. The President 0 1 2 3 9 
B. Parliament 0 1 2 3 9 
E. Your Local Government 
Council  
0 1 2 3 9 
F. The ruling party 0 1 2 3 9 
 
53. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or 
haven’t you heard enough about them to say?   
 None  Some 
of 
them 
Most 
of 
them 
All of 
them 
Don’t 
Know / 
Haven’t 
heard 
enough Computed 
into scale 
variable 
(don’t know 
excluded) 
A. The President 0 1 2 3 9 
B. Members of 
Parliament 
0 1 2 3 9 
C. Government officials   0 1 2 3 9 
D. Local government 
councillors  
0 1 2 3 9 
E. Police  0 1 2 3 9 
F. Tax Officials  0 1 2 3 9 
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Demographic variables 
1. How old are you? [scale recoded into categories]  
18-24 1 
25-34 2 
35-44 3 
45-54 4 
55+ 5 
 
97. What is your highest level of education? 
No formal schooling  0 
Informal schooling only  1 
Some primary schooling  2 
Primary school completed  3 
Intermediate school or some secondary school / high school 4 
Secondary school / high school completed  5 
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university  6 
Some university 7 
University completed  8 
Post-graduate  9 
Don’t know 99 
 
102. Respondent’s gender  
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
102. Respondent’s race  
Black / African  1 
White / European  2 
Coloured / Mixed race  3 
South Asian / Indian  4 
Other  95 
 
URBRUR Location of respondent 
Urban  1 
Rural 2 
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Syntax  
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